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Good people, things cannot go right in England and never will, until goods are held in 
common and there are no more villeins and gentlefolk, but we are all one and the same 
[…]. They are clad in velvet and camlet lined with squirrel and ermine, while we go 
dressed in coarse cloth. They have the wines, the spices and the good bread: we have the 
rye, the husks and the straw, and we drink water. They have shelter and ease in their fine 
manors, and we have hardship and toil, the wind and the rain in the fields […]. [W]e want 
things to be changed, or else we will change them ourselves.* 
 
 
 
We must not lose sight of the fact that the greater challenge is to address the issues of 
injustice, inequality and unfairness, which clearly gave rise to the sorry situation we find 
ourselves in.** 
 
 

* The priest John Ball, observed preaching to the masses in public squares by Jean Froissart in 1318  
(Froissart and Brereton 1968: 211-212). 
** Editorial in the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation (Daily Nation 2008, January 10th) 
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ABSTRACT 
This thesis investigates the contention that socio-economic inequality has a detrimental effect 
on economic growth by breeding political instability. This hypothesised causal pattern has 
been subject to academic interest and empirical investigation for centuries, but still no 
agreement has been reached as to what the relationships really look like. During the 1990s the 
number of quantitative studies in this field increased dramatically, but they reached highly 
different conclusions. An important objective of this thesis is to explore what lies behind these 
inconsistent empirical findings.  
 
The hypothesised causal pattern is investigated both theoretically and empirically. Socio-
economic inequality is thought to produce political instability by breeding relative deprivation 
and discontent. Political instability is, in turn, likely to decrease growth because it constitutes 
a disincentive to invest. These hypotheses are explored through cross-national time-series 
regression analyses of a total of 188 countries from 1950 to 2004. This study is the first to use 
the recently updated and expanded dataset on socio-economic inequality provided by the UN-
based World Institute for Development Economics Research in May 2007. Previously, lack of 
comparable and extensive data on this variable has made it difficult to conduct large-scale 
quantitative analysis of the political and economic effects of socio-economic instability.  
 
The analytical results reveal the following: while instability does seem to affect growth 
negatively, the hypothesis that inequality breeds political unrest is not unanimously supported. 
This is because a series of robustness tests show that the results are dependent on how 
inequality and instability are measured. The use of the largest and most recently updated data 
source on socio-economic inequality has thus not contributed to clarifying whether inequality 
reduces economic growth by breeding political instability. It has contributed in a different 
way, however, because the analysis offers a possible explanation of why previous empirical 
studies have reported such diverging findings: namely that they measure socio-economic 
inequality and political instability in different ways. This is an important finding because it 
shows that the reliability of the conclusions of existing studies can be questioned.
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This thesis focuses on the political and economic consequences of socio-economic inequality 
and takes as its point of departure the contention that socio-economic inequality reduces the 
rate of economic development by breeding political instability. This alleged causal pattern has 
been subject to academic focus and empirical investigations since the times of the Ancient 
Greeks, and distributional issues and ideals of equality have played a central role in many of 
the world’s conflicts and revolutions. As stated by Lichbach (1989: 433), the three great 
ideologies of the last three centuries – nationalism, liberalism and socialism – all spawned 
revolutionary movements based on ideas of inequality, although different ones. For example, 
in the French Revolution people called for “Liberté, égalité, fraternité”; the propaganda of the 
Russian Revolution was “peace, land and bread”; a wartime slogan of the Chinese Revolution 
was “those who have much give much; those who have little give little”; and the rhetoric of 
the American Revolution was “all men are created equal”. Indeed, the timelessness and 
universality of this topic is demonstrated by the two opening citations. Several centuries and 
widely different contexts separate them, but their message remains the same. The first citation 
comes from one of Jean Froissart’s Chronicles, “The Peasants’ Revolt in England” (1318). It 
describes the great uprisings and rebellion of the peasantry and common people in England 
that came as a response, according to Froissart, to the stark contrast between serf and noble, 
peasant and gentry, in material well-being and freedom from subjection. The second citation 
is taken from an editorial of the Kenyan newspaper Daily Nation, commenting on the political 
violence that has marked Kenyan reality since the elections in December 2007.   
 
1.1 WHY STUDY THE EFFECTS OF SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
The aim of this thesis is to answer the following questions: 1) does socio-economic inequality 
reduce economic growth by increasing the level of political instability, and 2) why have 
previous studies on this subject reached such diverging conclusions? The theoretical basis on 
which to expect such a relationship is the following: First, a highly unequal, polarised 
distribution of resources produces relative deprivation and is thus an important source of 
discontent. In that way, inequality creates strong incentives to engage in violent protests, 
assassinations, coups or other politically destabilising activities. In turn, political instability 
discourages investment for at least two classes of reasons: first, it creates uncertainty 
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regarding the political and legal environment, and secondly, it disrupts market activities and 
labour relations, with a direct adverse effect on productivity (Perotti 1996a: 151). 
 
Several circumstances contribute to the persisting academic interest in this subject. First, as 
emphasised by the World Development Report from 2006, and clearly shown by Figure 1 
below, the differences in GDP per capita among Western countries and the rest of the world 
are still severe. According to the most recently available data from the World Bank, Western 
Europe and North America, comprising 13 percent of the world’s population, held 72 percent 
of the world’s total income in 2006 (World Development Indicators 2006). Being able to shed 
light on some of the underlying causes of this empirical pattern is a goal in itself. 
 
Figure 1: Regional differences in GDP per capita (the world)1 
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Secondly, as depicted by Figure 2, there is a negative correlation between income distribution, 
as measured by the Gini coefficient, and level of economic development (GDP per capita), 
something that calls for an explanation. This relationship was also shown by Easterly (2002), 
and according to him, “if this link is causal from inequality to income, it provides further 
strong evidence that there is a long-run negative association between growth (of which 
                                                 
1 The graph is constructed by the author on the basis of data from the World Development Indicators (World 
Bank 2006).  
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income is of course the cumulative sum) and inequality” (Easterly 2002: 2).2 This correlation 
has been an important motivation behind the 1990s increase in empirical studies of the 
relationship between economic inequality and growth (Galor and Zeira 1993: 35).  
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot of GDP per capita and Gini3  
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Thirdly, despite the long-lasting academic and public interest in the political and economic 
consequences of socio-economic inequality, still no agreement has been reached as to what 
these really are, and the divergence in both theoretical expectations and empirical findings has 
spurred a continued interest in the subject (MacCulloch 2005: 93). A major problem 
associated with applying a quantitative approach to studying socio-economic inequality has 
been the limited data availability and comparability: until the late 1990s most studies were 
cross-sectional analyses with very few observations. In 2007 the UN based World Institute for 
Development Economics Research published an updated and expanded version of their 
inequality dataset, which is the most comprehensive international data collection on within-
country economic inequality. This dataset enables cross-sectional time series analyses that 
include socio-economic inequality as a variable in a scale that has not previously been 
possible.4 The dataset is unique, not because of its large expansion, but also in its detailed 
                                                 
2 Easterly’s term income can be interpreted here as the level of GDP per capita. 
3 The scatterplot is produced by the author with the computer software SPSS version 14. The variable definitions 
of GINI and GDP and their data sources are specified in Appendix A. 
4 This dataset has existed since 1997, and was first updated in 2004.   
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information on each data point, making it possible to conduct a differentiated analysis that 
takes into account different ways of measuring inequality and contextual specifics that have 
made cross-sectional comparison difficult. The hope is that with this new data collection on 
economic inequality it will be possible to answer the research questions of this thesis, which 
have remained unsettled for so long.  
 
Finally, any conclusions regarding the effects of socio-economic inequality on political 
instability and growth can have significant implications for what kind of policies are 
recommended and implemented around the world to enhance growth (Muller and Seligson 
1987). If inequality is thought to be irrelevant, or as having a positive effect upon economic 
growth, then a government might not be compelled to introduce redistributive programs, and 
it can pursue a model of development that promotes rapid wealth accumulation at the expense 
of distributional equality. If, on the other hand, great inequality is expected to cause mass 
protest and collective violence, then a government should be compelled to implement policies 
that reduce the effective inequality in society. As Barro puts it, redistribution can have a 
positive effect upon growth if it reduces crimes and riots caused by income inequality, and 
even in a dictatorship, self-interested leaders would favour income-equalising transfers if the 
net effect were a decrease in the tendency for social unrest and political instability (Barro 
2000: 7). 
 
It is imperative to note that political stability not only is important in relation to growth, it is 
also a goal per se: “The question of why nations differ in rates of domestic political violence 
is of intrinsic interest because the maintenance of political stability is a goal of all 
governments” (Muller and Weede 1990: 624). Since the end of the Cold War most conflicts 
have been intra-national, non-ideological disputes that take place in less developed countries. 
Accounting for these conflicts has become a high-priority global task, and theories on the 
determinants of conflict can provide practical tools for preventive diplomacy (Auvinen 1997: 
177). It is also important to note that political instability and the incidence of political upsurge 
are sometimes a necessary means to achieve a “greater good”. When people protest it is 
sometimes a reaction to an inacceptable situation such as in the presence of a repressive, non-
democratic regime, and collective violence has thus sometimes led to the creation of new and 
more satisfying political communities (Gurr 1970: 3).   
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1.2 STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY  
The hypotheses subjected to analysis in this thesis are examined empirically through a cross-
section time-series multivariate regression analysis of a panel of 188 countries from 1950 to 
2004. The thesis is divided into three parts. The first part presents the theoretical expectations 
and previous empirical findings for the hypothesised relationship between socio-economic 
inequality and political instability, and subsequently for that between political instability and 
economic growth. The chapter starts out by explaining the reason why it is important to study 
what factors affect the rate and level of economic development. It then gives an overview of 
the different hypothesised paths of causation that link inequality to negative growth, with the 
objective of putting political instability as a path of causation into context. The hypothesis 
about the effects of inequality on political instability is far more complex and ambiguous both 
in its underlying theoretical assertions and related empirical findings than that of the 
economic effects of political instability. Therefore, the main focus of chapter 2 will be on the 
relationship between socio-economic inequality and political instability.  
 
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological issues related to the approach adopted here, and how 
the various variables are measured and operationalised. Both socio-economic inequality and 
political instability are measured in various ways, the purpose of which is to test the 
robustness of the analytical findings. The analytical model consists of a two-equation system: 
in the first equation political instability is the dependent variable, and in the second the 
dependent variable is economic growth. Because causality between economic growth and 
political instability is expected to run in both directions, tests for simultaneity are introduced 
to avoid biased results. When simultaneity is found to be present, a simultaneous equation 
model is employed. When it is not, a recursive model is used. The third part of the thesis, 
chapter 4, presents and discusses the results of the analyses, followed by a conclusion that 
sums up the thesis and its main findings.  
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2 WHAT WE THINK WE KNOW: THEORETICAL 
EXPECTATIONS  
 
The aim of this chapter is to show how the hypotheses of this thesis are justified. The chapter 
is organised in the following way: First, I elaborate on why the underlying goal of both this 
thesis and an infinite amount of academic work, ultimately is contributing to knowledge about 
what can increase or reduce the economic development of a country. Secondly, I present an 
overview of the literature on the relationship between inequality and growth, with the 
objective of putting the path of causation explored here in context. Thirdly, I discuss the ways 
in which inequality is expected to affect political instability. Finally, I elaborate on the 
relationship between instability and growth, and show how the former is thought to affect the 
latter. These sections are accompanied by examples of previous empirical findings, which, 
together with the insights offered by the various theoretical approaches, affect our 
expectations about causality between these variables. A summary of the theoretical 
discussions concludes the chapter.  
 
2.1 THE IMPORTANCE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The variable ultimately to be explained in this thesis is the rate of economic development, 
more specifically the growth rate of GDP per capita. An important objective of the thesis is 
thus to achieve knowledge about some of the factors that cause variation in levels of 
economic development across time and space. But what makes economic development so 
important that explaining its variation constitutes a basic purpose, not only of this thesis, but 
of an infinite amount of literature since the very beginning of academic enterprise? The scope 
of this thesis does not allow me to enter into the philosophical complexities associated with 
this fundamental question. Nevertheless, avoiding the discussion altogether is too simplistic 
because its conclusions are decisive for the very grounds on which research is justified. If 
economic development does not increase quality of life, then an important reason for 
explaining its variation disappears. Most studies concerned with economic development treat 
it as a given good. However, it is being questioned whether, and when, material well-being 
increase actual well-being and personal happiness. For example, several studies have shown 
that the societal upheavals, extensive demographic changes, and environmental degradation 
often associated with rapid economic development can create more problems than 
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improvements to the lives of those affected (Kenny 2005: 204), and others demonstrate that in 
some cases the fruits of economic growth are so unevenly distributed that the well-being of 
the poor majority does not improve (Easterly 1999: 240; Todaro 1997: 15).  
 
On the other hand, few would disagree that in a modern world economic well-being is 
strongly associated with such basic aspects of human life as survival, comfort, and ultimately, 
self-realisation. With widespread misery, poverty and unfulfilled material needs as a historical 
– and in many places, current – backdrop, the pursuit of economic growth has naturally been 
central to human life. But are the marginal returns of continued development constant, or are 
there limits beyond which further growth in material well-being does not produce more actual 
well-being? Studies of the relationship between subjective and objective measures of well-
being commonly find that the level of economic well-being is associated with happiness only 
up to a certain point (Kenny 2005; Seghieri et al. 2006). Therefore, even though both 
developed and developing countries are included in this analysis, I do not contend that 
economic growth is equally important independently of its starting point. Rather, there are 
obvious difficulties related to determining at what level of development to draw a line, if such 
exists, above which further development does not generate increased well-being. Such an 
evaluation would be highly subjective. This, added to methodological considerations, such as 
the advantage of having a large dataset, commends me to abstain from discriminating among 
different levels of development. The implications of this choice are further discussed in 
relation to the analysis in chapter 4 (see section 4.2.5).  
 
The common practice of equating economic development with the level of GDP per capita is 
criticised for missing important aspects of economic development such as measures of life 
expectancy, literacy rates, political liberties and legal justice, poverty rates, occupational 
patterns, and similar demographic characteristics. But increases in GDP per capita have been 
shown to affect these aspects of development positively. Indeed, a range of studies have found 
that quality-of-life indicators generally are higher in richer countries (e.g. Barro 1996; Mauro 
1995; Pritchett and Summers 1996) – stated in Huntington’s terms: “all good things go 
together” (Huntington 1968, cited in Easterly 1999: 240). The correlation between these 
indicators and level of GDP per capita provides the use of the latter as a measure of economic 
development with validity, and it indicates that, although growth processes might produce 
unwanted effects, higher levels of GDP per capita in general is associated with improved life 
conditions. In addition, data on GDP per capita is far more easily attainable for a wide range 
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of countries and years than alternative measures such as those mentioned above (this will be 
discussed further in chapter 3), and using the growth rate of GDP ensures comparability with 
most of the existing studies on the subject. Therefore, in line with most studies on economic 
growth, I make the basic assertion that economic development is a good – in general 
facilitating the improvement of conditions of human life, independently of context. The crude 
simplification of complex matters that this necessarily entails, and the important caveats of 
the abovementioned literature, will be taken into account in the discussion of the analytical 
results presented in chapter 4.  
 
2.2 SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH:    
DIFFERENT PATHS OF CAUSATION 
 
There is no universally agreed-upon answer to how socio-economic inequality within a 
population of a social unit should be defined. Theoretically, it can be said to refer to the 
degree to which the economic abilities of the rich are greater than those of the poor. For more 
practical ends, it can be defined as the number of people living in either extreme poverty or 
affluence relative to the total population.5 For centuries economic inequality has been an 
important subject of analysis. One has studied both the causes and effects of inequality from 
different perspectives: economic, political, sociological, psychological and philosophical 
(Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002: 1477). However, modern macroeconomic thought and the 
theoretical study of the relationship between economic inequality and economic development 
have gone through many different phases (Galor and Zeira 1993), and as an explanatory factor 
of economic growth, the distribution of income “has been very much out in the cold” 
(Atkinson 1997: 297). Only at the end of the last century economic inequality started 
reappearing in economic and political studies, and during the 1990s it received renewed 
theoretical interest and empirical attention. While during the 1950s and 1960s the main focus 
tended to be on the determinants of inequality, inspired by the influential work by Kuznets,6 
inequality was now re-established as one of the main factors in explaining economic growth 
(Atkinson 1997).  
 
                                                 
5 In the methodological discussion in the next chapter I will elaborate further on how inequality is conceptualised 
and measured in this analysis. 
6 Simon Kuznets: “Economic Growth and Income Inequality” (1955). 
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Several so-called growth puzzles – typically, when two quite similar countries display very 
different growth records – have partly spurred the renewed focus on socio-economic 
inequality. A common example of such a growth puzzle is described by Lucas in his article 
“Making a Miracle” (1993). In the early 1960s South Korea and the Philippines were similar 
with regard to all major economic aggregates: GDP per capita, investment per capita, average 
saving rates, population, urbanisation, and primary and secondary school enrolment rates. But 
over the following 30 year period fast growth in South Korea resulted in a fivefold increase of 
the output level, while that of the Philippines barely doubled. In an attempt to explain this 
puzzle, Benabou (1996: 11-12) and Aghion, Caroli and Garcia-Peñalosa (1999: 1615-1616) 
point to the fact that the two countries were actually very different on one dimension, namely, 
the degree of socio-economic inequality. For example, the Gini index for the Philippines was 
18 percentage points higher than for South Korea, and the ratio of the income share of the 
20% richest compared to that of the bottom 20%, or even to the bottom 40%, was about twice 
as large in the Philippines, and similar disparities characterised land ownership. 
 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom that socio-economic inequality is good for growth,7 the 
vast majority of the studies pertaining to the so-called “new growth wave” of the 1990s8 thus 
claim to show that the relationship is actually negative. In his detailed overview of the 
literature in the mid-1990s, Benabou (1996: 13) concludes: “These regressions, run over a 
variety of data sets and periods with many different measures of income distribution, deliver a 
consistent message: initial inequality is detrimental to long-run growth”. This contention, as 
we shall see, was not completely warranted at the time, and has been both confirmed and 
challenged since (Nel 2003). For example, Tanninen (1999: 1115) found “a clear negative 
reduced-form relationship between several “predetermined” income inequality measures and 
the average long-run per-capita-growth rate”. Similarly, Clarke’s (1995: 422) finding is that 
inequality is directly and negatively correlated with growth, and that, although substantially 
fairly small, this relationship is statistically significant. Forbes (2000), on the other hand, 
claims to show through her analysis that inequality is actually positively related to growth. 
While an enormous literature investigates the effect of inequality on growth, less attention has 
                                                 
7 This assumption has been made based on the expectation that a concentration of assets will enable large-scale 
investments necessary for economic development (see section 2.2.1). 
8 This term refers to the renewed academic interest in examining the determinants of economic growth, 
especially in such factors that are not strictly economic but rather political and social, largely due to the fact that 
the stark differences in levels of development between poor and rich states seemed to persist (Aghion et al. 1999; 
Castello and Domenech 2002; Fielding 2003b). 
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been given to exploring the specific determinants through which inequality affects growth 
(Bandyopadhyay and Basu 2005: 1273). Reduced form analyses9 such as those above-
mentioned are not very enlightening in this regard. In fact, and as pointed out by Barro (2000: 
8), a problem is that the different theories on the relationship between inequality and growth 
tend to have off-setting effects and that the net effect of inequality on investment and growth 
therefore are ambiguous. It is therefore much more useful to look at that part of the literature 
where several different paths of causation have been explored either directly or indirectly. The 
main ones are the savings rate, redistributive policies, credit market constraints, rent seeking 
and political instability. These are depicted in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Overview of hypothesised causal links between socio-economic inequality and growth 
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While the literature focusing on the savings rate hypothesise a positive effect of inequality on 
growth, the other four mechanisms imply a negative effect of inequality on growth (Castello 
and Domenech 2002: 187). Table 1 below gives an overview of the main existing studies on 
the effect of socio-economic inequality on economic growth, the paths of causation they have 
explored and the effect that they have reported. Before moving on to the path of causation 
hypothesised in this thesis, namely that of political instability, I will briefly present the 
alternative linkages.  
                                                 
9 Reduced-form analyses investigate the direct effect of socio-economic inequality on growth and do not specify 
or analyse how the former is supposed to affect growth. They skip a causal step, one could say.  
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Table 1: Recent quantitative studies on the effect of socio-economic inequality on growth10 
Study Presented effect Path of causation 
Hardy (1979) No relationship Political instability 
Venieris and Gupta (1986) Negative Savings rate and political instability 
Cukierman et al. (1992) Negative Political economy 
Bertola (1993) Positive Savings rate/ political economy 
Galor and Zeira (1993) Negative Credit market constraints (H.D.) 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994) Negative  Political economy 
Persson and Tabellini (1994) Negative Political economy 
Birdsall et al. (1995) Negative Credit market constraints 
Clarke (1995) Negative Not specified/ reduced form 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) Negative Political instability 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) Negative Political economy/ political instability 
Perotti (1996) Negative Political instability/ credit m. constraints 
Torstensson (1996) No clear relationship Political economy 
Knack and Keefer (1997, 2002) Negative Rent-seeking 
Deininger and Squire (1998) Negative Credit market constraints (H.D.) 
Li and Zou (1998) Positive Political economy 
Temple (1998) Negative Not specified/ reduced form 
Aghion et al. (1999) Negative  Credit market constraints 
Tanninen (1999) Negative Not specified/ reduced form 
Barro (2000) No clear relationship/ 
Inverted U-curve 
Not specified/ reduced form 
Chang and Ram (2000) Negative Credit market constraints (H.D.) 
Forbes (2000) Positive Savings rate/ not specified 
Sylwester (2000) Negative  Political economy 
Easterly (2001) Negative Reduced form (rent-seeking) 
Landa and Kapstein (2001) Negative Political economy 
Castelló and Domenéch (2002) Negative Credit market constraints (H.D.) 
Easterly (2002) Negative Rent-seeking/ credit market constraints 
Panizza (2002) Negative (weak, not robust) Not specified/ reduced form 
Banerjee and Duflo (2003) Inverted U-curve Not specified/ reduced form 
Nel (2003) Negative  Risk perceptions of investors 
Odedokun and Round (2004) Negative Political instability; credit market 
constraints (H.D.) and the fertility rate 
Bandyophyay and Basu (2005) Positive/negative* Not specified/ reduced form 
Knowles (2005) Negative for developing 
countries 
Not specified/ reduced form 
Frazer (2006) No clear relationship/ 
country specific 
Not specified/ reduced form 
García-Peñalosa and Turnovsky 
(2006)  
Positive Not specified/ reduced form 
* Positive effect in developed countries, negative in developing countries 
 
2.2.1 THE SAVINGS RATE 
Most of the literature that studied the economic effects of inequality during the 1950s and 
1960s, focused on its effect on saving. It was claimed by neo-classical economic theorists 
that individual savings rates rise with the level of income. That is, the marginal propensity to 
save is higher for the rich than the poor. Because a high level of investments is a prerequisite 
of rapid growth, then transfers from rich to poor reduce capital accumulation and investment, 
                                                 
10 The table is constructed by the author for the purpose of this thesis and based on a review of the literature in 
the field.  
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and hence growth (Barro 2000: 8; Chang and Ram 2000: 788; Adelmann and Robinson, in 
Chenery and Srinivasan 1989: 951; Clarke 1995: 404) – a line of reasoning that lends 
legitimacy to refuting redistribution of wealth from the rich to the poor in a society (Kaldor 
1978, in Birdsall et al. 1995). This conventional wisdom has been challenged from several 
theoretical stands during the course of the last decades. For example, Venieris and Gupta 
(1986) rejected the classical approach by claiming to have demonstrated that the bulk of 
savings is in fact produced by the middle income class and not the upper class. Others 
maintain that consumption is more important for growth than savings. This is in part what 
has led Landes (1998: 217-221) to conclude that an ideal society for development and growth 
would be one with a large middle class, i.e., a relatively equal distribution of economic 
wealth. Even though some have maintained the classical argument and found empirical 
support for it, most prominently Bertola (1993) and Forbes (2000), the vast majority of 
empirical studies have hypothesised a trade-off between inequality and growth.  
 
2.2.2 REDISTRIBUTIVE POLICIES 
One of the most studied paths of causation linking inequality to growth is that of political 
demands for redistributions (Temple 1998: 318). During the 1990s several path-breaking 
studies took as their theoretical approach, and found empirical evidence for, that skewed 
income distribution encourages higher taxes and redistributive policies, and in that way 
reduces growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Benhabib and Rustichini 1996; Cukierman et al. 
1992; Persson and Tabellini 1994). The logic of this approach is the following: If the mean 
income in an economy exceeds the median income, then a system of majority voting tends to 
favour redistribution of resources from rich to poor.11 These transfer payments, such as taxes, 
distort economic decisions and thus lower growth (Barro 2000: 6). The political economy 
approach has been criticised on theoretical grounds, most notably by Dagdeviren et al. (2001) 
who argue that it is difficult to understand how the median voter (and those below) in 
developing countries can effectively overcome the powerful differential that gave rise to 
inequality in the first place, and force through redistributive policies (cited in Nel 2003: 625). 
Indeed, empirical evidence has been found that inequality can actually lead to lower income 
taxation and thus higher growth (Li and Zou 1998). More generally, the political economy 
approach has been criticised by several authors that have found evidence that reject the 
                                                 
11 According to Acemoglu and Robinson (2000: 1191-1193), the democratising reforms in Britain, France, 
Germany and Sweden that took place during the nineteenth century led to a fall in inequality due to subsequent 
tax reforms that redistributed wealth to the poor. 
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median voter hypothesis. E.g., as pointed out by Deininger and Squire (1998) it is logically 
derived from the so-called median-voter theorem that tax rates are democratically determined, 
and that one would not observe the relationship in non-democratic settings. By splitting their 
dataset into democratic and authoritarian regimes, it is shown that this assertion does not hold, 
and that democratic voting does not appear to be the root of the inequality-growth link (Clarke 
1995; Knack and Keefer 1997; Levine and Renelt 1992).12   
 
2.2.3 CREDIT MARKET CONSTRAINTS 
Credit constraints and market imperfections constitute a path through which inequality can 
reduce growth. Investment in human and physical capital constitutes both a source of growth 
at the country level and an important way out of poverty for individuals and families. 
Especially, the accumulation of human capital, as measured by the educational attainment of 
the population, has consistently emerged as an important cause of economic growth and 
development (Birdsall et al. 1995: 483; Castello and Domenech 2002). As large segments of 
the population in poor countries do not possess initial wealth, investment has to be financed 
through credit. This is not unproblematic, however, because of constraints in the credit 
market. Credit market imperfections arise as the interest rate for individual borrowers is 
higher than that for lenders. This is due to the lenders’ lack of information about the 
borrowers, which implies that there are costs connected to acquiring such information and 
preventing default (Galor and Zeira 1993: 39). Many poor people can thus not afford to 
borrow, and they often lack collateral. The moral hazard associated with lending increases as 
the borrowing amount increases, because the incentive to default rises at higher borrowing 
levels, and hence tracking costs rise. Consequently, as education represent high initial costs 
which only pays off in the long run, limitations in the access to credit makes poor households 
forego human-capital investments, which would offer relatively high rates of return (Barro 
2000: 6). Thus, greater inequality increases the credit restrained share of the population and 
in this way affects growth negatively (Aghion et al. 1999; Deininger and Squire 1998; Galor 
and Zeira 1993). On the aggregate level, countries with high inequality thus invest less in 
human capital and are less able to benefit from technological innovations, resulting in that 
they grow more slowly and remain poor (Galor and Zeira 1993).  
 
                                                 
12 From a different point of view, Milanovic (2000) finds evidence that redistribution is higher in more unequal 
societies, but still rejects the median voter hypothesis because his analysis reveals that the middle class 
(including the median voter) does not benefit from this redistribution. 
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2.2.4 RENT-SEEKING 
According to Hall and Jones (1999, in Easterly 2002: 6) institutions can have both a 
productive and a so-called predatory equilibrium. In the predatory equilibrium, resources are 
diverted towards seeking to seize others’ assets or protecting one’s own instead of spending 
resources on asset creation. Many authors have pointed out that a higher gap between rich and 
poor would tend to raise the returns to predation relative to production. As Barro (2000: 7) 
puts it, the participation in activities such as collective violence and crime represents a direct 
waste of resources because the time and energy of these participants are not devoted to 
productive efforts. Moreover, the threats to property rights deter investment. Through these 
mechanisms, more inequality tend to reduce the productivity of an economy (Alesina and 
Perotti 1996: 1214). A related approach is the one that focuses on the effect of social 
polarisation on growth. Here it is hypothesised that societies that are polarised with respect to 
income, ethnicity, religion, and/ or other dimensions, exhibit lower growth rates than un-
polarised societies. This is because polarisation reduces social trust and increases possible 
gains from predatory actions by chief executives, which in turn affect growth rates 
detrimentally (Easterly and Levine 1997; Keefer and Knack 2002; Knack and Keefer 1997; 
Svensson 1998; Woo 2003; 2005).13 Thus, polarised societies, e.g. in terms of socio-economic 
inequality, will tend to have higher levels of rent-seeking and hence lower economic growth.14 
 
2.2.5 POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
All of the above-mentioned ways in which inequality can affect economic growth have been 
dealt with in a wide array of studies. The path of causation that will be in focus in this thesis, 
however, is one that has also received a large amount of attention both theoretically and 
empirically, namely, political instability. When comparing different paths of causation, Perotti 
(1996a) found that the mechanism linking inequality to growth that received the strongest 
result from empirical investigation was that of political instability. Illustrating this path of 
causation, Stewart and O’Sullivan (1998: 28) argue that establishing an economic and social 
system which spread the fruits of progress widely and to all significant regions/ ethnicities/ 
religious groups, was central in mitigating conflict in Uganda, Sri Lanka and Kenya. 
                                                 
13 During recent years, substantial empirical evidence has been found that support the notion that social trust is 
an important factor for economic development (e.g., Zak and Knack 2001). 
14 The approach is related to the hypothesis that political instability reduces the time-horizon of politicians in 
power, making it more likely that they will engage in short-term policies and rent-seeking at the expense of 
macroeconomic stability and long-term development policies (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 1206; Woo 2003: 394). 
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Similarly, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) argue that many Western countries democratised 
during the 19th century as a response to the threat of revolution, which constituted a political 
and economic menace to the elites’ position. This threat had been intensified by increasing 
socio-economic inequality in the population and redistributive demands. Partly induced by 
industrialisation, large and pronounced differences in the standards of living between the 
elites and the people created political unrest and made revolution more attractive to the 
distributional losers.  
 
Such observations have led many to argue that “[…] redistribution of income must be ranked 
as one of the more meaningful reforms that a modernizing government can undertake in the 
interest of achieving political stability” (Muller and Seligson 1987: 444). Formulated in a 
synthesised way, the idea is that political instability, produced by stark socio-economic 
inequalities, creates an environment unfriendly to both savings and investment that, in turn, 
lowers growth rates (Landa and Kapstein 2001: 282). Important contributions in fields such as 
psychology, sociology and political science form the theoretical basis for the expectations we 
have about the relationship between socio-economic inequality and political instability, and 
the effects of political instability on economic growth has long been an important research 
field in economic theory and political economy. In what follows I will present the theoretical 
foundations for the expected causal relationships between inequality and political instability, 
and between the latter and economic growth, and give examples of central empirical findings. 
  
2.3 THE EFFECT OF INEQUALITY ON POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
What do we mean by political instability? As stated by Perotti (1996b: 80), the concept of 
political instability is rather nebulous and does not have an immediately obvious and objective 
counterpart. Consequently, empirical studies display a wide range of different 
operationalisations. As stressed by Russett (1964), it is therefore necessary to clarify what is 
meant by political instability. According to Alesina and Perotti (1996), political instability can 
be viewed in two ways: 1) as executive instability such as the propensity to observe 
government changes, or other kinds of  regime-related political instability such as coups 
d’état, purges and governmental and constitutional crises; or 2) as social unrest and political 
violence, that is, civil society-induced manifestations of political instability. Many studies 
focus on either the relationship between socio-economic inequality and political instability or 
on the relationship between the latter and economic growth. Studies of the first type focus 
 15
primarily on political instability induced by civil society, due to the fact that what is analysed 
is how individuals respond to socio-economic inequality. Studies focusing on the effect of 
political instability on economic growth often focus in addition to regime-related political 
instability. This is because the channel through which political instability is thought to affect 
growth is primarily investment. Thus, what is relevant in these studies is the kind of 
instability that affects investment, which not necessarily involve violent acts – or even civil 
society at all.15 In this thesis, political instability enters into the hypothesis as a mediating link 
between socio-economic inequality and economic growth. Hence, regime-related political 
instability is irrelevant in this setting as it is a kind of instability that inequality is not likely to 
affect. Therefore, political instability is defined here as collective unrest that arises from civil 
society and that has political objects as its targets. Given that such unrest often involves 
violent action, and in accordance with the literature on the subject, the terms political unrest, 
political violence and political instability will be used interchangeably in what follows. 
 
There are of course many potential sources of conflict and political instability in a nation, 
such as ethnic, religious and regional disputes, discrimination and lack of political democracy. 
Nevertheless, the principal political contest and debate in a nation often involve a polarisation 
of social groups around distributional issues (Lichbach 1989: 432), and the above-mentioned 
sources of conflict often become precarious only when followed by such polarisation. 
Revolution was defined by Marx as a class struggle, and by Pareto as a circulation of elites, 
both placing the role of economic inequality at the centre of the field. As stated by Sen (1973: 
1): “The relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one”. Many would argue 
that the general issue of inequality has been involved in all major episodes of conflict. For 
example, Verba and Orren state that “[t]he demand for equality has lain at the epicentre of the 
major upheavals that have erupted on the American political scene: the Revolution, the 
Jacksonian era, the Civil War and Reconstruction, the Populist-Progressive period, the New 
Deal and the tumultuous 1960’s and 1970’s” (Verba and Orren 1985: 21, cited in Lichbach 
1989: 433). 
 
A remarkably diverse literature, ancient and modern, ideological and theoretical, has 
coalesced on the assertion that political violence is a function of economic inequality 
                                                 
15 Elite struggles for power and alternations in office in a political setting where basic rules are lacking and 
unpredictability prevails can produce uncertainty around property rights and economic policies, and thus 
disincentives for investment. 
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(Sigelman and Simpson 1977: 105). Indeed, income distribution was a subject of central 
importance to the classical economists. Aristotle (cited in Linehan 1980: 193) identified 
inequality as the “universal and chief cause” of instability: “Inferiors revolt in order that they 
may be equal, and equals that they may be superior”. He asserted further that “where the 
middle class is large, there are least likely to be factions and dissension”. Centuries later, in 
The Federalist No. 10, Madison (1787-1788) described inequality in the distribution of 
property as the “most common and durable” source of political faction (Easterly 2001: 317). 
Later still, Engels argued that political violence occurs when political structures are not 
synchronised with socio-economic conditions (Sigelman and Simpson 1977: 106). These 
contentions have remained central, and economic inequality is still regarded as a crucial factor 
leading to social conflict (Horowitz 2000; Schock 1996; Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002). 
This is forcefully expressed by Hibbs (1973: 196-198), who contends that all major cross-
national quantitative studies of dissent that do not include economic inequality as an 
independent variable, must acknowledge specification error. 
 
Are these seemingly strong and uniform theoretical expectations supported empirically? 
Many studies do find that inequality is associated with higher political instability (see Table 
2). However, the finding has not remained unchallenged, and the expected strong and positive 
relationship between inequality and political dissent sometimes conflicts with the data 
(Lichbach 1989: 432). As Midlarsky (1988: 491) states: “[…] rarely is there a robust 
relationship discovered between the two variables. Equally rarely does the relationship plunge 
into the depths of the black hole of non-significance”. Macculloch (2005: 93) similarly 
concludes that two decades of empirical research and over 3 dozen studies on the relation 
between inequality and conflict has produced a diverse and contradictory array of findings, 
and thus that the impact of inequality on conflict is still being debated.16 Below, Table 2 lists 
central empirical studies and their findings, an overview that confirms Schock’s (1996: 101) 
observation  that “an uncomfortable ambiguity prevails with regard to the relationship 
between income inequality and political violence”. The causes of this empirical 
inconclusiveness will be a main topic in chapter 4. Another, related problem is the simplistic 
manner in which most studies deal with the theoretical foundations for their hypothesised 
relationship between inequality and instability, and more generally for that between inequality 
                                                 
16 Interestingly, Lichbach wrote almost exactly the same in 1989, indicating that the conventional hypothesis has 
been challenged almost for fifty years, but still without any solution: “two decades of empirical research in 
conflict studies have challenged the conventionally accepted view that a strong, positive relationship exists 
between inequality and political conflict” (Lichbach 1989: 440). 
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and economic growth. At the centre of the controversy lies the question of what determines 
each individual’s support for radical change through violent means, yet the determinants of 
e.g. revolutionary preferences remain largely unstudied in the literature (MacCulloch 2005: 
94): “The reasoning behind various EI-PC propositions – how and why economic inequality 
breeds political conflict – has typically been neglected” (Lichbach 1989: 436).  
 
Table 2: Findings in the literature on the effect of inequality on political instability17 
Study Presented effect Type of study 
Kling 1956 Positive Small-N, qualitative study 
Russett 1964 Positive Quantitative, cross-section 
Feierabend & Feierabend 1966  Positive Theoretical work and cross-section analysis 
Runciman 1966 No relationship Theoretical work and empirical analyses 
Huntington 1968 Positive Theoretical work 
Mitchell 1968 Negative Case study (South Vietnam) 
Gurr 1970 Positive Theoretical work 
Russo 1972 No relationship Quantitative, cross-section 
Hibbs 1973 No relationship Quantitative, cross-section 
Parvin 1973 Negative (weak) Quantitative, cross-section 
Nagel 1974 Positive 
(curvilinear) 
Case-study (South Vietnam) and 
quantitative, cross-section 
Sigelman & Simpson 1977 Positive (weak) Quantitative, cross-section 
Hardy 1979 No relationship Quantitative, cross-section 
Weede 1981 No relationship Quantitative, cross-section 
Muller and Jukam 1983 No relationship Quantitative, survey analysis 
Panning 1983 Positive Theoretical model 
Muller 1985 Positive Quantitative, cross-section 
Muller and Seligson 1987 Positive Quantitative, cross-section 
Midlarsky 1988 Positive Quantitative, cross-section 
Muller and Weede 1990 No relationship Quantitative, cross-section 
Moaddel 1994 Positive Cross-national structural modelling 
Alesina and Perotti 1996 Positive Quantitative, cross-section 
Perotti 1996 Positive  Quantitative, cross-section 
Schock 1996 Positive*  Quantitative, cross-section 
Temple 1998 Positive Quantitative, cross-section 
Fearon and Laitin 2003 No relationship Quantitative, panel 
Nel 2003 No relationship/ 
Negative 
Quantitative, panel** (Sub-Saharan Africa 
only) 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004 No relationship Quantitative, panel 
Maccullock 2005 Positive Quantitative, survey analysis (taste for revolt) 
* Contingent upon regime repressiveness 
** A significant positive relationship is found only when subjective measures of political instability are 
used 
 
How, then, is socio-economic inequality thought to cause political unrest? As Dahl (1966, in 
Sigelman and Simpson 1977: 125) argued, the causal chain connecting objective socio-
economic conditions with actual political behaviour is long and tenuous. There are three 
stages in the process connecting socio-economic inequality with the outbreak of political 
                                                 
17 The table is constructed by the author for the purpose of this thesis and based on a review of the literature in 
the field. 
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violence: 1) that in which discontent is generated, 2) when it is politicised, and 3) that when it 
is actualised in political violence. In what follows I will elaborate on the mechanisms that 
impel the progression of these processes. By doing so, I intend to show how socio-economic 
inequality can cause political instability.  
 
A large body of cross-national research has been undertaken based on the assumption that 
socio-economic inequality produces relative deprivation, and according to Gurr (1970: 62), 
most of the literature on collective violence assumes a causal relationship between relative 
deprivation (or some equivalent concept) and the occurrence of violence. As stated by Alesina 
and Perotti (1996: 1214) in their seminal work “Income distribution, political instability and 
investment”:  
 
A large group of impoverished citizens, facing a small and very rich group of well-off 
individuals is likely to become dissatisfied with the existing socio-economic status quo and 
demand radical changes, so that mass violence and illegal seizure of power are more likely 
than, when income distribution is more equitable.  
 
Relative deprivation can be defined as a perceived discrepancy between a person’s value 
expectations and his or her value capabilities (Gurr 1970: 13). Value expectations are the 
goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled, and value 
capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of attaining or 
maintaining, given the social means available to them. Thus, by being an important source of 
relative deprivation which in turn produces discontent, socio-economic inequality is thought 
to be an indirect cause of political violence and instability. Important contributions to the 
theory of relative deprivation are the influential works of Davies (1962), Feierabend and 
Feierabend (1966), Huntington (1968), Gurr (1970) and Runciman (1966; 1972). They show 
that relative deprivation is decisive to the first stage of the process of political unrest, the 
generation of discontent, thus its theoretical implication and argumentative logic will be 
central in the following sections. 
 
2.3.1 THE GENERATION OF DISCONTENT 
A general contention is that revolution is not very likely in a country with a high degree of 
socio-economic equality and well-being (Acemoglu and Robinson 2000). Why exactly is this? 
In Muller and Jukam’s (1983: 159) terms: “People who take part in acts of civil disobedience 
or political violence are discontented about something. That is a truism”. The discrepancy that 
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constitutes the definitional core of relative deprivation, between the goods and conditions in 
life that people perceive that they should and could have, and the goods and conditions that 
they actually have or think are within reach, spurs the incipience of a disposition to aggressive 
action (Gurr 1970: 319; Snyder 1978: 502). This disposition is expressed here as discontent, a 
term that is central in explanations of collective violence. Discontent refers to the socio-
psychological mechanisms that make people resort to violent behaviour.18 Due to the 
importance of material well-being in human life, this discontent will often be closely 
connected to one’s economic situation, and the notion of being relatively deprived is based 
upon an evaluation of this situation. According to Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, material 
needs and physical well-being is fundamental to all life. As discussed in the beginning of this 
chapter, in the context of a modern world, this translates into assigning primacy to one’s 
economic situation relative to less fundamental needs in Maslow’s hierarchy. Referring to 
Cantril’s cross-national survey of human concerns, Gurr (1970: 69) concludes that “[m]aterial 
values are clearly of greatest concern to the people of the world”.19 The survey revealed no 
significant difference between countries of various developmental levels.  
 
This might lead one to think that absolute deprivation, that is, poverty, makes a person 
discontent. But an important postulate of the theory of relative deprivation is that discontent is 
not produced by poverty per se. Poor people might be unaware that they are deprived, or they 
might think that a better life is unattainable, or even undeserved. As pointed out by Weede 
(1981: 641), if e.g. an untouchable street-sweeper in Calcutta accepts his low status and 
extremely meagre income as deserved, he will not feel deprived relative to his standards of 
justice and expectations, however absolutely deprived he may seem by Western standards. 
More importantly, extremely poor people lack available resources to protest. As argued by 
Huntington (1968: 53), poverty itself is a barrier to instability, because those who are 
concerned about the immediate goal of the next meal are not in a position to worry about the 
great transformations of society. Supportive of this argument are the studies of Nel (2003), 
and Krueger and Maleckova (2003), the latter showing that poverty was not a decisive factor 
in explaining who participated in Hezbollah’s militant wing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. 
Thus, according to relative deprivation theorists, it is relative – not absolute – deprivation that 
                                                 
18 A term that is also frequently used, is systemic frustration (e.g. Feierabend and Feierabend 1966). This concept 
is the equivalent of discontent. 
19 When answering questions about one’s hopes and fears about the future, the majority of the respondents 
mentioned materially related issues such as standards of living, health, technological advances, economic 
stability, and owning a house or land. Political participation and security were also important categories. 
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it is though to produce discontent and in turn aggressive political behaviour, and a prominent 
source of relative deprivation is the extent of socio-economic inequality in a society  (Muller 
and Jukam 1983: 160; Schock 1996: 101). However, as resources are scarce, when some 
people are very rich this necessarily is at the expense of someone else (Horowitz 1985), and 
one could thus say that socio-economic inequality necessarily involves some degree of 
absolute deprivation. This has led some to believe that inequality is curvilinearly associated 
with instability. For example, when finding that a high degree of inequality (i.e., many poor 
people) was actually associated with less violence in South Vietnam, Mitchell (1968: 423) 
ascribed this partly to what he calls the “docility and low aspirations” of poorer peasants. 
 
The fact that relative deprivation refers to a person’s subjective notion of his own situation 
makes it clear that socio-economic inequality, referring to the actual distribution of economic 
means in a society, does not necessarily cause discontent. According to the theory of relative 
deprivation, it is the gap between an individual’s expected and achieved well-being, rather 
than structural conditions per se, that ultimately produce political violence (Thorbecke and 
Charumilind 2002: 1486). Some theorists go so far as to claiming that objective measures of 
inequality are irrelevant for outbreaks of political violence unless they are accompanied by 
measures of subjective notions of this inequality (Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Zimmermann 
1983). This might not be completely warranted, however, because the likelihood that people 
feel deprived is higher when the actual distribution of wealth in society is unequal. As 
expressed by Nafziger and Auvinen (2002: 156): through the demonstration effect of 
consumption levels of the relatively well off, high income concentration increases the 
perception of relative deprivation by large population segments. In addition, if measures of 
the subjective notion of deprivation are to be included in the analysis, serious problems of 
data availability and cross-national comparability would arise that could stall any attempts at 
testing the relationship empirically. 
 
Social comparison and modernisation 
A crucial question thus appears: when does socio-economic inequality translate into a notion 
of being relatively deprived? Decisive here is the potential that lies in socio-economic 
inequality of increasing the expectations in the population of a higher level of material well-
being when such levels are exposed through the life-style of the relatively better-off. This 
implies that if socio-economic inequality is to translate into relative deprivation, and in turn 
cause discontent, it must be accompanied by individual comparison between people, because 
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if one is not aware of the situation of others, there is no basis on which to feel deprived. In 
Panning’s (1983: 323) terms, “inequalities in a society affect the behaviour of its members 
only if those individuals compare their own lot with that of others and as a result become 
gratified or dissatisfied” (emphasis added). It therefore becomes pivotal to answer the 
questions: when do people compare their own situation with that of others, and whom do they 
compare with? Festinger’s (1954) path-breaking theory of social comparison processes states 
that evaluating one’s own abilities lies in the nature of the human being. Further, it shows that 
comparison with others is the main tool for such evaluation, as objective and a priori given 
standards hardly ever exist. According to Hobbes, one of the foremost political philosophers 
of rational political action, people seek relative advantage and not merely absolute advantage. 
As Taylor, (1987, cited in Lichbach 1989: 458) says: “In Leviathan, Hobbes seems to assume 
that each man seeks to maximize not merely his own payoff, but also his ‘eminence’, the 
difference between his own and other people’s payoff”. One could thus say that social 
comparison is an inherent part of human nature, and that unless people are extremely poor and 
spend all their time and energy on merely surviving, comparison will always take place 
(Popkin 1979 and Maslow 1954, in Besancon 2005: 395).  
 
It has been argued that modernisation widens the scope and increases the intensity of 
comparison between people, and that it therefore facilitates the generation of discontent 
(Moaddel 1994: 295). Modernisation processes lead to increased social mobility and greater 
information flows across geographical and social borders, and in this way people are exposed 
to new ways of life and experience changes in the lives of individuals or groups around them. 
As a consequence, people become aware that these new ways of life are within reach, and that 
misery can be avoided (Panning 1983: 323). A prominent advocate of such mechanisms is 
Huntington. In his seminal book Political Order in Changing Societies (1968) he relates 
manifestations of instability with economic inequality through modernisation. Huntington 
(1968: 57) asserts that as a society modernises, social mobilisation makes people aware of, 
and resentful towards the fact that they are relatively deprived: “The influx of new ideas calls 
into question the legitimacy of the old distribution and suggests the feasibility and the 
desirability of a more equitable distribution of income”. This “diffusion” of equity and social 
justice in modern times, Toqueville’s “dread (of) the insistent and immediate demand for 
equality in our lives”, implies a strong relationship between inequality and instability because 
the spread of norms of equality makes invidious comparisons universal and all forms of 
subordination illegitimate (Lichbach 1989: 437).  
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It is commonly assumed that people compare their situation with others that are relatively 
close to themselves on the point of comparison. For example, a poor farmer will not compare 
himself with the rich, urban elite, but with people that belong to his own, or approximate, 
socio-economic strata (Festinger 1954: 120; Nagel 1974: 455; Runciman 1966: chap. 10). 
This has led many (e.g. Nagel 1974) to assume that the shape of the relationship between 
inequality and instability resembles and inverted U. Even though inequality is expected to 
cause grievances, collective political violence is assumed to occur at intermediate levels of 
inequality. This is because if the distribution in a society is close to equal, people are not 
discontented, and if the distribution is very unequal, they do not rebel because comparison 
with economic strata too far from their own does not take place.20 I contend, however, that the 
social mobility associated with modernisation processes incites comparison across such strata 
by making it evident that it is possible to improve one’s life conditions. Indeed, Festinger 
(1954: 137) emphasises that comparison across highly deviant groups can take place if the 
area of comparison is sufficiently important and central in a person’s life. In light of the 
central place of material needs and economic well-being, it follows that the most decisive 
point of comparison between individuals and groups is the economic conditions under which 
they live.  
 
In addition to social comparison, people are also likely to compare their present situation with 
how they have fared previously. As modernisation is associated with increases in material 
well-being (at least temporarily) a situation can arise where many people have experienced 
some improvement to their own situation, and have “gained an appetite for more” (Mitchell 
1968: 437). In instances when they are worse off, or expect to be worse off, than they have 
been, this can lead to discontent and in Davies’ (1962) terms, a revolutionary mood. This 
process is prominently expressed by Soule (1935, cited in Gurr 1970: 114, emphasis added): 
 
When the people are in their most desperate and miserable condition, they are often least inclined 
to revolt, for then they are hopeless... Only after their position is somewhat improved and they 
have sensed the possibility of change, do they revolt effectively against oppression and injustice. 
What touches off insurrection is hope, not the lack of it, rising confidence, not bleak suffering. 
 
To sum up, comparison with others is natural to human beings and its scope and intensity is 
enhanced by modernisation processes. Due to the universal primacy of material well-being 
and the social consequences of modernisation, comparison across socio-economic strata is 
                                                 
20 Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, that they are very poor and thus too occupied with ensuring the next meal. 
A U-shaped relationship, that is, that political violence will be most frequent at either high or low levels of 
inequality has also been hypothesised (e.g. Davies 1962). 
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likely to take place. This tendency to compare one’s own situation with that of others exposes 
to people the degree of socio-economic inequality in society, and where this inequality is 
wide-spread, this becomes a prominent source of relative deprivation. Relative deprivation, 
defined as a discrepancy between people’s expectations and how they really fare, in turn 
produces discontent. But as Muller (1985: 52) states, discontent is only a necessary condition 
for collective violence, discontent must be mobilised.  
 
2.3.2 THE MOBILISATION OF DISCONTENT 
Recall that there are three stages in the process that transforms socio-economic inequality to 
the actual outbreak of political unrest. Following the generation of discontent are the second 
and third stages in the process of political violence, that is, the politisation and concrete 
manifestation of discontent in acts of protest behaviour. Together these stages can be referred 
to as the mobilisation of discontent. This section will present two different approaches to 
explaining incidents of political unrest. While one emphasises the importance of relative 
deprivation-induced discontent, the other focuses on each individual’s participation decision, 
contending that discontent is not sufficient to produce unrest. This is the so-called rational 
actor approach. The section concludes that despite the objections put forth this latter 
perspective, socio-economic inequality is likely to be positively related to the outbreak of 
political unrest.  
 
When discontent is politicised, it means that people blame the political system and its actors 
for the state of things and that discontent therefore is directed at political targets. While the 
general term collective violence refers to a situation where members of a collectivity take 
violent action against others, political violence can be defined as “all collective attacks within 
a political community against the political regime, its actors or its policies” (Gurr 1970: 157). 
It has been argued that insurgency is more likely if the less advantaged can identify the 
perpetuators of their poverty and suffering, and that the probability of manifest conflict 
increases when discontent is focused on governments or related political targets (Nafziger and 
Auvinen 2002: 156; Snyder 1978: 503). According to Gurr (1970: 159), discontent is a 
necessary precondition for political violence, but as he states: “the relationship is not exact. 
[…] Depending on peoples’ perspectives on violence and politics, relative deprivation-
induced discontent may be either focused on, or deflected from, the political system”.  
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How relevant is the distinction between collective and political violence? Discontent is likely 
to be politicised to the extent that a regime affects, or is thought to have the potential to affect, 
the lives of most or all of its citizens (Gurr 1970: 181). As there are strong and widespread 
doctrines in the modern world, stating that the political system is and should be responsible 
for social problems, discontent tends to be politicised. Indeed, a glance at the internal conflicts 
that have taken place during the contemporary history, confirms Gurr’s (1970: 178-179) 
assertion that nearly all large-scale outbreaks of collective violence are politically motivated 
and directed towards political targets, and the distinction between collective and political 
violence is therefore more theoretical than real. These terms will therefore be used 
interchangeably in what follows. The literature on explanations of the actual outbreak of civil 
unrest can be divided into two strands, and I will now present the first approach to explaining 
how discontent is mobilised. 
 
Relative deprivation and the mobilisation of discontent 
What determines whether discontent actually materialises as violent action? Lichbach (1989: 
459) points out that the synaptic link transforming discontent into behavioural dissent has 
received too little attention. One approach focuses on relative deprivation-induced discontent, 
and emphasises the importance of the grievances brought about by economic conditions. This 
perspective treats the outbreak of political unrest as a function of discontent: if people are 
discontented enough, they will engage in acts of protest. Due to the importance of economic 
concerns in people’s lives, it is assumed that these to a high degree influence individuals’ 
participation decision in political violent activity. Supportive of this notion is a study of Nel 
(2003) on the effect of inequality on political instability and growth in sub-Saharan Africa. He 
finds that the more a government is committed to welfare spending, the less prone to 
instability a polity would be. According to relative deprivation theorists, the disposition to 
collective violence thus depends on how badly societies violate socially derived expectations 
about the means and ends of human action. As stated by Festinger (1954: 124), if there is a 
discrepancy between this person’s evaluation of his own “performance” and the performance 
of those with whom he compares himself with, then he will act to reduce this discrepancy.  
 
In his article “Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America” Kling 
(1956: 33) describes a situation where inequality is so severe that violence is seen as 
unavoidable: land ownership is so heavily concentrated that no individual not already 
possessing great tracts of agricultural land can reasonably hope to achieve wealth through 
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farming, and of the possible sources of enrichment, only government is open to competition. 
Political office provides such a unique source of gain that “large segments of the population 
are prepared to take the ultimate risk of life, in a revolt, in a coup d’état, to perpetuate a 
characteristic feature of Latin American politics – chronic political instability”. History 
provides us with plenty examples of other groups experiencing such situations: the Parisian 
workers in 1848, Mexican peasants in 1910, the German Kleinburgertüm in the 1920s, 
Hungarians in 1956 and black South Africans in the 1960s (Gurr 1970: 92). Therefore, 
relative deprivation theorists hypothesise that the potential for collective violence is greatest 
when people feel sharply deprived with respect to their most deeply valued goals. 
 
The critique of the relative deprivation approach 
The results from empirical studies testing the relative deprivation hypothesis, however, are 
highly mixed (Snyder 1978: 504). This could be due to the fact that there are several 
qualifying conditions that affect whether discontent actually translates into collective 
violence. As Sen (1973: 1) points out: “[…] that a perceived sense of inequity is a common 
ingredient of rebellion in societies is clear enough, but it is also important to recognize that 
the perception of inequity […] depend[s] substantially on possibilities of actual rebellion”. 
Formal modellers have thus shown that a relationship between economic inequality and 
discontent can be derived logically, but have not linked discontent with violent behaviour 
(Lichbach 1989: 454). The most extensive critique of the explanations of political violence 
that are founded on relative deprivation and discontent, comes from an alternative perspective 
often referred to as the rational actor perspective, or the political opportunity approach. The 
critics belonging to this stance hold that much of the relative deprivation literature tends to 
overlook factors that explain the varying degree to which discontent is organised and 
resources mobilised for sustaining political insurgency (Muller 1985: 48; Snyder 1978: 503).  
 
According to Festinger (1954: 117), “[a] person’s cognition (his opinions and beliefs) about 
the situation in which he exists and his appraisals of what he is capable of doing (his 
evaluation of his abilities) will together have bearing on his behaviour”. Muller and Weede 
(1990: 625) similarly remind us that individuals do not rebel in a vacuum. “If they are rational 
actors, they will take the costs of rebellion into account”. According to Blainey’s (1975, in 
Besancon 2005: 396) theory of victory, there must be a belief in the ability to win in order to 
choose violent rebellion. While the relative deprivation perspective assumes that actors will 
compare their returns from economic activities with the economic returns of others, the 
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rational actor perspective assumes that actors will compare their economic returns with their 
returns from dissident activities (Lichbach 1989: 462). This theoretical stand thus focuses on 
each person’s decision to participate, characterising it as being based on an expected utility 
calculation that balances potential personal gains and losses (MacCulloch 2005: 94). It 
therefore hypotheses that opportunity costs influence the relationship between relative 
deprivation and collective violence (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Skocpol 1979; Tilly 1978).  
 
A basic assumption made by the rational actor approach is that the sources of discontent that 
lead to political violence are inherent in all societies and that the occurrence of such violence 
depends on the political opportunities and constraints of the immediate political environment, 
rather than variations in levels of economic inequality or the intensity of economic discontent 
(Schock 1996: 104). For example, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find that socio-economic 
conditions are unrelated to politically motivated violence, and that it is the opportunities for 
rebellion that decide whether such violence occurs. They assert that an important motivation 
for participation in collective violent action is greed, that is, each individual’s conscious 
evaluation of the potential gain he or she will have from participation. Here the so-called free-
rider problem emphasised by Olson’s collective action theory is illustrative (Lichbach 1989: 
463). Since everyone will get the fruits of collective dissent regardless of their participation, 
why should anyone bear the personal costs of participating in dissent? The participation 
decision is thus affected by a considerate evaluation by rational actors of the costs and 
opportunities associated with dissident activities. The following question thus arises: when 
does this evaluation prevent discontent from materialising in political violence?    
 
Resource mobilisation and regime repressiveness 
It has been claimed that it is not discontent per se that causes collective violence but the 
organisation of discontent (Feierabend and Feierabend 1966: 251; Muller and Seligson 1987: 
426; Snyder 1978: 505; Weede 1981: 640). That is, acts of protest behaviour depend on “[…] 
the extent to which dissident groups are able to acquire control of the resources necessary to 
develop strong and effective organizations for the purpose of obtaining collective goods” 
(Muller 1985: 48). Even though inequality creates incentives for the deprived to rise up, 
people do not necessarily have the resources, the ability to communicate, or the symbolic 
power generated by social capital that it takes to do so. These resources are sometimes 
controlled by the ruling elite, who will use them to suppress any attempted resistance 
(Rodriguez 2000, in Nel 2003: 629). Jenkins and Perrow (1977) claimed to have demonstrated 
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in their study “Insurgency of the Powerless” that farmers were unable to organise in political 
protest actions without a surrounding political environment that facilitated insurgency, as for 
example sponsorship by established organisations or the absence of collective controls and 
resources used to suppress it. According to Skocpol (1979: 112-157), the peasant revolts 
crucial in the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions did not take place because of the 
inequalities in these societies but rather because the peasants had sufficient autonomy from 
the local landlords to enable them to mobilise collectively. Some scholars have gone even 
further by proposing that inequality in fact can affect insurgency negatively. For example, in 
his study from 1968 of South Vietnam, Mitchell (1968) claimed to have shown that economic 
inequality decreased political instability, because high economic inequality is associated with 
powerful elites that have the resources and the incentives to use social, economic and political 
power to repress political dissent.21   
 
The dissident groups’ capacity to undertake collective action is thus conditioned by the 
context in which they find themselves, and a key determinant of this context is the 
repressiveness of the political system or regime (Eisinger 1973: 11; Snyder 1978: 505). A 
basic premise of rational action theory of political violence is that the costs of rebellion are a 
function of the degree of regime repressiveness and the behaviour of the government in 
response to protest (acts of coercion or negative sanctions) (Muller and Weede 1990: 625). As 
stated by MacCulloch (2005: 95), “[w]henever high levels of inequality is accompanied by a 
repressive military, tastes for revolt may not be manifested in terms of observable rebellions”. 
As found by Blomberg (1996), increases in military defence counteract domestic collective 
violence. An important factor conditioning the balance between discontent and utility 
calculation is thus the degree to which the regime is expected to use repressive means to 
counteract violent protest behaviour (Feierabend and Feierabend 1966: 251; Schock 1996: 
104; Tilly 1978: 49). Muller (1985) hypothesises that regime repressiveness is related to 
collective violence in a curvilinear, inverted U shaped fashion: an extremely repressive, 
closed regime will leave little opportunity for dissident groups to engage in collective protests 
and violence, while in an open democracy political violence should rarely occur, as most 
groups can effectively pursue their interests through peaceful channels of political 
participation.  According to this logic then, it is under a regime structure of intermediate 
                                                 
21 Paranzino (1972) took a second look at Mitchell’s study, and questioned Mitchell’s interpretations of what his 
land-tenure variables actually measure. In addition to showing a significant regional effect, Paranzino’s findings 
reversed those of Mitchell for almost all measures of tenure inequality (Hardy 1979: 211). 
 28 
repressiveness that collective political violence should be most likely (Huntington 1968: 275; 
Schock 1996: 105). This assertion has resulted in a wide array of studies of political violence 
incorporating a variable measuring regime repressiveness in their analysis, contending that 
repression increases conflict except when it is severe (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre et al. 
2001; Muller and Seligson 1987).22  
  
Concluding about the effect of inequality on political instability 
What role then, should be ascribed to socio-economic inequality in explanations of the 
mobilisation of discontent and the outbreak of collective violence? The rational actor 
approach has been criticised for the tendency to treat economic discontent as ubiquitous and 
as a constant (Schock 1996: 105), while in fact it is not: Levels of socio-economic inequality 
do vary both across space and time. Further, there is reason to question the central contention 
of the rational actor perspective that individuals assume a rational weighing of different 
alternatives and ultimately chooses the one that is best for him or her (Lichbach 1989: 460). 
How credible is this assumption? Are people really calculating personal gains versus costs, 
and based on this, making a conscious choice how to behave, at the same time as enduring 
deep frustration and a notion of being unjustly deprived? Indeed, a weakness of the rational 
actor approach is that it is not able to account for events that are apparently spontaneous and 
that do not have an organisational base (Snyder 1978: 506).  
 
According to Gupta (1990: 108), a pervasive view among experts and observers of incidents 
of collective violence is that a large part of participation decisions are not rational:  
 
The image of a violent, wild-eyed revolutionary, with his guns blazing, or blowing himself up 
in a suicidal attempt to accomplish his impossible political goals, provides us with a typical 
example of an emotive, if not an irrational, act.  
 
Frustration, anger and desperation drive people to engage in protest and violent behaviour, not 
a calculative weighing of benefits against costs. This contributes to the case for the relevance 
of inequality, relative deprivation and discontent in explanations of violent behaviour. And 
even if one admits to the notion that humans generally are rational, this does not necessarily 
mean that they are selfish. According to Gupta, (1990: 115) “[w]e must be prepared to 
recognize the absurdity of the viewpoint that any goal other than the one of selfishness 
constitutes irrationality. Hence, we should broaden the definition of human rationality to 
                                                 
22 As Muller (1985) points out, there seems to be truth in Machiavelli’s dictum that a leader should either 
embrace or crush his opposition. 
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include the desire to maximize group interest”. Thus, even if it means taking personal risks 
and bearing heavy costs, people might act on their discontent as much out of frustration on 
their own behalf as on their group’s behalf, and they might still be acting rationally. 
 
The following line of reasoning also lends support to the notion the socio-economic inequality 
is important in explanations of the outbreak of political violence: As inequality increases, the 
pool of possible participants in conflict behaviour increases Lichbach (1989: 436). As 
expressed by Muller (1985: 53): “It seems plausible to expect that in societies with high 
inequality, where the distribution or scope of discontent is presumably widespread, discontent 
is more likely to be mobilized somehow, ceteris paribus, than in societies with low 
inequality.” Therefore, as the mobilisation of discontent is correlated with the extensiveness 
of inequality, such that when inequality is pervasive some mobilisation is almost bound to 
occur, then the relationship between inequality and political violence should be “positively 
accelerated”. Hence, despite the criticisms, the idea that economic inequality is related to a 
high potential for violent challenges to the state or its policies remains a plausible assumption 
(Schock 1996: 99). On the basis of these insights I conclude that socio-economic inequality 
can be expected to increase the level of political instability, and the following hypothesis can 
be formulated: (H1): Socio-economic inequality produces political instability.  
 
I will now move on to discussing the second link in the relationship subjected to analysis in 
this thesis, namely that between political instability and economic growth, and answer the 
following question: Why is the presence of political instability expected to reduce the rate of 
economic development? 
 
2.4 THE ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
Both the theoretical expectations and empirical findings are much more complex and 
ambiguous regarding the relationship between inequality and instability compared to that 
between instability and growth. This section will therefore be briefer than the previous one. 
Let us begin by comparing two illustrative cases, namely, the records of Argentina and Japan 
on the dimensions of political instability and economic development. In the beginning of the 
previous century Argentina was one of the world’s wealthiest countries, with an income per 
capita in the top twenty of the world in 1960. The same year Japan had a per capita income 
below Iraq, Ireland and Argentina and was not even among the top twenty-five. During the 
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course of the last forty years Japan has experienced one of the fastest growth rates of the 
world. Argentina, on the other hand, has often come close to economic collapse. While 
Argentina has had a history of political instability, with several coups d’etat and much 
political violence, Japan has been a model for political stability. It has not been marked by 
political violence, and it has had the same political party in office continuously from 1960 
until 1993 (Alesina et al. 1996). Does this conjunction contain a pattern of causality? Kuznets 
(1966: 451) states that “[o]ne could hardly expect much economic growth under conditions of 
economic turmoil…and unpredictable changes in regimes”. Likewise, Gupta (1990: 250) 
concludes his comprehensive study of the effect of political instability on economic growth by 
saying that “[t]he presence of political violence poses a serious threat to the pursuit of peace 
and prosperity of a nation”. This strong assertion has been confirmed empirically by an almost 
infinite array of studies (see Table 3 below), giving support to the notion that political 
instability is harmful for growth.  
 
Table 3: Findings in the literature on the effect of political instability on economic growth23 
Study Finding Type of study 
Hardy (1979) Negative and 
positive 
Quantitative, cross-section 
Venieris and Gupta (1986) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Londregan and Poole (1990) No relationship Quantitative, panel 
Barro (1991) Negative Quantitative, panel 
Fosu (1992) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Mauro (1995) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Alesina et al. (1996) Negative Quantitative, panel 
Alesina and Perotti (1996) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) Negative Formal model 
Blomberg (1996) Negative Quantitative, panel 
Perotti (1996a) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Auvinen (1997) Negative Quantitative, panel 
Svensson (1998) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Persson and Tabellini (in Taylor and 
Woodford 1999 1c) 
Negative Formal model 
Easterly (2001) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Feng (2001) Negative Quantitative, cross-section 
Campos and Nugent (2003) Positive* Quantitative, panel 
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) Negative Case study (time series) 
Fielding (2002; 2003a; 2003b; 2004) Negative Case studies (time series) 
Nel (2003) Negative Quantitative, panel (Sub-Saharan Africa only) 
Woo (2003) Negative Quantitative, panel 
Gwartney et al. (2006) Negative Quantitative, panel 
* Dependent variable: investment, not growth 
                                                 
23 The table is constructed by the author for the purpose of this thesis and based on a review of the literature in 
the field. 
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Casting a glance at the world scenery as of the beginning of 2008, several examples stand out 
that illustrate the underlying mechanisms of this relationship. Perhaps the most current is the 
situation that has followed the Kenyan presidential election on December 27th 2007.24 In the 
wake of the alleged electoral victory of the incumbent president Kibaki and the subsequent 
outbreak of mass political violence, headlines such as “Experts warn of downturn in economic 
growth”, “Violence too costly” and “Kenya’s economic future at stake” have marked the 
Kenyan media. Professor Terry Ryan, consultant to the Treasury and a member of the 
Monetary Policy Advisory Committee, says to the newspaper Daily Nation on January 11th 
that the impact of the political violence “could reduce growth from seven to between two and 
4.5 per cent” (Wachira 2008, Daily Nation, January 14th). What lies behind these poor 
prospects? The direct economic consequences of the violence include the loss of property and 
vandalising of utilities of both businesses and civilians. But conflict is not only immediately 
damaging to those directly involved. Conflict also results in large development costs: “We 
must realize that, under conditions of social unrest, political upheaval and wars, economic 
modernisation is impossible” (Fei 1997, cited in Stewart and O'Sullivan 1998: 2). As 
described in an editorial in the Daily Nation on January 14th, the tourism industry, decisive to 
Kenya’s economy, was affected severely: “Tourists do not go into areas seen as unstable or 
dangerous. […] Empty hotel rooms mean workers laid off. Twenty thousand jobs have 
already been shed. The Kenya Tourism Board estimates that if the trend continues, 120.000 
jobs will have been lost by March. And this does not include jobs that will be lost in the ripple 
effect from other industries that service the tourist sector” (Daily Nation 2008, January 14th).  
 
INVESTMENT AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
The Kenyan example highlights a central point to the argument that instability is detrimental 
to growth, namely, its negative consequences for investment. Indeed, who would want to 
invest their money in a firm that produces hotel furniture or establish a restaurant in Nairobi 
these days? Both domestic and foreign investors are likely to prefer a stable political 
environment. As stated by Kuznets (1966: 451), “[…] clearly some minimum of political 
stability is necessary if members of the economic society are to plan ahead and be assured of a 
relatively stable relation between their contribution to economic activity and their rewards”. 
In a similar vein, Levine and Renelt (1992: 958) contend that it is not surprising that 
“countries that experience a high number of revolutions and coups tend to be countries that 
                                                 
24 Other current examples of highly politically unstable areas would be Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, 
Zimbabwe, Sudan, Palestine, Lebanon, Chechnya, Kosovo and Haiti. 
 32 
invest less of their resources domestically than countries with stable political environments”. 
Investment has long been established as a decisive driving force of growth (Barro 1996: 7), 
and by reducing the incentives to save and invest, political instability reduces growth (Alesina 
and Perotti 1994: 359).  
 
The reason why political instability is thought to decrease investment incentives is because it 
creates uncertainty. Collective violence represents an immediate threat to property, and in 
addition the probability of the government being overthrown is higher when social unrest is 
widespread. This makes the course of future economic policy and the protection of property 
rights more uncertain (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 1214). It has also been pointed out that in a 
situation of political instability, the probability that the government will repudiate contracts 
increases (Thorbecke and Charumilind 2002: 1484). The uncertainty associated with such 
circumstances increases the risk of capital loss. Because a high risk discourages investment in 
physical capital, the availability of factors of production is reduced. Furthermore, a high risk 
also raises the uncertainty of future rates of return of investment projects, and thus the 
likelihood of loan defaults rises. In this way the cost of capital increases, resulting in 
reluctance among investors to take productive economic initiatives. They might even “exit” 
the economy altogether (Alesina et al. 1996: 191). As formulated by Feng (2001: 273): “An 
impending political crisis puts investors’ decisions to send their money into the market on 
hold”. Therefore, capital flight and luxury consumption among the local capital holders based 
on foreign import25 might be characteristic of politically unstable situations (Fosu 1992: 830-
831; Venieris and Gupta 1986).26  
 
For the economic actors that choose to stay in the market, political instability may influence 
the timing and organisation of the production process negatively. The uncertainty associated 
with political instability can produce rampant stops and starts in investment projects – 
resulting in the inability of the economy of attaining the optimal growth path (Fosu 1992: 
831). In addition, by reducing the planning time-scale for business leaders, uncertainty has 
negative consequences for projects that have longer-term growth goals. It can also prevent 
state expenditure in sectors that would have long-term growth-enhancing consequences, such 
                                                 
25 Such luxury consumption takes place at the expense of the investments necessary to create economic 
development. 
26 Supportive of this expectation is Fielding’s study of the economic effects of the Palestinian Intifada, where he 
found that violence lead to Israeli capital flight (Fielding 2004). 
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as investing in human capital and infrastructure (Nel 2003: 614) (cf. section 2.2.3). Due to 
mechanisms such as these, Zak (2000, in Feng 2001: 274) notes the following:  
 
In countries where regime change is common, investment tends towards the liquid and 
speculative, leaving these countries with low-investment and low-productivity industries 
(such as textiles and mining), rather than capital-intensive enterprises requiring investment in 
the plants and high-technology equipment that provide the foundation for advanced 
industrialisation. 
 
Several studies find a robust negative correlation between investment rates and various 
measures of political instability (Barro 1991; Easterly and Rebelo 1993; Levine and Renelt 
1992; Venieris and Gupta 1986). For example, through several studies on the economic 
consequences of the political instability associated with the Palestine-Israeli conflict, Fielding 
finds that violence of all kinds following the uprising (Intifada) among Palestinians between 
1987 and 1993 depressed Israeli investment substantially (Fielding 2003a; 2003b; 2004). He 
also finds similar effects of the political instability associated with the Apartheid period in 
South Africa (Fielding 2002). Studying the terrorist activity in the Basque Country from the 
1970s to the 1990s, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find a strong negative effect of the 
terrorist activities on economic prosperity. What these examples depict, are situations of 
violence and threat to life, property and property-rights; a powerless political authority, 
incapable of establishing security; and a high degree of political uncertainty as to what the 
future might bring. 
 
It becomes clear that the disincentive to investment that political instability represents 
ultimately rests on the fear of losing property (Barro 1991: 437). As formulated by 
MacCulloch (2005: 93): “A fundamental requirement of market economies is the security of 
ownership claims to property. Yet throughout history existing claims to property have been 
regularly challenged by revolts”. The importance for investment of the rule of law and 
contractual certainty in general, and the protection of property rights specifically, is 
emphasised by several scholars (e.g., Barro 1996; Landes 1998; North 1981; Svensson 1998; 
Tornell and Velasco 1992) . The occurrence of attempted or successful revolutions or coups 
indicates a propensity to abandon the rule of law and therefore, in principle, a threat to 
established property rights (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 1214). Investors will be reluctant to risk 
their capital when property rights are weak and poorly protected, because they fear that their 
returns will be appropriated by others (Gwartney et al. 2006). As stated by Landes (1998: 32): 
Why should anyone invest capital and labour in creating or acquiring wealth that one risks 
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losing? When property rights are poorly enforced, a wedge is created between the marginal 
product of capital and the rate of return that can be privately appropriated by investors 
(Svensson 1998: 1318). Thus, by reducing the certainty that property rights will remain 
protected, and in that way creating disincentives to invest, political instability is negatively 
related to growth.  
 
Despite the obvious logic and intuitiveness of this argumentation, the importance of political 
stability for growth has not always been recognised in economic science. But, as emphasised 
by several scholars, the importance of political variables for economic development should 
not be underestimated. Gradually economists have started to take seriously the possibility that 
political instability can have a large and lasting impact on the economy (Fielding 2004: 465). 
On the importance of political factors Feng (2001: 288) writes:  
 
I am tempted to argue that their negative effects on private investment far exceed the 
unwholesome impact of monetary or fiscal policies on private investment. Political 
determinants do matter in private capital formation, and their effects are fundamental and far-
reaching.  
 
But is instability always bad? As noted earlier, sometimes collective, political violence can 
bring an authoritarian regime to collapse, and, as such, instability can have long-term positive 
consequences. Alesina et al. (1996: 192) state that government change might be viewed 
favourably by economic agents if the current government is incompetent or corrupt and its 
successors are seen as an improvement. Similarly, Mancur Olson (1982, in Fedderke et al. 
2001) has suggested that where political instability disrupts rent-seeking activities, it may 
have a positive impact upon growth. However, in such cases any positive effects on growth 
will most likely not be immediate, but will rather set in after a new government has been 
established and its pro-growth policies have actually been realised. Thus it is not instability in 
itself that affects growth positively, but the establishment of policies by the new government 
that promote investment and economic activity. In sum, the following hypothesis is generated: 
(H2): Political instability affects economic development negatively. 
 
2.5 SUMMARY – THEORETICAL DISCUSSION 
This chapter has attempted to show how socio-economic inequality can reduce economic 
growth by producing political instability. It started out by discussing the importance of 
studying what affects the rate of economic growth, and concluded on this point that in general 
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increases in the level of GDP per capita are indeed associated with an increased quality of life. 
An overview of the different hypothesised paths of causation between socio-economic 
inequality and economic growth was then presented, before attention was turned to the causal 
link subjected to analysis in this thesis, namely that of political instability. Central 
contributions in the literature dealing with the relationship between inequality and political 
instability were presented, followed by a theoretical discussion of the underlying mechanisms 
of this hypothesised causal pattern.  
 
Socio-economic inequality is expected to produce political instability due to its central role in 
breeding relative deprivation – and as such, its potential to generate discontent. This potential 
becomes effective in the face of social comparison, a human characteristic that is magnified 
by various processes related to modernisation. According to the rational actor perspective, the 
actual manifestation of discontent in acts of collective unrest is conditioned by individual 
evaluations of costs versus gains from participating in such acts. However, people do not 
always act based on such a rationalistic evaluation of possible personal gains. They might also 
take into account the possible gains of their collectivity, in which case it is sometimes rational 
to participate in acts of collective protest. Further, by breeding discontent, socio-economic 
inequality increases the pool of potential participants in protest behaviour. Therefore, and 
independently of the objections put forth by rational action theorists, socio-economic 
inequality is hypothesised to affect the level of political instability positively.  
 
The chapter closed by discussing the relationship between political instability and economic 
growth. By creating uncertainty around future protection of property rights and increasing the 
chances of capital loss, political instability discourages investment. On these ground, then, 
political instability is hypothesised to have a detrimental effect on growth. Put together, we 
thus see that socio-economic inequality, by breeding political instability, is thought to have a 
negative effect on economic growth.   
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3 VARIETIES OF KNOWING: METHODOLOGY AND 
MEASUREMENT 
 
In this chapter I will discuss the methodological issues related to my analysis. The research 
questions are: 1) does socio-economic inequality affect economic development negatively by 
producing political instability, and 2) why do previous studies report such diverging results? 
The methodological approach adopted to answer these questions is the quantitative approach, 
and the methodological tool is regression analysis. In the first part of this chapter I discuss the 
methodological issues in detail and relate them to the sample selection and analytical design, 
and in the second part I describe how the variables are measured and operationalised.  
  
3.1 METHODOLOGY 
3.1.1 A QUANTITATIVE APPROACH 
In studying the current research question I adopt a quantitative approach. While qualitative 
analyses are decisive in generating theory and constituting the basis on which hypotheses are 
made, quantitative studies in turn test these hypotheses with the objective of either modifying 
them or providing them with empirical support (Ragin 1987: 55). Qualitative studies are case-
oriented in that they focus one or a few particular social units or historical events and 
emphasise their complexity and uniqueness (Ragin and Zaret 1983). Quantitative, large-N 
analyses, on the other hand, aim at an over-arching scientific goal: the ability to generalise - 
making statements about the relationship between phenomena that are independent of time 
and space. Quantitative analyses are thus variable-oriented: they seek replacing the proper 
names of social units or historical events with variables. The inclusion of a large number of 
units enables statistical control, which is necessary to make statements about the relationships 
with a sufficient degree of certainty (Landman 2003: 26-27). However, large-N studies face a 
trade-off. The contextual uniqueness of each case forces the renouncement of the accuracy 
and complexity associated with the qualitative approach, in Sartori’s (1970) terms, it implies 
moving up the ladder of abstraction. This is important because it touches upon what a 
researcher can hope, and claim, to achieve when applying a quantitative approach. One cannot 
make accurate statements about specific cases on the basis of statistically established 
relationships between variables. Awareness of this will mark the interpretation of the results 
of the analysis in the next chapter.  
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3.1.2 MULTIPLE REGRESSION AS THE ANALYTICAL TOOL 
Compared to simple correlation analysis, regression analysis offers additional possibilities 
that are decisive for the two main goals of quantitative analyses. The first goal is related to 
determining causation. When employed correctly, regression analysis enables estimation of 
the direction and strength of a causal relationship. As social phenomena are determined by a 
range of causes, multiple regression analysis will be used to examine the relationships 
between the variables in this analysis. This technique incorporates several explanatory 
variables, and enables estimation of the isolated effect of each explanatory variable in 
addition to their relative strength, by holding constant the effect of the other variables (Lewis-
Beck 1980: 47). As opposed to the physical sciences, however, where relationships are law-
like in nature, the relationships in the social sciences can only be expressed in probabilistic 
terms (Lijphart 1971: 684). This means that an error term (e), representing the variation in the 
dependent variable that is due to causes that are unknown (or not explicitly determined), has 
to be included. In my analysis this leads to the following mathematical expressions:  
 
Y (instability) = a0 + b1X1(inequality) + b2X2 + b3X3 + … + bkXk + e                      (equation 1) 
Y (growth) = a0 + b1X1(instability) + b2X2 + b3X3 + … + bkXk + e                           (equation 2) 
 
We commonly assume a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables, 
even though this is not always correct.27 Therefore, regression analysis implies producing a 
line in a scatterplot that in the best possible way describes the statistical tendency in the data 
we are analysing (Skog 2004: 220). This is done using the principle of Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), which produces the line with the smallest possible sum of distances, between 
the line and the data points. In other words, OLS minimises the sum of squared errors (SSE).28   
Regression analysis helps achieving a second goal in quantitative studies, namely, making 
generalisations, and thus also predictions, about real world relationships. Prediction rests upon 
the premise that the sample subjected to analysis is drawn from the population of interest in a 
random way,29 and based on this sample we can make inferences about the population through 
                                                 
27 This assumption can generally be made in the face of the following four circumstances: 1) there are empirical 
grounds to assume linearity; 2) the linear specification is most parsimonious; 3) theory might be too weak to 
suggest what an alternative specification should be; and 4) empirical investigation of the data might fail to 
suggest a clear alternative to the straight line model (Lewis-Beck 1980: 13). However, when analysing the data, 
the linearity assumption will be examined in relation to the specific model adopted here. 
28 The sums are squared to avoid positive errors cancelling out negative errors (Lewis-Beck 1980: 14). 
29 In studies where aggregates such as countries (and perhaps at different points in time) are the analytical units, 
one could argue that it is difficult to randomly draw the sample, as the population is necessarily limited to a fixed 
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significance testing. Following the norm on this field (Lewis-Beck 1980: 31), I base the 
significance testing in my analysis on the t-statistic. A two-tailed 95 % confidence interval is 
constructed around the slope estimate,30 and if the value of zero does not fall within this 
interval (above 1.96/ below -1.96 on the t-distribution), the null-hypotheses is rejected at the 
.05 level of significance, i.e. with a confidence of 95%. When determining whether the 
relationships are significantly different from zero, I apply this level of significance.31     
 
When conducting a regression analysis, the following five assumptions are made: 1) there is 
no specification error. That is, the relationship between the dependent and independent 
variables is linear and no relevant explanatory variables have been left out and no irrelevant 
variables included; 2) There is no measurement error, meaning that the variables are 
accurately measured; 3) The error term is homoskedastically and normally distributed and is 
not auto-correlated; and 4) There is no correlation between the independent variables and the 
error term (Lewis-Beck 1980: 26; Skog 2004: 236-257). In addition comes a fifth assumption, 
namely the absence of multicollinearity, which we have when two or more independent 
variables are approximately linearly correlated (Kennedy 2003: 48-49). In connection with the 
analysis in the next chapter the different assumptions will be discussed and any possible 
violation will be dealt with. However, some violations are expected a priori due to 1) the 
panel design of the data and 2) the endogenous nature of the analytical structure. These 
violations will therefore be discussed in the following sections.   
 
3.1.3 PANEL DESIGN 
SAMPLE SELECTION  
The sample subjected to analysis in this study, that is, the choice of countries and years, is to a 
large degree determined by the data availability for the inequality variable, as this is the 
measure with the most limited data extension. To enable the inclusion of as many 
observations as possible on inequality, the time range in my dataset extends from 1950 to 
2004, and the number of countries included is 188. All regions of the world are well 
                                                                                                                                                        
number of countries (and years). However, the events preceding the values that the different countries exhibit on 
variables such as inequality, instability and level of GDP have arguably taken place in a stochastic manner and 
could have resulted in different outcomes (Midtbø 2000: 59-60).  
30 A two-tailed test is applied to factor in the possibility that the direction of causality of some variables on the 
dependent variable(s) might not be as expected. 
31 However, as there is no given answer to what level of significance is appropriate, I do not treat the 5% level as 
an absolute, but rather an approximate indicator of statistical significance. Variables that are significant at the 10 
percent level of significant will therefore also be reported in the analysis.  
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represented. This results in an unbalanced panel, as the coverage on the different variables 
varies in terms of which countries and years are included. Selecting a sample on the basis of 
data-availability raises the question of representativeness, due to the fact that data availability 
is known to be correlated to level of national development. Some scholars have even 
suggested that an index of data availability could serve as a measure of societal modernity 
(Sigelman and Simpson 1977: 115).  
 
Another problem of studies based on country-level data is that countries are so different that 
their comparability can be questioned (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003). Many methodological 
theorists warn against “comparing the incomparable” and measuring and analysing a 
phenomenon across inherently different cases (Russett 1964: 444). The inclusion of countries 
from all world regions and different levels of development creates problems of measuring 
variables in a consistent and accurate way both across countries and over time. It thus 
constitutes a risk of violating the principle of measure validity (Muller and Jukam 1983: 
161).32 Further, it increases the risk of disregarding relevant explanatory variables at the intra-
country level (Dogan and Kazancigil 1994: 41-42). On the other hand, one could argue that 
the comparison of inherently different cases is necessary to establish exactly what it is about 
these cases that cause the differences they display, and that the insight that studies of different 
cases yields is necessary for generalisation. For example, Barro claims that it is impossible to 
get an accurate understanding of long-term effects of different factors on growth studying the 
experience of one or a few countries (Barro 2000). These problems of comparability will be 
taken into account when interpreting the results in the analysis in the next chapter.  
 
THE PANEL DESIGN’S ADVANTAGES – AND PROBLEMS 
As opposed to cross-sectional and time series analyses, the panel design incorporates both 
dimensions. This has two important advantages. Through a panel design one is able to test 
whether a relationship is truly general, that is, whether it holds across space and time. 
Combining the time and space dimensions also facilitates the identification and measurement 
of effects that perhaps would not appear in pure cross-sectional or time series analyses. 
Further, to be able to estimate the statistical significance of a causal relationship, one depends 
on a sufficient number of freedom degrees.33 When only one dimension is included the 
                                                 
32 E.g., developing countries tend to have large measurement errors in national accounts (Barro 2000: 10-11). 
33 The concept of freedom degrees refers to the number of observations relative to the number of variables (Skog 
2004: 163). 
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number of observation is necessarily limited, and restricted data availability for certain 
countries and early time periods accentuates this problem. Over-determination of explanatory 
systems is therefore a danger to one-dimensional designs: as the number of societies, cultures 
and political units is highly limited and the number of relevant variables is very high, the 
number of freedom degrees becomes too low to allow consideration of all relevant factors 
(Przeworski and Teune 1970: 30). In Bartolini’s  (1993: 160) terms:  
 
[I]n order to control for the validity of empirical generalizations the safest way to proceed is 
in a contrast between cross-sectional and cross-temporal results. It is therefore not simply a 
question of one or the other; rather, research designs should always try to observe both types 
of variance. 
 
The panel design also has the ability to analyse dynamic behaviour, which the cross-sectional 
design can tell us nothing about, and by creating more variability, a panel design alleviates the 
multicollinearity problem (Baltagi 2005: 4-6; Kennedy 2003: 302). 
 
A common objection to the panel design is that the inclusion of both the space and time 
dimension unavoidably increases the number of missing values in the sample. However, using 
an unbalanced panel counteracts this problem, as it allows for the inclusion of values that are 
only available for some countries and/or for some years. The inclusion of the space dimension 
increases the risk of observing a heteroskedastically distributed error term, which means that 
the variance in the error term is dependent upon the values on the X-axis, that is, the 
independent variable (Midtbø 2000; Skog 2004: 246). As heteroskedasticity renders the 
significance testing unreliable, White’s heteroskedasticity corrected covariance matrix is 
included in the final models to correct for this. Further, non-stationarity is common in time 
series and panel data analyses, and leads to spurious results. In variables that are non-
stationary, the mean and variance depend on time, which invalidates the t-statistic and the 
estimation of the explanatory power of the model, the R² (Gujarati 2003: 797). The Phillips-
Pearon unit root test will be applied in the analysis to examine whether non-stationarity is 
present. The most serious problem associated with panel data structure, however, is violation 
of the assumption that the error term is not auto-correlated (Kennedy 2003: 140).   
 
Autocorrelation in the error term is due to the fact that many variables display little variation 
across time on each unit in the analysis, which leads to a situation where the error term related 
to one observation is correlated to the error terms of other observations, and thus violating the 
fourth regression assumption (Lewis-Beck 1980: 28). There is disagreement on how much 
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autocorrelation can be present without constituting a problem, but it is usual to draw the limit 
at .30, or 30 %. Common ways of dealing with autocorrelation is to control for its effect by 
including an autoregressive parameter or the lagged dependent variable at the right hand side. 
Here, the latter will be done when the estimated autocorrelation is above .30. Including the 
lagged dependent variable is not an uncontroversial practice. It has been criticised for “eating 
up” all the variation in the dependent variable (Wilson and Butler 2003, in Gudbrandsen 
2005: 39), and for leaving any remaining autocorrelation un-dealt with (Plümper et al. 2005). 
Nevertheless, other scholars such as Beck and Katz (2004) recommend the inclusion of a 
lagged dependent variable, and point out that one can estimate any remaining autocorrelation 
after the lagged dependent variable has removed its part. I will therefore report estimated 
autocorrelation when presenting the regression results in the next chapter, and whenever this 
is below .30 it will be considered unproblematic.   
  
The second major advantage of the panel design is that it facilitates estimation of the effect of 
unobserved variables. With repeated observations on each unit one is in a better position to 
account for unmeasured effects (Petersen, in Hardy and Bryman 2004: 331). In any cross-
section there are innumerable unmeasured explanatory variables that affect the “behaviour” of 
the units in the analysis. Also, there may be time-series variables that affect the units 
uniformly but differently in each time period. In a pure cross-sectional analysis these omitted 
effects cannot be accounted for. Many would argue that this cross-sectional heterogeneity is 
the normal state of affairs, as there are so many unknown variables determining Y. 
Nevertheless, their influence results in a different intercept for each unit, and their omission 
thus causes biased estimation. Therefore, applying the standard OLS technique is 
inappropriate “unless the influence of these omitted variables (embodied in the different 
intercepts) is uncorrelated with the included explanatory variables” (Kennedy 2003: 303). 
With a panel design there is a way of improving estimation that allows for different intercepts, 
that is, applying OLS to either the Fixed Effects Model (FEM) or the Random Effects Model 
(REM) (Petersen, in Hardy and Bryman 2004: 331; Kennedy 2003: 303-305). I will now 
discuss their differences and explain my choice of model. 
  
CHOICE OF MODEL: FIXED OR RANDOM EFFECTS? 
The difference between the FEM and REM lies in their assumptions about the error term.  
Contrary to the REM, the FEM assumes that the error term is not randomly related to the 
independent variables or to country-specific effects. Thus, it assumes that the effect of the 
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omitted variables on the dependent variable is non-random. If true, this violates a premise of 
regression analysis and renders the statistical output unreliable. Thus, the Fixed Effects Model 
includes a dummy variable for each group (country) to take into account the group-specific 
effects. In this way one is able to control for the non-random effects of omitted group-
specific, time-invariant variables in the analysis (Gujarati 2003: 636-652). There are, 
however, important drawbacks to the FEM, some of which the Random Effects Model is 
designed to overcome (Kennedy 2003: 304). First, there is the “degrees of freedom”-problem. 
The introduction of a large number of dummy variables reduces the degrees of freedom, and 
the more groups (countries) in the analysis, the more dummy variables. (Gujarati 2003; 
Kennedy 2003: 303-305). The principal drawback, however, is that the FEM complicates the 
inclusion of other time-invariant variables because it will not be able to estimate the impact of 
these variables (Gujarati 2003: 646; Petersen in Hardy and Bryman 2004: 338). Plümper et al. 
(2005: 333) point out that if a level effect of at least one variable or a time-invariant variable 
of theoretical interest exists, then the inclusion of country dummies is problematic because it 
suppresses level effects.  
 
The debate about which model is preferable is still going on, and thus there is no universally 
agreed-upon answer. However, despite its attraction, there is a major qualification of the 
Random Effects Model that makes it applicable only in certain circumstances (Kennedy 2003: 
305). The assumption of the REM that the error term is randomly related to the independent 
variables is a strong assumption, and if it does not hold, the REM produces biased estimates. 
In my analysis the chance that there are unspecified variables captured by the error term 
which are non-randomly related to specific countries or to the explanatory variables, is 
relatively high, and this makes the use of the REM inappropriate. There is also a statistical 
tool that can be used to determine whether the Random Effects Model or the Fixed Effects 
Model should be applied, the Hausman Test.34 The null-hypothesis of the Hausman Test is 
that the results obtained by the two models are not significantly different. In that case, the 
REM is more efficient. The alternative hypothesis is that the efficient model is biased, 
implying that the FEM is preferred. The values produced by the Hausman test when applied 
to the multivariate models here, indicate strongly that the assumption of randomness is 
unfounded. Therefore, due to both substantial and econometric objections, the Fixed Effects 
Model will be applied in this analysis.  
                                                 
34 This test was developed by J. A. Hausman in 1978 and presented in “Specification Tests in Econometrics” in 
volume 46 of Econometrica the same year. 
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When it comes to the above-mentioned drawback to the FEM, only one is relevant. In my 
dataset the freedom-degrees problem is not pronounced since the extensive panel structure 
including a sample of 188 countries implies a modest loss of freedom degrees. The second 
problem, on the other hand, may be more serious. There are theoretical reasons to assume that 
several variables that are consistent across time, and only vary between countries, are relevant 
explanatory variables in this analysis. The inclusion of these variables is rendered impossible 
by the Fixed Effects Model, and consequently one of the regression assumptions might be 
violated. In the evaluation of the analytical model in the next chapter, I will discuss whether 
relevant explanatory variables have been excluded and the consequences this might have. 
 
3.1.4 THE ENDOGENEITY PROBLEM 
The two-equation system of my analysis brings additional challenges into the thesis. In the 
first equation political instability is the dependent variable, and in the second equation the 
dependent variable is economic development, measured by the rate of economic growth.35 At 
this point a serious problem arises: Causality in the relationship between political instability 
and growth can run in both directions (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003: 114; Alesina and 
Perotti 1994: 355). That is, the dependent variable in the second equation, economic growth, 
is at the same time theoretically assumed to be an explanatory variable in the first equation. It 
has conventionally been argued that economic growth promotes political stability (Abadie and 
Gardeazabal 2003; Barro 1991), and intuitively this is not far-fetched. Economic hardship 
causes discontent in the population, which can lead to an increased threat of violence 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2000: 1183). This assertion is held by relative deprivation theorists 
such as Gurr (1970) and Hibbs (1973) (cf. section 2.3.1), in addition to theories of systemic 
frustration and Marxist theories of rebellion (Schock 1996:112-113). On the other hand, it has 
also been argued that growth may have a destabilising effect, as it can produce social 
dislocation and increased socio-economic disparities (Olson 1963). Independently of whether 
the effect of growth is positive or negative, there are thus reasons to assume that growth 
should be included in analyses explaining political instability.    
 
However, including growth in the first equation as an explanatory variable creates a problem 
of endogeneity, which violates the regression assumption that there is no correlation between 
                                                 
35 In addition, an alternative measure, the yearly rate of change in the level of investment (INVESTC), is 
introduced to test the robustness of the results. This will be explained further in section 3.2.3.  
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the explanatory variables and the error term (Gujarati 2003: 719; Kennedy 2003: 180). To 
deal with this, many studies apply a simultaneous equations model using a so-called Two 
Stage Least Squares system (2SLS). In a simultaneous equations model instrumental variables 
are used to create predicted values which replace the right-hand side endogenous variables in 
the equations.36 To investigate whether simultaneity is present in the different models I 
introduce a simultaneity test (details on this test are presented in Appendix C). This makes it 
possible to decide in which cases it is appropriate to use a simultaneous equations model. If 
the test reports simultaneity, a simultaneous equations model as described above is used. 
When it does not, a recursive model is employed.37  
 
When specifying the recursive models, some considerations must be dealt with. First, due to 
the theoretical expectation of causality running in both directions between instability and 
growth, the safest thing to do to ensure that the right-hand side variables are truly exogenous 
would be to lag these variables before including them in the recursive models. In that way one 
would be completely sure that the estimation is not biased due to any simultaneity that the test 
was not able to capture. Further, in the case of the instability equation, there are reasons to 
believe that in addition to having an immediate effect on political instability economic growth 
is likely to have a delayed effect on instability. For example, some of the consequences of a 
lower rate of economic growth will not be manifested and felt by people until some time has 
elapsed, for example massive job lay-offs and higher living costs. On the basis of this, a 
lagged version of GROWTH is used in the recursive models where instability is the dependent 
variable. As for the equation where economic development is the dependent variable,38 
however, the effects of instability are expected to be immediate. As explained in the previous 
chapter, incidents of collective unrest and violence disrupt investment decisions and 
consumption patterns as they take place. The effect on the growth rate will thus appear within 
weeks or months, not years. Therefore, emphasising these theoretical considerations, 
instability is not lagged in the growth equation.39 
                                                 
36 When applying a simultaneous equations model, the particular equation must be identified. An equation is 
identified when “the numerical estimates of the parameters of a structural equation can be obtained from the 
estimated reduced form coefficients” (Gujarati 2003: 739). To achieve this, the so-called order and rank 
conditions must be fulfilled - which they are in this analysis (see Appendix C). 
37 A recursive model simply indicates that the explanatory variables are de facto exogenous. 
38 For reasons of simplicity, this equation will hereafter be referred to as “the growth equation” even though it 
includes the models where the change in the investment share of GDP (INVESTC) is the dependent variable. 
39 To make sure that this is the right choice, the lagged effects of instability and the non-lagged effects of growth 
were explored. In the case of instability, it appeared that even though the l-year lagged effect is occasionally 
significant in the growth equation, it is the immediate effect of instability that is most important. This effect is 
not affected by the introduction of the lagged variable. As for the growth variable, it is the lagged version that is 
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3.2 MEASUREMENT 
I will now elaborate on how the different variables are measured and operationalised. Below, 
Figure 4 sums up the variable relationships subjected to analysis in this thesis, the control 
variables introduced in each equation, and the hypothesised directions of causality. As was 
explained in section 2.3 and 2.4, inequality is thought to have a positive effect upon political 
instability, and this, in turn, is hypothesised to have a detrimental effect upon growth. The 
background for including the control variables listed in Figure 4 will be given in section 
3.2.4.40   
 
Figure 4: Overview of the hypothesised variable relationships and the control variables included:  
Inequality   +  Instability     -  Growth/ 
(various measures)    (various measures)    Investment change  
 
 
 
 Control variables:                  Control variables: 
 Instability (lagged) + (exp. effect)    GDP per capita  -/+ (exp. eff.)
 GDP per capita  -       Investment    + 
Growth (lagged) -/+     Openness    + 
Regime   +/-      Government consumption  - 
 Population density +     Population growth  - 
 Urban population +         
 Semi-repressiveness +  
                                           
3.2.1 MEASURING SOCIO-ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
As touched upon in the previous chapter, there are no agreed-upon answers to how inequality 
should be defined and the complexity and vagueness of this concept makes measuring it a 
challenge. Consequently, inequality has been measured differently across time, space, and 
scientific branches, but also within each branch (Lichbach 1989: 441-442). In the following 
section I will therefore elaborate on how inequality is measured in this analysis. Some 
scholars have employed the share of the middle class of the total income of the population as 
a measure of inequality (Alesina and Perotti 1996; Easterly 2002), others have looked at the 
ratio of the income shares of the first decile to the tenth decile of the population, and yet 
others compare the share of the richest 20 percent to that of the poorest 40 percent (Nel 
2003).41 The most common measure, however, is the so-called Gini coefficient.42 It is an 
                                                                                                                                                        
most significant in the recursive instability model: the non-lagged effect of GROWTH/ INVESTC is actually 
never significant at the 5 per cent level. 
40 Details on the variables are given in Appendix A. 
41 See Table 4 below. 
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expression of how the total income of a society is distributed among its members, and varies 
between 0 and 1 (alternatively 0 and 100). To explain how it is calculated one can draw upon 
a graphical representation of the Lorenz curve43:  
 
Figure 5: The Lorenz curve and the Gini coefficient44 
 
 
 
The horizontal axis measures the cumulative proportion of the population starting from the 
poorest and ending with the richest, the vertical axis measures the cumulative proportion of 
income (or consumption) accruing to the corresponding unit on the horizontal axis 
(UNU/WIDER 2007: 17). The Gini coefficient is the simply the area between the 45 degree 
line and the Lorenz curve (multiplied by two): the smaller, the more equal a distribution, the 
larger, the more unequal. In line with most empirical studies of income inequality, and 
because it is the measure that is most widely covered by the large-N data collections, I use the 
Gini coefficient as the main measure of socio-economic inequality.45  
 
In 1997 The World Institute for Development Economics Research at the United Nations 
University (UNU-WIDER) initiated the project “Rising Income Inequality and Poverty 
Reduction: Are They Compatible?”. In connection with this, data on inequality was compiled. 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 The Gini coefficient was developed by the Italian statistician Corrado Gini and published in 1912. 
43  The Lorenz curve was developed by Max O. Lorenz in 1905 for representing income distribution. 
44 The figure is collected from http://www.singaporeangle.com/2007/01/non_sequitur_economics_ii_the.html. 
45 An important aspect of variation in the literature regarding how inequality is measured, concerns what 
economic sector is the basis for the inequality measure. As stated by Sen (1992: 12): “[i]nequality of what?” The 
most important distinction is the one between inequality of land or of income (Lichbach 1989). Over the years it 
has become more common to use the latter. The distribution of land holdings is becoming less relevant as 
modernity spreads and urban populations grow. Muller and Seligson claimed already in 1987 that it is income 
inequality that is of greatest importance in studies of political instability, as urban populations are crucial in the 
mobilisation of discontent (Muller and Seligson 1987: 427).  
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As the data set grew larger UNU-WIDER decided to make it publicly available in 2000 under 
the name World Income Inequality Database (WIID). Over the years updates have been made, 
the last, WIID2b, was published in May 2007. WIID2b contains 4982 Gini observations, and 
to a less extent data on quintile and decile income shares, gathered from altogether 228 
different sources.46 These in turn build upon different primary sources and surveys, making 
the WIID2b a so-called secondary dataset. Due to this, the data in WIID2b vary on several 
different aspects: a) what segments of the populations are covered; b) what the unit of analysis 
is; c) what weights are employed when the income sharing unit is an aggregate (family or 
household); d) what income definition has been used and e) what source the data are collected 
from. The use of secondary sources poses the problem of comparability and accentuates the 
need for a thorough and appropriate documentation of all aspects of the data: their primary 
source, what criteria have been used when gathering them and what exactly it is that they 
measure. The critics of the use of secondary sources point in particular to the problem of 
insufficient documentation (Atkinson and Brandolini 2001; Pyatt 2003; Székely and Hilgert 
1999). Therefore, when updating the first version of the World Inequality Indicators Database 
(WIID1), one has taken this objection into account and aimed at minimising the problems of 
secondary datasets by offering extensive information on the different observations, enabling 
the researcher to assume an informed and sober use of the data.47  
 
The WIID2b dataset contains not only different kinds of inequality data from a whole array of 
different sources, the data also overlaps in many instances. Of the complete WIID2b dataset 
of 4982 Gini observations, only 1560 remain when counting only single observations.48 In an 
effort to maximise the number of observations on the Gini variable in my dataset, I have thus 
included 1560 Gini observations from the WIID2b dataset. The process of reducing the 
dataset to including only single observations was intricate and laborious, and only possible 
after an extensive and considerate evaluation of the three aspects of variation: 1) definition of 
income; 2) unit of analysis and different weighing systems applied to them; and 3) the 
different data sources. To illustrate what sort of challenge it represents to anyone who wishes 
to use the dataset, Table 24 in Appendix D shows how Argentina’s Gini coefficient in 1961 is 
                                                 
46 The coverage varies across different countries and years, making the dataset an unbalanced panel. 
47 In addition, the WIID datasets offer quality ratings covering all observations, based on criteria that are 
described in Appendix D. 
48 This is after having removed all observations that do not cover all areas, population segments and age groups. 
Some observations were based only on e.g. rural or urban areas, or only on the economically active part of the 
population, or on certain age groups. For the purpose of this thesis, these observations were deleted from the 
dataset. 
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reported in the WIID2b. As shown here, there are 14 different Gini observations for Argentina 
in 1961. Appendix D also contains a detailed description of how the selection scheme was 
constructed to guide the choice of which observation to include when several were available 
for the same country-year. Most importantly, disposable income is the preferred income 
definition,49 and person-weighted household data are preferred as units of analysis. These 
choices are in line with the recommendations of the Canberra Group50 and based on 
qualitative considerations (The Canberra Group 2001: 37-38).  
 
The WIID dataset is by far the compilation of data on income inequality with the greatest 
coverage both in terms of time and space, for the first time making possible relatively large-N 
studies including developing countries (Nel 2003: 612). Most of the literature studying 
income inequality uses datasets that are both very old and much less extensive in coverage, 
some of which form part of WIID. Although comparability with the findings of these studies 
might be partly sacrificed as a consequence, the fact that this analysis uses the most recently 
updated and improved WIID2b nevertheless represents an important improvement compared 
to existing studies in that it increases the number of observations substantially and offers the 
information necessary to ensure awareness regarding how the data are treated. 
 
As an endeavour to test the robustness of the findings, I include in addition another common 
measure of income inequality, namely the income share of the middle class, more specifically 
the share of the third and fourth quintiles of the population.51 This variable, (MIDCLASS), 
also taken from the WIID2b dataset, contains 928 single observations after having removed 
duplicates using the same procedure and selection scheme as described for the Gini variable. 
If the analyses produce similar results independently of whether inequality is measured using 
the Gini coefficient or the income share of the middle class, the findings are strengthened. The 
                                                 
49 In an effort to reduce the bias that arises due to the fact that substantial parts of the economy in many less 
developed countries does not primarily consist of incomes, inequality is measured on the basis of consumption in 
these countries when such data are available (see Appendix D for details on this point). 
50 The Canberra Group on Household Income Statistics was formed with the aim of improving national statistics 
on household income distribution and inequality, and the quality of international comparisons in this area. The 
group was organised in 1996 and completed their work in 2001 with a final report and recommendations. In 
addition to various countries, the following institutions participated: Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), Inter-American Development 
Bank (IADB), International Labour Organization (ILO), Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), Luxembourg Income Study Group at the Centre for Population, Poverty and Public 
Policy Studies / International Networks for Studies in Technology, Environment, Alternatives, Development 
(CEPS/INSTEAD), United Nations Statistics Division, World Bank and the Economic Commission for Europe. 
51 The quintile group shares express the share of total income going to each fifth of the population ordered 
according to the size of their incomes. 
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1560 and 928 observations that are included in GINI and MIDCLASS  vary on several of the 
dimensions of variation in the WIID2b dataset. To make sure that the inclusion of 
observations that are measured differently does not affect the results in the analyses in any 
significant way, I subject these two inequality measures to several sensitivity tests. Thus, four 
alternative versions of GINI and MIDCLASS are constructed, which consist of a smaller data 
sample that is more uniform with regard to what kind of data is included.  
 
First, GINIINC and MIDINC exclude gross income measures and non-adjusted units of 
analysis altogether. This reduces the number of observations from 1560 (GINI) and 928 
(MIDCLASS) to 917 and 679, respectively. Further, the variables GINICON and MIDCON 
consist only of consumption and expenditure data. However, the exclusion of income data 
reduces the data set substantially (to 348 Gini and 181 middle class observations). I therefore 
constructed two alternative variables, GINIIN and MIDIN, which exclude consumption and 
expenditure data instead of income data. In this way I can test whether the exclusion of 
consumption/ expenditure data alters the results in any significant way with an N that is large 
enough to avoid the problem of too few freedom degrees (GINIIN has 1273 observations and 
MIDIN 778). Finally, I include two versions that combine the different exclusion criteria of 
the former versions: GINISM (664) and MIDSM (530). These exclude gross income measures, 
consumption and expenditure data and non-adjusted units of analysis.52  
 
3.2.2 MEASURING POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
The plan of this study is to test the hypothesis that economic inequality affects economic 
development negatively by causing an increase in political instability. I have explained how 
economic inequality is measured and will now proceed to outlining the measurement and 
operationalisation of political instability. In part due to their different research questions, the 
existing literature displays a wide range of different operationalisations: the frequency of 
coups d’etat; the frequency of revolutions; the extension of politically motivated violence and 
the existence of guerrilla groups; political demonstrations or strikes; the degree of weakness 
of the constitution (the frequency of changes made to it); the frequency of changes in the 
executive; and the perceived risk of such phenomena. Table 4 below lists what measures both 
of political instability and socio-economic inequality that central studies employ: 
                                                 
52 I do not pretend here that the list of sub-samples is exhausted. I could admittedly have create even more 
versions of the GINI and MIDCLASS variables and run more sensitivity tests. However, I conclude that 10 
different inequality measures are enough to serve the purposes that the scope of this paper allows. 
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Table 4: Measure differences across studies on the effect of inequality on instability53 
Study Inequality measure Instability variable 
Kling 1956 Relative shares in land holdings (UN - 
Department of economic affairs) 
Government turnovers, revolutions, uprisings, 
violence, coups d'etat 
Russett 1964 Gini index and relative shares in land 
holdings 
Instability of personnel, internal group violence, 
internal war, stability of democracy 
Feierabend and 
Feierabend 1966  
An index of systemic frustration measuring 
exposure to modern lifestyles not available to 
one self 
Index containing various measures of internal 
conflict  
Mitchell 1968 Owner-operated land as a percent of all land, 
and the coefficient of variation of the 
distribution of land-holdings by size 
Degree of government control 
Russo 1972*  The Gini coefficient Degree of government control  
Hibbs 1973 Social structural imbalances: the ratio of 
educational level to economic development 
level, and the ratio of urbanisation to 
economic development level 
Factor-analysed data on six types of mass anti-
system events 
Parvin 1973 The Gini coefficient (Kuznets 1963) Number of deaths resulting from group 
domestic violence per 1 million 
Nagel 1974 The Gini coefficient Degree of government control 
Sigelman and 
Simpson 1977 
The Gini index (Paukert 1973) Hibb's measure of political instability 
Hardy 1979 The Gini index (Paukert 1973) Riots, armed attacks, deaths from political 
violence, political strikes 
Weede 1981 Top 20 % income share (Paukert 1973, 
Ahluwalia 1974) 
Amed attacks and deaths from political violence
Muller and Jukam 
1983 
Variuos variables measuring subjective 
discontent 
Index of aggressive political participation 
Muller 1985 Income share of upper quintile Deaths from domestic political violence (Jodice 
and Taylor 1983) 
Muller and 
Seligson 1987 
The Gini coefficient (land distribution), and 
the income share of the upper 20% 
Deaths from political violence per 1 million 
Midlarsky 1988 A systematic departure of the pattern of 
holdings of one societal sector relative to the 
pattern of holdings of another 
Deaths from political violence 
Muller and Weede 
1990 
Average life expectancy Political violence death rate 
Moaddel 1994 Income share of the top 20% Index comprising riots and deaths, 
demonstrations, assassinations and 
government sanctions 
Alesina and 
Perotti 1996 
Share of the middle class (Jain 1975) Index comprising assassinations; deaths; 
coups d'etat or coup attempts; and 
authoritarian regime 
Perotti 1996 Share of the 3rd and 4th quintile, and share 
of 3rd quintile alone 
Index comprising assassinations; deaths; 
coups d'etat or coup attempts; and 
authoritarian regime, and Gupta's instability 
index (1990) 
Schock 1996 Ratio of the total value added in the 
manufacturing sector to salaries in the 
manufacturing sector (World Bank data) 
Total deaths from demonstrations, political 
strikes, riots, armed attacks, and 
assassinations (Taylor and Jodice 1983) 
Temple 1998 Income share of the middle class (Deininger 
and Squire 1996) 
Assassinations; Perotti's sociopolitical 
instability index (1996) 
Fearon and Laitin 
2003 
The Gini coefficient Civil war 
Nel 2003 Gini index; expenditure share of bottom 40%; 
expenditure share of top 20%; and 
expenditure share of  3rd and 4th quintile 
(WIID version 1 (2000)) 
Index that combines propensity towards coups 
d'etat with actual events of elite and civil 
instability; and a subjective measure of 
instability (survey) 
Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004 
Gini coefficient on income inequality and land 
inequality (Deininger and Squire 1996) 
Civil war 
Maccullock 2005 The Gini index (Deininger and Squire 1996); 
and the 90/10 ratio (Luxembourg Income 
Study) 
Preference for revolt (survey results) 
                                                 
53 The table is constructed by the author and based on a review of the literature in the field. 
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As discussed in section 2.3, the measures of political instability can roughly be divided in two 
broad categories: regime-related instability and instability induced by civil society. Due to the 
nature of the research question of this thesis, it is the latter kind of political instability that is 
relevant here.54 Several different measures of this kind of political instability are included in 
this analysis, for a number of reasons: First, as argued by Moaddel (1994: 283),  it is 
impossible to justify the choice of one single measure – which should we choose, and for 
what reasons? It is also evident from the great variety in the literature (cf. Table 4) that 
political instability can manifest itself in several different ways and cannot be captured by a 
single variable (Woo 2003: 395). As pointed out by Sigelman and Simpson: “[t]he primary 
problem we faced in measuring political violence was less one of locating suitable data than 
of choosing an apt measure from among the rich variety of candidates” (Sigelman and 
Simpson 1977: 113). Most studies therefore include several measures of political instability, 
and sometimes construct indices of political instability. Secondly, using different measures 
enables comparisons of this study with a greater number of existing empirical studies, and 
thirdly, by running the analysis with different measures of instability the robustness of the 
analysis is tested: similar results across the different measures strengthens the reliability of the 
results. 
 
The Cross-National Time Series Archives dataset compiled by Arthur Banks and 
collaborators is a widely used data source on political instability (e.g. the seminal work of 
Barro 1991), which offers data on a wide range of measures that are extensive both in time 
and country coverage. Of the various measures of instability offered in Banks’ dataset, I focus 
on the following: assassinations, general strikes, guerrilla warfare, riots, revolutions and anti-
governmental demonstrations. 55 However, as Dogan points out in the article “The use and 
misuse of statistics in comparative research”: “[s]ingle isolated indicators are often 
misleading. […] By compounding various indicators in an index, the sociological significance 
of statistical data could be enhanced”(Dogan and Kazancigil 1994: 48-49). In line with this 
argument, and with many existing empirical studies on the subject (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 
1996; Nel 2003), I thus construct a conflict index, CINDEX, which consists of the sum of the 
                                                 
54 It has also been argued that using objective measures of political instability is misleading, and that it is the 
subjective measure, that is, investors’ perceptions of political uncertainty that determine the investment rate 
(Mauro 1995: 690). A study by Nel (2003) supports this notion empirically as he finds that perceived instability 
decreases growth but not “real” instability measures. However, as the existence of a link between inequality and 
perceived instability is rather dubious, such measures are not included.  
55 As discussed in the previous chapter, measures such as coups d’état, governmental crises, purges and cabinet 
changes, are not included in the analysis, as they refer to kinds of instability that is primarily regime-induced, 
while what this study focuses upon is instability induced by civil society.    
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above-mentioned instability measures. However, the use of indices is not unproblematic. It 
mixes measures that tap different kinds of conflict events, and their aggregation can 
complicate the theoretical interpretation of analytical results (Hardy 1979: 212). Therefore, I 
run in addition the analysis with all the individual components of CINDEX. Thus there are a 
total of 7 different measures of political instability that enters into the analysis.56 The 
extension of the 7 variables measuring political instability in my dataset adds up to 8255 
country-years each. The large coverage is especially important since the number of 
observations on my inequality variables is quite small and highly dispersed across countries 
and years.  
 
3.2.3 MEASURING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
To measure economic development I follow a traditional approach by focusing on the yearly 
change in percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in other words, the growth rate (see 
section 2.1). This variable consists of data gathered from Penn World Table (PWT), version 
6.2, a widely used and acknowledged data source with extensive coverage both in terms of 
countries and years, and which many of my studies of reference employ.57 PWT reports data 
on three different measures of real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. One is measured 
in current prices and two in constant prices. One of the latter, RGDPCH, uses a price chain 
index with the base year changed each year and it is adjusted both annually, to capture price 
changes and cross-nationally, to reflect purchasing-power parity. According to Feng (2003: 
4), this is the preferable measure of GDP. It is also the basis for the growth measure provided 
by PWT.  
 
As described in the previous chapter, the mechanism through which political instability is 
thought to lower growth is by affecting the investment decision. By creating uncertainty 
regarding the security of property and property rights, something that is decisive to both 
domestic and foreign investors, political instability constitutes a disincentive to invest (cf. 
section 2.4). Further, in economies that rely on exports of primary products the growth rate 
may sometimes be largely driven by increased international prices and consequently it will 
not reflect the actual economic development of these countries. Therefore, as a supplement to 
                                                 
56 All the variables are measured in absolute numbers and are not adjusted for population size. This is based on 
the position held by Alesina and Perotti, who argue that assassinations and events that similarly rare are “just as 
disruptive of the social and political climate in a small country as of a large country” (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 
1208). I regard this description as apt for all the variables used here.  
57 The Penn World Table is also referred to as the Summers and Heston dataset. 
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GROWTH, I test the hypothesis with an alternative measure of economic development, the 
yearly change in percent of the investment share of GDP per capita. PWT offers data on the 
investment share of GDP, a variable that is based on the other measure of GDP in constant 
prices, RGDPL. This measure does not use a price chain index but is obtained by adding up 
consumption, investment, government consumption and exports, and subtracting imports in 
any given year (Heston et al. 2006, Data Appendix). On the basis of this variable I constructed 
the change variable, INVESTC. 
 
3.2.4 THE CONTROL VARIABLES 
To be able to compare the results of one’s analysis with the rest of the literature, substantial 
components have to be similar, such as variables and the country and time coverage (Campos 
and Nugent 2003: 533). I therefore take the existing literature on the field as a starting point 
when determining what variables to control for in the analysis. However, there are limits to 
how many control variables one should include. As Alesina et al. put it: different authors have 
their own “favourite” explanatory variables, from purely economic ones, to geographic, legal, 
political, cultural, religious and historical ones (Alesina et al. 2003: 182). For example, 
Levine and Renelt points out that over 50 variables have been found to be significantly 
correlated with growth in at least one regression (Levine and Renelt 1992: 942). At the other 
extreme, Achen claims that ”[a] statistical specification with more than three explanatory 
variables is meaningless” (Achen 2002: 446). Combining the objectives of validity, 
parsimony, and minimising the risk of collinearity, I choose an approach in between and 
include a limited set of control variables in this analysis (6 in the first equation and 5 in the 
second). As the analysis includes sensitivity tests in which the variables are measured in 
different ways, the total number of models becomes very high. Therefore, the inclusion of the 
following control variables is fixed, that is, they will not be removed from the final models in 
those cases where they do not yield statistically significant results. 58 
 
EQUATION 1: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In the first equation measuring inequality’s effect upon political instability, the literature 
suggests that controls for the following variables should be included: 
 
 
                                                 
58 For details on the various variables and their sources, see Appendix A. 
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GDP per capita (natural logarithm) 
Contrary to the central assertion made by relative deprivation theorists that it is relative well-
being that matters for the generation of discontent (see section 2.3.1), others claim that 
absolute well-being is more decisive for political stability than relative well-being. For 
example, Parvin found that absolute economic well-being, measured as per capita income, 
was a far more influential factor than relative well-being, measured as economic inequality, 
which in fact turned out to have the opposite effect than what is usually assumed (Parvin 
1973). The finding was partly supported by the results of Sigelman and Simpson’s analysis. 
While they found that the relationship between inequality and political violence was moderate 
and linear in the expected direction, they too emphasised that the effect of income per capita 
was a more critical determinant than inequality. It is commonly assumed that level of 
economic development affects political stability positively, and a variable measuring this is 
often included in equations explaining political instability of various kinds (Hardy 1979; 
Huntington 1968; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Nagel 1974; Parvin 1973; 
Sigelman and Simpson 1977; Weede 1981; Zimmermann 1983). I thus include a variable 
measuring GDP per capita to control for level of economic development in the first equation. 
Due to the great dispersion in the levels of GDP across countries, the natural log of GDP is 
used.59  
    
Growth 
As discussed in detail in section 3.1.4, economic growth is though to be an important 
explanatory variable when studying political instability, and many such analyses include 
growth as an independent variable (e.g. Alesina and Perotti 1996; Auvinen 1997; Barro 1996; 
Londregan and Poole 1990; Nel 2003; Schock 1996). I thus include GROWTH as a control 
variable in this equation. As was discussed in section 3.1.4, in the recursive models a lagged 
version (1 year) of GROWTH is included. This is done to be sure that the estimations are not 
biased due to simultaneity that the test for simultaneity has not been able to capture, and 
because there are theoretical reasons to lag this variable. 
 
Regime   
The inclusion of regime type as a control variable stems from the possibility that its effect 
makes the estimation of the effect of inequality on instability biased. As democracies tend to 
                                                 
59 The measure is the same as the GDP that forms the basis for GROWTH, as explained in section 3.2.3. 
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have both more equal income distributions and less political instability than authoritarian 
regimes (Gurr 1970; Rogowski 2004; Østby 2005) (cf. section 2.2.5), any established 
causality between inequality and instability might be spurious. It is assumed that political 
violence is most likely to occur in societies that do not provide non-violent patterns to value-
satisfying action, that is, an open, democratic contest over political priorities and resource 
distribution (Feierabend and Feierabend 1966: 251). This is the reason why studies such as 
Keefer and Knack’s (2002) “Polarization, politics and property rights: Links between 
inequality and growth” include a regime dummy variable. The opposite effect of regime is 
also expected in the literature, primarily stemming from the hypothesis that in authoritarian 
regimes, repressiveness will prevent people from engaging in political violence (e.g. Moaddel 
1994).60 Despite their different expectations, these two last-mentioned studies both 
hypothesise a linear effect, and in line with Moaddel’s study I have operationalised regime as 
a dummy variable where the value of 1 is assigned to authoritarian countries. I use the ACLP 
dataset as my data source (see Appendix A).   
 
Urban Population and Population Density 
Finally I include two demographic variables, urban population and population density, that 
seem important when studying the determinants of political instability. Many political 
scientists, such as Huntington (1968) and Hibbs (1973), argue that more urbanised societies 
should be more politically unstable because political participation and social unrest are more 
likely to be higher in cities (Alesina and Perotti 1996: 1214). According to the relative 
deprivation hypothesis outlined in the previous chapter it also seems reasonable to suggest 
that when people are crammed more densely together, they become more aware of their 
situation relative to that of others. Scholars like Muller and Seligson and Moaddel similarly 
point out that it is easier to mobilise urban populations than rural ones (Moaddel 1994: 295; 
Muller and Seligson 1987: 427). These variables are included in empirical studies to a varying 
degree, but when included they are often found to be important (Annett 2001; Auvinen 1997; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Nel 2003). POPDEN is entered into the analysis as its natural 
logarithm, and URBPOP is simply the percentage of urban population of the total population. 
 
 
 
                                                 
60 See section 2.3.2. 
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Instability (lag) 
I include in the equation a 1-year lag of the instability variable. This is simply because 
previous instability is thought to affect the present instability positively (Gurr 1970). In 
addition, in many of the models autocorrelation was above 0.3 when this lag was not included 
(see section 3.1.3, page 42). The lagged variables are specified as the original variable name 
plus L, e.g. CINDEXL. 
 
Semi-Repressiveness 
As discussed in section 2.3.2, theories of rational action, resource mobilisation and political 
opportunities, hypothesise that it is political, economic and organisational opportunities that 
are decisive factors explaining political violence, and that the occurrence of violence will be 
greatest at intermediate levels of regime repressiveness. As parsimony is a methodological 
goal, it makes sense to explore the simple general effects before moving on to more complex 
models (Weede 2002: 99). Therefore, a measure of regime repressiveness will only be 
included in those cases where inequality is significant to test whether this effect disappears 
when a control for regime repressiveness is included.61 The variable SEMI is a dichotomous 
variable constructed on the basis of the democracy-autocracy variable from the POLITY IV 
dataset. The value 1 is given to the cases displaying values between -3 and +3, and the value 0 
otherwise. 
 
EQUATION 2: THE RATE OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In the second equation measuring the effect of political instability upon the rate of economic 
development, I introduce the following variables: 
 
GDP per capita (natural logarithm) 
It is common practice to control for the initial level of GDP when studying the determinants 
of growth, and in line with most studies on the field (e.g. Barro 1997; Easterly 2002; Knack 
and Keefer 1997; Krieckhaus 2004), I thus include GDP per capita in this equation. 
According to neo-classical growth theory, its basic version provided by Robert Solow, 
diminishing returns to capital makes poorer countries grow at faster rates than rich countries, 
leading to convergence between rich and poor countries in the long run (Mankiw 1995; Solow 
                                                 
61 In these cases the variable REGIME is not included, as this is another measure of regime repressiveness, 
although measured in a different way. The inclusion of both would confuse the analytical interpretation of the 
semi-repressiveness variable. 
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1956). According to this viewpoint, the expected effect of initial GDP per capita is therefore 
negative. However, the convergence hypothesis has been disproved by several studies. For 
example, Benhabib and Rustichini observe that poor countries grow more slowly than rich 
countries due to the poorer countries lower investment rates in physical and human capital 
(Benhabib and Rustichini 1996), while Keefer and Knack ascribe the same empirical pattern 
to the lack of institutional quality in developing countries (Keefer and Knack 1997). The 
expected direction of the effect of this variable thus remains open.62 
 
Investment 
Including the level of investment as an explanatory variable in equations where growth is the 
dependent variable is in line with neo-classical growth theory, which states that a higher 
savings rate (i.e. investment rate) is an important determinant of growth, and further, 
numerous works have identified investment as a major vehicle for accelerated growth (Barro 
1996: 9; Benhabib and Rustichini 1996: 125; Feng 2001: 288). I therefore include this 
variable in the second equation. Investment is here measured as the investment share of GDP 
in constant prices, as specified in section 3.2.3 and Appendix A.63  
 
Trade openness 
Trade openness is thought to affect growth positively, and many studies, also those focusing 
on the effect of instability on growth, find that the effect of trade openness is significant 
(Barro 2000; Easterly 2002; Sachs and Warner 1997). Here, it is measured as total trade as a 
percentage of GDP, and data are collected from PWT.  
 
Government consumption 
Government consumption, on the other hand, is assumed to have a negative effect on growth. 
Many scholars view this variable as particularly important, and find statistical support for this 
assertion (Alesina et al. 2002; Barro 2000; Sylwester 2000). Government consumption is 
measured as the government’s share of GDP. Here too, data are collected from PWT.  
 
Population growth  
Many contributors to the growth literature point to the negative correlation that is often shown 
to exist between population growth, (alternatively, the fertility rate), and economic growth 
                                                 
62 Here too, GDP is represented in the equation by its natural log. 
63 This is the variable from which INVESTC (see section 3.2.3) has been constructed. 
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(Barro 1996; Krieckhaus 2004; Perotti 1996a). Fertility theory states that as family size 
increases, parents diminish their average investment in human and physical capital per child 
(Becker et al. 1990). I therefore include a control for this in my analysis and expect its effect 
to be negative. POPG is operationalised as the annual percentage growth of total population, 
as defined by Global Development Network Growth Database.  
 
3.3 SUMMARY – METHODOLOGY AND MEASUREMENT 
To investigate whether socio-economic inequality affects economic growth negatively by 
increasing political instability, I apply a quantitative approach, and my analytical tool is the 
regression analysis. The sample subjected to analysis is a time-series cross-section panel of 
188 countries from 1950 through 2004. To control for the possibly significant effect of 
omitted variables that is due to the panel design of the analysis, I apply the Fixed Effects 
Model. Another challenge associated with the structure of the analysis is the possibility of the 
presence of endogeneity: the causality between instability and growth might run in both 
directions. Therefore, a simultaneous equations model is used when simultaneity is found to 
be present, otherwise a recursive model is employed. To test whether the results are robust to 
different ways of measuring inequality and instability, these phenomena are measured in 
different ways. The growth variable is complemented with a variable measuring annual 
change in the investment level to examine whether this can supply the analysis with any 
additional knowledge that is more specific with regard to the research question. The choice of 
control variables is guided by the existing literature on the field and remains fixed throughout 
the analysis.   
 59
4 WHAT WE HAVE LEARNED AND WHAT WE STILL DO NOT 
KNOW: TENTATIVE FINDINGS 
 
This chapter consists of three main sections. In section 4.1 the results of the analysis are 
presented. In section 4.2 the results are discussed elaborately and methodological issues are 
dealt with. Finally, section 4.3 sums up the analysis and its main findings, and offers some 
tentative conclusions. Tables 5 and 6 below list the variables in the two equations and the 
effects they are expected to have. 
 
Table 5: Variables and expected effects – EQUATION 1* 
Concept Variable names Expected effect 
Socio-economic inequality (various) GINI; GINIIN; GINIINC; GINICON; 
GINISM; MIDCLASS;MIDIN; MIDINC; 
MIDCON; MIDSM  
+ 
Lag (1 year) of political instability (various) CINDEXL; ASSASSL; DEMSL; 
RIOTSL; GWARL; REVL; STRIKESL + 
Growth rate of GDP per capita (1 year lag) GROWTHL/ INVESTCL -/+ 
Level of gross domestic product per capita  GDP** - 
Urban population URBPOP + 
Population density POPDEN** + 
Regime REGIME +/- 
Semi-repressiveness SEMI + 
* Dependent variable: POLITICAL INSTABILITY. Independent variables: inequality; instability lagged; growth of 
GDP/ change rate of investment (lagged); GDP per capita; urban population; population density; regime type; 
(semi-repressiveness of the regime)  
** Natural logarithm 
 
Table 6: Variables and expected effects – EQUATION 2* 
Concept Variable names Expected effect 
Political instability (various) CINDEX; ASSASS; DEMS; RIOTS; 
GWAR; REV; STRIKES - 
Level of gross domestic product per capita  GDP** -/+ 
Level of investment INVEST + 
Government consumption GOVCON - 
Trade openness OPEN + 
Population growth POPG - 
* Dependent variable: GROWTH/ INVESTC. Independent variables: Instability; instability lagged; GDP per capita; 
level of investment; government consumption; trade openness; population growth 
** Natural logarithm 
 
4.1 PRESENTATION OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
As described in the previous chapter, I have constructed several measures both of socio-
economic inequality, political instability and economic development:64 When combining all 
the different measures in separate constellations, one is left with not less than 140 model 
                                                 
64 See variable overview in Appendix A for variable details and Appendix E for descriptive statistics. 
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versions: 70 models where the rate of economic development is measured as growth (10 
inequality measures multiplied by 7 instability measures), and equally 70 where it is measured 
as the yearly rate of change in the investment level.65 Tests for simultaneity have been 
conducted for all of the different models, and in those cases when simultaneity was present a 
simultaneous equations model was used, and when it was not, a recursive model was applied. 
The simultaneity test reported simultaneity in 25 of the GROWTH models; the remaining 45 
were therefore made recursive. Of the INVESTC models, simultaneity was present in 14 of the 
models; the remaining 56 were run recursively. In the next section I will present three models 
(A, B, and C) in detail.66 As the total amount of information from all of the models is very 
large, I will synthesise the remaining results so as to identify their general patterns.   
 
4.1.1 THREE MODELS 
Tables 7- 8: Model A (recursive):  GINI; CINDEX; GROWTH  
Dependent variable: CINDEX 
Variable b SE t-stat P Mean of X Adjusted R² Est. AC
CINDEXL 0,47 0,10 4,85 0,00 2,80   
GROWTHL 0,06 0,03 1,79 0,07 2,23   
POPDEN -0,41 1,50 -0,28 0,78 7,27   
GDP -1,94 0,78 -2,48 0,01 8,83   
REGIME 0,89 0,53 1,68 0,09 0,28   
URBPOP 0,08 0,05 1,59 0,11 59,43   
GINI -0,01 0,02 -0,20 0,85 38,79   
      0,41 -0,00
b: regression coefficient (unstandardised); SE: Standard error; P: level of significance; AC: autocorrelation 
Number of units: 1233 
 
Dependent variable: GROWTH 
Variable b SE t-stat P Mean of X Adjusted R² Est. AC
CINDEX -0,10 0,02 -4,23 0,00 1,67   
GDP 1,31 0,56 2,32 0,02 8,30   
INVEST 0,16 0,03 4,71 0,00 14,73   
GOVCON -0,14 0,03 -4,39 0,00 22,40   
OPEN -0,01 0,01 -0,97 0,33 72,11   
POPG 0,19 0,37 0,52 0,60 1,93   
      0,06 0,11
b: regression coefficient (unstandardised); SE: Standard error; P: level of significance; AC: autocorrelation 
Number of units: 5830 
 
                                                 
65 As specified in section 3.2.4, the set of control variables that are included remains fixed in all of the models. 
66 These three models are chosen because they reflect the spectre of different findings across the models. This 
will be explained and discussed further in what follows.    
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As shown in Tables 7 and 8, Model A examines the relationship between GINI, CINDEX and 
GROWTH. The simultaneity test produced an insignificant residual for Model A, so the 
analysis was run recursively. The most important variable in the first equation is the variable 
measuring socio-economic inequality, namely GINI. The effect of GINI is not statistically 
significant in model A, and the implication of this is that socio-economic inequality, measured 
as GINI, does not affect political instability, measured as the conflict index, CINDEX. The 
first hypothesis of this thesis, that socio-economic inequality breeds political instability, is 
therefore rejected by this model.  
 
As for the control variables in equation 1, we can see that the lagged conflict index is 
positively and significantly related to CINDEX: an increase of 1 on this variable causes an 
increase of .47 on the conflict index. This is to be expected: previous conflicts affect the 
present conflict level positively. The only other variable that is significant at the 5-percent 
level is GDP. This regression coefficient goes in the expected direction: a higher level of 
GDP per capita is associated with lower levels of conflict. As this is a logarithmic variable it 
cannot be interpreted linearly. In real numbers its coefficient of -1.94 must be interpreted in 
the following way: moving from having the lowest GDP per capita (170 US$ - that of Liberia 
in 1995) to the average level of GDP per capita in this dataset (7092 US$ - approximately that 
of Brazil in 1988), implies a decrease of 3.14 on the conflict index, and moving from the 
average to the highest GDP per capita (84 408 US$ - that of Qatar in 1974) implies a decrease 
of 2.66 on the conflict index. The effect is thus greatest at the lower end of the scale. 
 
Two variables are significant at the 10-per cent level, GROWTHL and REGIME. GROWTHL 
has a positive effect on conflict, something that indicates that the economic growth of the 
previous year causes a rise in the present conflict level, even though the magnitude is 
relatively small (a rise of 1 percentage point on the growth rate causes an increase of .06 on 
CINDEX) and the significance level is rather low. This goes against the expectation that 
growth will reduce political instability, and lends support to Olson’s hypothesis that growth 
actually has a destabilising effect due to its potential to produce social dislocation and 
increased socio-economic disparities.  
 
Further, we can see that REGIME has a positive effect on conflict. As this is a dummy 
variable where the value 1 is given to non-democratic regimes, this coefficient can be 
interpreted in the following way: being a non-democratic regime is associated with a value on 
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the conflict index that is .89 higher than that of a democratic regime. The variable urban 
population is almost significant at the 10-percent level and its sign is positive. Although the 
direction of this variable is as expected, indicating that countries with a large urban population 
are more prone to be politically unstable than countries with greater segments of the 
population living in rural areas, the weak significance of this variable makes it questionable 
whether this effect really exists. One control variable is completely insignificant in this 
model: POPDEN. This indicates that a more densely populated country is not more likely to 
experience political unrest than countries that are less densely populated.  
 
When it comes to the second hypothesis, that political instability reduces economic growth, 
we must look at the second table of Model A. Due to the fact that inequality does not enter 
into this equation, the sample size is much larger, namely, 5830 observations. As was 
hypothesised, the variable measuring political instability, CINDEX, is negative, and it is 
highly significant. An increase of one incidence of conflict (either an assassination, a riot, a 
revolution, an incidence of guerrilla warfare, a strike or an anti-government demonstration), 
decreases the growth rate in that same year by  .10 percentage points.  
 
Three of the control variables have significant and expected effects on the growth rate. GDP 
is positive with a t-statistic of 2.32, implying that the level of GDP affects the growth rate 
positively. Again, the logarithmic nature of this variable prompts the following interpretation: 
moving from having the lowest GDP per capita to the average (see the preceding 
interpretation of equation 1), is associated with an increase in the growth rate of 2.11 
percentage points, while a move from the average to the highest level of GDP per capita 
results in an increase of 1.8 percentage points on the growth rate. The positive effect of the 
level of GDP per capita goes against the convergence hypothesis that claims that developing 
countries will grow faster than developed countries and that their levels of development will 
therefore converge over time. Rather, it supports the counter-expectation that cross-country 
differences in levels of GDP per capita will persist, or even grow, due to the less developed 
countries’ lower investment rates in human and physical capital and lower institutional 
quality. Indeed, this is further indicated by the highly significant positive effect of the level of 
investment (INVEST) on the growth rate. Finally, GOVCON is negative and significant, 
supporting the expectation that the higher the share of government consumption of the total 
gross domestic income, the lower the growth rate. Two control variables, trade openness and 
population growth, did not have a significant impact on growth in this model. 
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The adjusted R² tells us how much of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by 
the independent variables in the model.67 We can see from Model A that for the instability 
equation, adjusted R² is .41, and .06 for the growth equation. This means that for the 
population from which this sample is drawn, 41 per cent of the variation in CINDEX can be 
ascribed the set of explanatory variables in the model, while the explanatory variables 
included in equation 2 can only account for 6 per cent of the variation in GROWTH.68 Further, 
we can see from the model that the estimated autocorrelation of both models is very low, -.04 
and .11, respectively.69 The results are therefore not biased due to autocorrelation.  
 
According to Model A, then, inequality does not have an effect upon the level of political 
instability, but the latter has a statistically significant negative effect upon the rate of 
economic development. But are these results robust to alternative ways of measuring the 
variables? Let us take a look at one of the other models, that in which inequality as been 
measured as MIDIN (the income share of the middle class) and instability as ASSASS (number 
of politically motivated murders or murder attempts).70      
 
Tables 9- 10: Model B (simultaneous equations):  MIDIN; ASSASS; GROWTH  
Dependent variable: ASSASS 
Variable b SE t-stat P Mean of X Adjusted R² Est. AC 
ASSASSL 0,29 0,10 2,96 0,00 0,31   
PRED -0,01 0,02 -0,34 0,73 2,41   
POPDEN 0,34 0,31 1,09 0,28 7,39   
GDP -0,46 0,19 -2,48 0,01 9,12   
REGIME 0,23 0,16 1,44 0,15 0,17   
URBPOP 0,03 0,01 2,49 0,01 65,60   
MIDIN -0,09 0,04 -2,15 0,03 37,14   
      0,29 -0,07 
b: regression coefficient (unstandardised); SE: Standard error; P: level of significance; AC: autocorrelation 
Number of units: 646 
                                                 
67 The R² is adjusted to remove any bias that is due to the number of explanatory variables included in the model. 
68 The following should be noted here: it has been argued that the importance of R² is limited and that a low R² 
does not necessarily imply a low degree of the variance has been explained. As Achen (1982: 59) points out, the 
problem with the R² in the social sciences is that the independent variables are not subject to experimental 
manipulation: in some samples, they vary widely and produce large variance, in others, the observations are 
grouped more tightly, thus producing little dispersion. Therefore, the variances are a function of the sample, not 
the underlying relationship. Although this objection is valid and should be kept in mind when interpreting the R² 
as reported here, the information that it gives is still useful.   
69 Durbin-Watson is a common measure of autocorrelation. It varies between 0 and 4 and values around 2 
indicate non-presence of autocorrelation. An estimated autocorrelation of .10 gives a Durbin-Watson of 1.8. 
Assuming six explanatory variables and a large N, this is approximately within the range within which 
autocorrelation is not a problem (1.83 and 2.17) (Gujarati 2003: 481, 970). 
70 For Models B and C I will focus on the effect of main variables in the analysis. The control variables will be 
further dealt with in connection with the discussion of the general patterns. 
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Dependent variable: GROWTH 
Variable b SE t-stat P Mean of X Adjusted R² Est. AC 
PRED 0,21 0,23 0,91 0,36 0,29   
GDP -3,39 0,76 -4,47 0,00 9,12   
INVEST 0,11 0,04 2,74 0,01 18,43   
GOVCON -0,05 0,06 -0,81 0,42 20,37   
OPEN 0,05 0,01 5,19 0,00 67,60   
POPG 0,24 0,39 0,62 0,54 1,03   
      0,30 0,09 
b: regression coefficient (unstandardised); SE: Standard error; P: level of significance; AC: autocorrelation 
Number of units: 646 
 
When testing for simultaneity in Model B, the estimated simultaneity was significant. This 
implies that including GROWTH in the instability equation and ASSASS in the growth 
equation71 would produce biased results due to the fact that these variables are not truly 
exogenous but are simultaneously affected by one another. Therefore, to avoid endogeneity 
and biased estimates, the analysis of this particular combination of variables was conducted 
using an S.E. (simultaneous equations) model. In Tables 9 and 10 the endogenous explanatory 
variables are thus replaced by the predicted variables and are called PRED in both equations. 
 
The analytical results for the instability equation in Model B reveal that, compared to the 
results in Model A, the effects of some of the variables remain approximately the same, while 
others are very different. Most importantly in this setting is the fact that the variable 
measuring socio-economic inequality, MIDIN, is here strongly significant and has the 
expected sign: An increase of 1 on MIDIN, that means, an increase of one percentage point of 
the share of the middle class (the Third and Fourth quintiles) of the population’s total income, 
causes a decrease on the dependent variable, ASSASS, of .09. This is quite a lot when one 
takes into account that the mean of ASSASS is .19 (see Appendix E). As for the second 
equation of Model B, the instability variable, appearing in Model B as PRED, has changed 
dramatically compared to Model A. While CINDEX was negative and statistically significant 
at the .01 percent level, PRED is not significant at all (and with a positive sign). Model B 
therefore does not support the hypothesised effect of instability upon growth as presented in 
section 2.4. To sum up the main message in model B: Socio-economic inequality increases 
the level of political instability, but political instability does not have an effect upon growth. 
Let us now look at a third model, and investigate whether either Model A or B is supported by 
                                                 
71 Recall that “the growth equation” refers to the equation where economic development is the dependent 
variable, hereunder also the rate of change in investment (INVESTC). 
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the results in this model. Now, the measure of inequality is MIDCON (the income share of the 
middle class, measured in terms of consumption), GWAR (incidents of guerrilla warfare) is 
the measure of instability and INVESTC (the yearly rate of change in the level of investment) 
replaced GROWTH as the measure of economic development. 
 
Tables 11- 12: Model C (recursive):  MIDCON; GWAR; INVESTC  
Dependent variable: GWAR 
Variable b SE t-stat P Mean of X Adjusted R² Est. AC 
GWARL 0,07 0,20 0,34 0,74 0,19   
INVESTCL 0,02 0,01 1,83 0,07 -0,23   
POPDEN -0,23 0,33 -0,68 0,50 7,19   
GDP -0,27 0,26 -1,02 0,31 7,89   
REGIME 0,08 0,08 0,99 0,33 0,51   
URBPOP 0,00 0,02 -0,08 0,94 41,82   
MIDCON 0,01 0,01 1,96 0,05 35,21   
      0,42 -0,10 
b: regression coefficient (unstandardised); SE: Standard error; P: level of significance; AC: autocorrelation 
Number of units: 176 
 
Dependent variable: INVESTC 
Variable b SE t-stat P Mean of X Adjusted R² Est. AC 
GWAR 0,06 0,06 1,02 0,31 0,18   
GDP -0,59 0,26 -2,27 0,02 8,30   
INVEST 0,14 0,02 6,08 0,00 14,76   
GOVCON 0,00 0,01 0,29 0,77 22,38   
OPEN 0,00 0,01 0,17 0,87 71,93   
POPG -0,14 0,09 -1,50 0,13 1,93   
      0,06 0,01 
b: regression coefficient (unstandardised); SE: Standard error; P: level of significance; AC: autocorrelation 
Number of units: 5773 
 
In this model simultaneity was not present, and a recursive system was thus applied. 
Beginning with the first equation in Model C, we can see that contrary to what was 
hypothesised, the measure of socio-economic inequality, MIDCON, has a positive and 
significant effect upon the level of instability. In other words, a higher level of socio-
economic inequality leads to lower levels of political instability: an increase of 1 percentage 
point in the income share of the middle class is associated with an increase of .01 on GWAR. 
As for the second equation in Model C, we see that GWAR has a t-statistic of 1.02 and is thus 
insignificant as an explanatory variable of the rate of change in the level of investment. The 
central features of Model C are that socio-economic inequality, measured as MIDCON, 
decreases political instability, measured as GWAR, while the latter does not have any effect 
upon economic development, here represented by INVESTC. 
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4.1.2 GENERAL PATTERNS 
The three models that have now been presented report entirely different results, and thus 
demonstrate that the hypotheses put forth in chapter 2 can both be rejected and supported, 
depending on what variables are used in the analysis. Model A, B and C display different 
extremes of the various explanatory variables in the two equations, but what is the general 
pattern for all of the 140 models that have been analysed? I will now present the “general 
behaviour” of the variables measuring socio-economic inequality, those measuring political 
instability and that of the different control variables in a synthesised manner, and investigate 
to what degree there can be found any general pattern across the models. 
 
EQUATION 1: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
As shown by the Models A, B and C, the effect of socio-economic inequality on political 
instability seems to depend on how the variables are measured, and the analysis of these 
models has thus not yielded any clear answer as to whether the hypothesis presented in 
chapter 2 about this relationship should be rejected or not. But these were just three models – 
does the broad picture that the 140 models constitute reveal any one salient effect, and are 
there certain combinations that give certain results?  
 
Table 13: General effects of the inequality variables in the instability equation 
Variable Total 
number 
Insignificant 
effect 
Significant 
positive effect 
Significant 
negative effect 
Expected Sign 
GINI 14 14 0 0 + 
GINIINC 14 14 0 0 + 
GINIIN 14 12 2* 0 + 
GINICON 14 14 0 0 + 
GINISM 14 14 0 0 + 
MIDCLASS 14 12 0 2* - 
MIDINC 14 10 2* 2 - 
MIDIN 14 12 0 2 - 
MIDCON 14 11 1 2 (1*) - 
MIDSM 14 14 0 0 - 
* Significant only at the 10 percent level 
 
We can see from Table 13 that the vast majority of inequality variables have a statistically 
insignificant effect in the instability models: Of a total of 140 entries, 127 are insignificant, 10 
are significant with the expected sign (of these, 5 are significant only at the 10 percent level), 
and 3 are significant with the unexpected sign (of these, 2 are significant only at the 10 
percent level). The general pattern in the models that have been analysed is thus that socio-
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economic inequality does not affect the level of political instability. In other words: this is the 
result given 1) the methodological setup of this analysis with its cross-sectional, cross-
temporal design; 2) the use of a fixed effects model and a simultaneous equations model when 
simultaneity appeared to be present; 3) the ten different ways of measuring socio-economic 
inequality; 4) the seven different ways of measuring political instability; 5) the two different 
ways of measuring economic development that have been used; and 6) in combination with 
the set of control variables that have been included in this analysis. 
 
Let us look at the control variables that were included in this equation, (summed up in Table 
14). The lagged instability variables are for the most part significant (in 84.3 % of the 
models), all of which have the expected sign. One can thus assert that how politically stable a 
country was in the previous year generally affects the present level of political stability. GDP 
has a less clear effect upon the level of political instability: in 59.3 % of the models this 
variable was insignificant. In those cases where GDP was significant, it had a negative sign in 
55 out of 57 models, which is in accordance with the expectations. As for the GROWTH/ 
INVESTC variables (lagged in the recursive models), these were insignificant in 89.3 % of the 
models. The indecisiveness regarding the direction in which causality should run that can be 
found in the literature (see section 3.1.4) manifests itself in the fact that in those cases where 
these variables had a significant effect on instability, 7 had a positive effect and 8 had a 
negative effect. But in general, the rate of economic growth and the change in the investment 
level do not affect the level of political instability.72 
 
Table 14: General effects of the control variables in the instability equation 
Variable Total 
number 
Insignificant 
effect 
Significant positive 
effect 
Significant negative 
effect 
Expected Sign 
Instability lagged 140 22 118 (14*) 0 + 
GDP 140 83 2 55 (13*) - 
GROWTH/ 
INVESTC 140 125 7 (4*) 8 (4*) -/+ 
REGIME 140 87 34 (11*) 10 (4*) +/- 
URBPOP 140 111 29 (15*) 0 + 
POPDEN 140 125 15 (9*) 2* + 
* Significant only at the 10 percent level 
 
                                                 
72 The recursive models were run with the un-lagged versions of GROWTH/ INVESTC, and the lagged versions 
were added to the S.E. models to see whether the time aspect affected the variables’ effect. This appeared not to 
be the case. 
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The regime variable was insignificant in about the same number of cases as GDP, namely, in 
62 % of the models. This might be an expression of an offsetting effect where its negative 
effect cancels out its positive effect. Alternatively, as suggested by Thorbecke and 
Charumilind (2002:1486), even non-democratic regimes can be forced to deal with public 
discontent to avoid social revolution and breakdown of the regime. For example, they 
describe how the dictator Suharto had to implement policies to reduce the economic 
inequality in the Indonesian population, mainly between the better-off Java and the less well-
off periphery islands, to strengthen his own position. In the cases in which REGIME was 
significant, it displayed both positive and negative effects and the theoretical ambiguity 
related to the effect of regime type on the level of political instability (see section 3.2.4) is 
thus confirmed empirically in this analysis. However, since in 34 of the 44 cases where 
REGIME is significant it has a positive sign, more support is given to the view that 
manifestations of political instability are most likely to occur in authoritarian regimes, where 
peaceful channels of political participation are not available.73   
 
When it comes to the two demographic variables in the analysis, URBPOP and POPDEN, the 
coefficients on both variables were for the most part insignificant. For example, URBPOP 
was insignificant in 111 out of the 140 models, that is, in 79.3 % of the cases. However, of the 
29 models in which this variable had a significant effect upon instability, all were positive, 
and thus in line with the theoretical expectation that the more people live in urban areas, the 
easier it is to mobilise people to engage in acts of collective violence and unrest. Generally 
then, one can say that the amount of urban population that a country has does not affect the 
country’s level of political instability, but that when it does have an effect, this is positive. As 
for POPDEN, this variable is insignificant in even more of the models than URBPOP. In 89.3 
percent of the models this variable is insignificant, indicating that in general the density of the 
population does not affect the level of political instability in a country. As with the amount of 
urban population, when POPDEN was significant it was mostly positive (in 15 out of 17 
cases), again in line with the theoretical expectation.    
 
As for the explanatory power of the models where political instability is the dependent 
variable, the adjusted R² is mostly around .30, varying between .20 and .45. For some of the 
models, however, the adjusted R² is lower, sometimes almost zero, but these are very few 
                                                 
73 Recall that the alternative hypothesis is that authoritarian regimes are least prone to political instability, as the 
repressiveness of these regimes prevents the outbreak of collective violence and unrest. 
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cases. Therefore, one can say that, to the degree that the R² tells us something about the 
goodness of fit, the fit of these models is quite good, meaning that the explanatory variables 
included in equation 1 account for a relatively large portion of the variation in the variables 
measuring political instability. The estimated autocorrelation for the models is generally 
around .10, and except in 9 of the 140 models, where the autocorrelation is estimated to more 
than .30, it is always below this level. Therefore, one can conclude that, generally, 
autocorrelation is not a problem in these models. 
 
EQUATION 2: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The general patterns for the first equation of this analysis have now been described, and I will 
now move on to the second equation. Table 15 below lists the levels of significance of the 
different instability variables that enter into the growth equation.  We can see that almost all 
of the variables are insignificant in about half of models, DEMS was insignificant in the 
fewest number of cases and RIOTS had the highest number of insignificant entries. In those 
cases where the instability variables were significant, they were almost exclusively negative. 
This means that in about half of the models instability had a statistically significant negative 
effect upon the rate of economic development, which is in accordance with the theoretical 
expectation. There was only model in which instability had a positive effect, in which case it 
was significant only at the 10 % level. Due to the even distribution of negative and 
insignificant effects, it is difficult to decide what the general pattern is. This will be discussed 
and investigated further in section 4.2. 
 
Table 15: General effects of the instability variables in the growth equation 
Variable Total 
number 
Insignificant 
effect 
Significant positive 
effect 
Significant negative 
effect 
Expected 
Sign 
ASSASS 6 3 0 3 (1*) - 
CINDEX 9 5 0 4 - 
DEMS 3 1 0 2 - 
GWAR 7 5 1 1 - 
REVS 5 3 0 2 (1*) - 
RIOTS 18 15 0 3 - 
STRIKES 5 3 0 2 (1*) - 
* Significant only at the 10 percent level 
 
As for the control variables that have been included in equation 2, Table 16 below sums up 
the general patters. As discussed in section 3.2.4, the theoretical expectations concerning the 
effect of GDP per capita are twofold. While neoclassical economic theory expects the growth 
rates of less developed countries to be higher than those of the developed countries, so that in 
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the long run the levels of development will converge across countries, it has become more 
common to assert that it is the other way around and that the differences between countries 
therefore will persist. This dataset shows that GDP generally has a negative effect upon 
economic growth, as this variable is negative and significant in 26 of the 53 models, 
compared to 8 of 53 which are the cases in which GDP is positive and significant. 
Convergence theory thus receives more support from these analyses than the assertion that 
rich countries grow faster than poor countries. However, the high number of instances in 
which this variable is insignificantly related to growth, (19 of 53 models), indicates that this 
relationship is not sensitive to different variable operationalisations.  
 
If we look at INVEST, the picture is clearer: only in 8 of the 53 models is this variable 
insignificant, and when it is significant it always has a positive effect upon growth. This gives 
support to the vastly agreed upon assertion that the level of investment is important for 
economic growth (cf. section 3.2.4). The contention that the level of government consumption 
is negative for growth is not supported in this analysis: in 44 out of 53 models GOVCON was 
insignificant. However, in all the 9 cases in which it had a significant effect upon the growth 
rate, this was always negative. Further, OPEN is positive and statistically significant in the 
majority of the models (27 out of 53),74 and it never has a negative effect upon growth. It 
should be noted, nonetheless, that in about half of the models this variable was insignificant, 
so its effect is not very robust to different model specifications. Finally, population growth is 
generally unimportant as an explanatory variable of economic growth, as POPG is 
insignificant in 83 % of the models. Curiously, however, in those instances where this 
variable does have a significant effect upon economic growth this is positive in 8 of 9 cases. 
This is contrary to the theoretical expectation, and might be due to spurious effects between 
the variables.    
 
Table 16: General effects of the control variables in the growth equation 
Variable Total 
number 
Insignificant 
effect 
Significant 
positive effect 
Significant 
negative effect 
Expected Sign 
GDP 53 19 8 26 -/+ 
INVEST 53 8 45 0 + 
GOVCON 53 44 0 9 (2*) - 
OPEN 53 26 27 (1*) 0 + 
POPG 53 44 8 (4*) 1 - 
 
                                                 
74 In the vast majority of these cases, OPEN was significant at the 1 % level or lower, with t-statistics around 4. 
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As for the explanatory power of the models where economic development is the dependent 
variable, the adjusted R² is below .12 in 26 models; between .20 and .30 in 7 models; and 
above .30 in 20 of the models. There is in other words great variation, and in the following 
sections I will explore what might lie behind these differences. The estimated autocorrelation 
of these models is never higher than .42, and around or below .10 in 48 of the 53 models. 
Generally, then, autocorrelation is thus not a problem in the models of equation 2. 
 
4.1.3 SUMMARY – ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
Summing up the main variable relationships in this analysis, we have seen that inequality does 
not seem to affect the level of political instability, but that this finding is not robust to 
alternative ways of measuring inequality and instability: In some models inequality did have a 
statistically significant effect upon political instability, and of these cases, inequality had both 
positive and negative effects. Castelló and Doménech’s (2002: 198) finding that the effects of 
economic inequality is largely independent of how it is measured is thus not supported by this 
analysis. As for the relationship between political instability and the rate of economic 
development, the analytical results provide stronger evidence of the existence of a negative 
effect. However, the political instability variables were statistically insignificant in about half 
of the models, and therefore one cannot at this point conclude one way or the other. Taken 
together, then, this analysis has given little support to the hypothesis that socio-economic 
inequality affects growth negatively by producing political instability. In the following section 
I will explore the analytical results in detail and investigate what may lie behind the general 
patterns just presented. 75 
 
4.2 DISCUSSION OF ANALYTICAL RESULTS 
In his study of the effect of inequality on growth across American states, Panizza (2002) 
shows that small differences in estimation techniques, in the method of measuring inequality 
or in the source of the data used to measure inequality can make a big difference in the 
observed relationship between inequality and growth. In this section I will explore to what 
degree the results are due to the various methodological specifications of this analysis. I will 
                                                 
75 Due to the limited scope of this thesis I have not been able to run the analysis testing for the effect of time. The 
Fixed Effects Model used here allows for such a test, and it would have been interesting to see whether the 
effects between the variables in the analysis are in any way different across time periods.  
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begin by investigating whether there are systematic differences in the results according to 
what variables have been used to measure the different phenomena.  
 
4.2.1 THE ROBUSTNESS OF THE DIFFERENT MEASURES 
To what degree are the analytical results dependent on how socio-economic inequality, 
political instability and economic development have been measured? This subsection aims at 
answering this question, and will begin by exploring the variable relationships in equation 1. 
 
 
EQUATION 1: POLITICAL INSTABILITY AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
In ten of the 140 models the inequality variables are significant or close to significant but 
have the unexpected sign. In another ten models they have a significant or close to significant 
effect on political instability and with the expected sign.  
 
Table 17 Regressions with the 10 most significant inequality variables with the unexpected sign* 
Economic development 
measure 
Instability variable Inequality 
variable 
Model** t-stat Expected 
sign 
P 
GROWTH ASSASS GINICON R -1,45 + 0,15 
 GWAR GINICON S -1,54 + 0,12 
 GWAR MIDCON R 1,57 - 0,12 
 REVS MIDCON R 1,52 - 0,13 
 REVS MIDINC R 1,74 - 0,08 
INVESTC ASSASS GINICON R -1,60 + 0,11 
 GWAR GINICON R -1,49 + 0,14 
 GWAR MIDCON R 1,96 - 0,05 
 REVS MIDCON R 1,60 - 0,11 
 REVS MIDINC R 1,67 - 0,10 
* Dependent variable: POLITICAL INSTABILITY 
** R = recursive model; S = simultaneous equations model 
 
 
Table 17 shows that there is a pattern among the inequality variables with significant or close 
to significant coefficients with the unexpected sign. It seems that ASSASS, GWAR and REVS, 
combined primarily with the inequality variables that are constituted only of consumption 
data, (GINICON and MIDCON), and two cases of MIDINC, are variable combinations that 
produce unexpected effects, namely a positive effect of inequality upon the level of political 
instability. However, it is important to note that only one of these variables is significant at 
the 5 percent level, namely, MIDCON in the model where GWAR is the dependent variable – 
the variable combination that was presented in Model C. 
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Table 18: Regressions with the 10 most significant inequality variables with the expected sign* 
Economic development 
measure 
Instability variable Inequality 
variable 
Model** t-stat Expected 
sign 
P 
GROWTH CINDEX GINIIN R 1,68 + 0,09 
 ASSASS MIDCLASS R -1,76 - 0,08 
 ASSASS MIDIN S -2,15 - 0,03 
 RIOTS MIDINC S -2,17 - 0,03 
 RIOTS MIDCON S -1,68 - 0,09 
INVESTC CINDEX GINIIN R 1,71 + 0,09 
 ASSASS MIDCLASS R -1,76 - 0,08 
 ASSASS MIDIN R -2,11 - 0,03 
 RIOTS MIDINC S -2,21 - 0,03 
 RIOTS MIDCON R -2,36 - 0,02 
* Dependent variable: POLITICAL INSTABILITY  
** R = recursive model; S = simultaneous equations model 
  
Table 18 reports the models where the inequality variable is significant, or close to 
significant, and has the expected sign. As was the case in the former table, a pattern can be 
detected among these models. First of all, there are mostly middle class variables on this list. 
Further, both the Gini and middle class variables that only include observations where the 
income definition is either income; disposable income; monetary income; or disposable 
monetary income (GINIIN and MIDIN, see Appendix A and D), in combination with 
CINDEX, yield significant coefficients (at the 10 percent level) with the expected sign. In 
addition to CINDEX, ASSASS and RIOTS are instability variables that appear several times in 
this table.  
 
When comparing the cases in which inequality as a positive effect upon instability with the 
cases in which this effect is negative, one finds that only in one case of the latter is the effect 
significant at the 5 percent level, and in two cases at the 10 percent level. Of the cases in 
which the effect of inequality is negative, on the other hand, its effect is significant at the 5 
percent level in five instances and at the 10 percent level in another five. And in most of these 
instances is inequality measured as a version of the middle class measure. Further, in all the 
recursive models reported in Table 18 the effect of instability on growth is negative, while it 
is non-significant in the S.E. models.76 This implies that if one uses a recursive model; 
measures inequality as the income share of the middle class relative to the income of the total 
population (more specifically, as MIDCLASS, MIDINC, MIDIN or MIDCON; and instability 
                                                 
76 I will discuss the differences between the recursive and the S.E. models separately in section 4.2.2. 
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as either the number of riots or assassinations during a year, one will find that inequality, by 
producing political instability, has a negative effect on economic growth.77  
 
Interestingly, in both Tables 17 and 18 we can see that the pattern is the same in the models 
where GROWTH is the dependent variable as when INVESTC is the dependent variable.78 
This implies that these results are robust to whether economic development has been 
measured as the growth rate of GDP per capita or as the rate of change of the investment 
level, and it strengthens the observation of statistical significance of the specific combination 
of inequality and instability variables that appear in the two tables.79 Exactly why inequality, 
when it is measured as the relative share of the middle class, affects riots and assassinations 
more strongly than the other measures of political instability included here, is hard to tell. The 
immediate interpretation is that when the relative share of the total income of a country 
pertaining to the middle class is small, people more often engage in riots or attempts to 
assassinate politicians or government officials than e.g. engage in guerrilla warfare, strikes, 
anti-government demonstrations, or revolutions. As the intuitive logic of behind this a pattern 
seems rather vague, however, such an interpretation must be drawn with caution, and a 
thorough theoretical investigation is needed to establish a justification for such an expectation. 
At this point I can merely report the empirical existence of this pattern.       
 
The control variables 
Are the effects of the control variables in equation 1 dependent upon how instability was 
measured? For three of the variables, this seems to be the case. First, the effect of REGIME is 
positive and more significant both substantively and in terms of number when GWAR is the 
dependent variable than what is the case with any other of the instability variables, actually in 
as much as 18 out of 20 models. In other words, authoritarianism is an important explanatory 
variable for the presence of guerrilla warfare. In the models where STRIKES is the dependent 
variable, on the other hand, REGIME is sometimes significant with a negative sign, and as 
such these models stand out from the models where other political instability variables are the 
dependent variable. In other words, “any strike of 1000 or more industrial or service workers 
that involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national government policies or 
                                                 
77 If one measures instability as the number of incidents of guerrilla warfare, and inequality as MIDCON, one 
will find that inequality actually decreases the level of political instability. 
78 Of course, this is only relevant in the simultaneous equations models, where INVESTC and GROWTH were 
included to produce the predicted values. 
79 As for the control variables in this equation, there were no clear systematic differences between the models 
stemming from different ways of measuring economic development.  
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authority” (see Appendix A), as opposed to other kinds of political instability, is more likely 
to take place in a democracy than in an authoritarian regime, which is not unreasonable, given 
that strikes are a common way of trying to alter the government’s policies in established 
democracies.  
 
Secondly, the effect of URBPOP appears to be significant and positive in more of the models 
where ASSASS and DEMS are the dependent variables than in the other models. This means 
that that the amount of urban population in a country is a more important variable for 
explaining the number of assassinations, or attempts of such, of a high government official or 
politician and the number of anti-government demonstrations than for explaining other kinds 
of political instability arising from civil society. Thirdly, GDP is negative and significant in 
about half of the models or more for all of the political instability variables except REVS. 
When this is the dependent variable, GDP is never negative and in some instances even 
positive and significant. This might be expressing that a revolution is more likely to take place 
in countries above a certain level of development, and suggests that carrying out a revolution 
is a resource demanding activity.80 
 
The adjusted R² and estimated autocorrelation 
Finally, let us see whether there are systematic differences in the explanatory power and the 
presence of autocorrelation across the models that stem from the different ways of measuring 
socio-economic inequality and political instability. As previously discussed, the adjusted R² in 
the models where political instability is the dependent variable are generally around .30. In 
some instances, however, this is below .20, and even below .10. A closer look at the models 
reveals that the adjusted R² is generally lower when DEMS, RIOTS and STRIKES are the 
dependent variables, indicating that the variables included in equation 1 have less explanatory 
power for the variation in these variables than for the variation in the other political instability 
variables. This suggests that these are kinds of political instability that are affected to a larger 
extent by other factors than those included at the right hand side in equation 1.  
 
Further, although this is not an absolute trend, it seems to be the case that the adjusted R² is 
different in those models where either GINICON or MIDCON is the variable measuring socio-
economic inequality. That is, for the political instability variables whose models have a 
                                                 
80 However, the fact that GDP is insignificant in most of the models where REVS is the dependent variable, must 
be interpreted to indicate that GDP generally does not affect whether a revolution takes place or not. 
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generally high adjusted R², the few cases when it is low it is usually a model where either 
GINICON or MIDCON is included. And for the three variables mentioned above, where the 
adjusted R² generally is low, the exceptions where it is high also tend to involve these 
inequality variables. In addition, whereas the estimated autocorrelation generally is very low, 
it appears that in the models where socio-economic inequality is measured as either GINICON 
or MIDCON, there is a problem with autocorrelation.81 In these models, autocorrelation is 
often estimated to be .30 or higher, up to as .64 at the most. This indicates that the 
observations in GINICON and MIDCON are correlated across time. Due to this the size of the 
standard error will be higher than what is estimated, and the significance testing will be 
therefore be unreliable (Skog 2004: 252). One reason why this is the case with these specific 
variables might be that they are based only on consumption data, which may not vary much 
across time, and in addition the number of observations on these variables is quite a lot lower 
than the other inequality variables.82  
 
EQUATION 2: ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The effect of political instability upon economic development appeared to be generally 
independent of how political instability was measured. As was shown in Table 15, most of the 
instability variables had a negative and statistically significant effect upon the rate of 
economic development in about half of the models. One exception is, however, the case of 
RIOTS: this variable had an insignificant effect in 15 out of 18 models. As I will show in 
section 4.2.2, this must be seen in connection with the fact that most of these models were 
simultaneous equations models. Further, the effects of the political instability variables on the 
rate of economic development did not seem to depend on whether the latter was measured as 
the growth rate of GDP per capita or of the rate of change in the level of investment. One can 
thus say that the analytical results of the effect of political instability on economic 
development are robust to different ways of measuring the two variables.83 
  
The control variables 
A close look at the different models reveals that for some control variables there are 
systematic differences between the models where GROWTH is the dependent variable 
                                                 
81 This is independent of whether the model is recursive or not, and what measures of political instability and 
economic development (in the case of a simultaneous equations model) have been used. 
82 GINICON has 348 observations and MIDCON has 181 (see Appendix A) – samples that are further reduced in 
combination with the other variables. 
83 In the simultaneous equations models, the effect of instability upon growth did not appear to depend on how 
inequality was measured. 
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compared to those where INVESTC is the dependent variable. This is the case for three of the 
variables in equation 2. First, OPEN is has a significantly positive effect upon the rate of 
economic development in about half of the models, and after a closer investigation it appears 
that this is mostly in the GROWTH models. When INVESTC is the dependent variable, OPEN 
is very often insignificant. This is possibly the case because trade openness is not as decisive 
for increases in the level of investment as it is for the growth rate of the economy in general, 
and probably affects consumption to a greater extent than investment. Secondly, GDP is 
insignificant in about half of the models where GROWTH is the dependent variable, and when 
it is significant its effect on growth is both positive and negative. In the INVESTC models, 
however, GDP is insignificant in less than one fourth of the models, and when it is significant 
(16 out of 21 models), its effect is always negative. Thus, one can assume that the level of 
GDP of a country is more important for investment specifically than for economic growth in 
general, and that less developed countries have generally higher rates of change in the level of 
investment than more developed countries.  
 
To a less degree than OPEN and GDP, GOVCON displays a certain pattern in this regard: 
While the variable is insignificant in 20 of the 21 models where INVESTC is the dependent 
variable, in 8 of the 32 models with GROWTH is GOVCON statistically significant and 
negative. This might indicate that the level of government consumption is irrelevant for the 
rate of change in the investment level, but that it sometimes has a detrimental effect upon the 
growth rate of the economy. Again, this is probably due to the fact that the growth rate 
comprises more than investments (such as consumption and technological progress).  
 
The adjusted R² and estimated autocorrelation 
While the adjusted R² in the second equation is robust to different measures of political 
instability, it appears to be systematically different in the models where GROWTH is the 
dependent variable compared to those where INVESTC is the dependent variable. Of the 21 
INVESTC models, the adjusted R² is around .10 or lower in 19, while of the 32 GROWTH 
models, the adjusted R² is around .30 in 25, and around .10 or lower only in 7 models.84 The 
only way to interpret this is that the explanatory variables included in the system produce a 
better fit to the models where GROWTH is the dependent variable compared to those where 
the rate of economic development is measured as INVESTC. In other words, the explanatory 
                                                 
84 The difference between the GROWTH models and the INVESTC models in this regard is not due to different 
sample sizes: that is, GROWTH and INVESTC have an approximately equal number of observations. 
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variables account for a greater proportion of the variation in the growth rate of GDP per capita 
than the rate of change in the level of investment. The estimated autocorrelation is 
approximately equal across the models, and is above .12 only in five cases (of these, the 
highest is .42, and all are simultaneous equations models where either GINICON or MIDCON 
is the variable measuring socio-economic inequality). 
 
SUMMARY – MEASURE DIFFERENCES 
This investigation has given us a very important insight: the ways in which inequality and 
political instability have been measured actually affects the analytical results in the first 
equation: There are specific combinations of inequality and instability variables that produce 
the finding that socio-economic inequality affects instability negatively, others that it affects it 
positively, and other still that it does not have any effect upon political instability. We have 
also seen that the effect of some of the control variables on the level of political instability 
depends on how the latter is measured, and that the explanatory power of the models depends 
on what measures both of instability and inequality are used. Further, the inequality measures 
to a varying degree affect the amount of autocorrelation that is present in the model. As for 
equation 2, we saw that the effect of instability upon growth did not vary systematically 
according to what measure of either instability or economic development was used, but that 
the effect of the control variables in some cases depended on how economic development was 
measured. And while the adjusted R² was generally higher in the GROWTH models than the 
INVESTC models, autocorrelation did not differ according to what measures were used. The 
fact that the analytical results are not robust to different ways of measuring the variables 
constitutes a possible explanation of why previous studies have concluded so differently.  
 
THE QUALITY OF THE VARIABLES: ARE THERE ANY PREFERRED MEASURES? 
At this point it becomes natural to pose the following question: among all the different 
measures that have been included in this analysis – are some measures better than the others 
in terms of validity and reliability? As for the measures of the rate of economic development, 
there are no substantial differences among the measures in this regard. The analysis revealed 
that the instability variables affected the variables measuring economic development 
approximately equally. This tells us that to the extent that political instability affects the rate 
of economic development, it affects both how the level of investment changes from one year 
to another and the growth rate of the economy in general. Therefore, political instability is 
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relevant not only for investments but for other aspects of economic activity as well, and the 
two measures included here thus appear to be equally relevant.  
 
As for the variables measuring political instability, one could argue that CINDEX is a 
preferred measure of political instability as it incorporates all the other measures and thus 
captures different aspects of political instability. However, as mentioned in chapter 3, the use 
of indices is not unproblematic. First, if the variables included do not measure the same 
phenomena to a sufficient degree, combining them in an index is not appropriate. To test 
whether this is the case, that is: how well CINDEX measures the general concept of political 
instability, I scrutinised the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient of the variable combination. It 
appeared to be .58, and thus relatively close to, but not above, the level which is generally 
seen as necessary in this regard (.70) (Ringdal 2001: 168).85 Secondly, CINDEX is not a 
weighted index but merely the sum of the other six measures of instability in the analysis. 
Consequently, all the components have been ascribed equal importance. Whether this is 
appropriate is something that has not been discussed in this setting, as the evaluation of how 
the different expressions of instability should be weighted relative to each other would require 
a study of its own.  
 
Further, this analysis has included several measures of political instability mainly for two 
reasons: The fact that the literature displays many different ways of measuring political 
instability demonstrates both the difficulty and the inappropriateness of choosing one 
expression of political instability, such as political assassinations, riots, revolutions, anti-
governmental demonstrations or the like, and this is in part the reason why many studies 
construct indices to measure political instability. Political instability is an abstract term with 
several concrete counterparts which are all relevant in a setting where the effects of socio-
economic inequality or the determinants of economic development are explored. In addition, 
the use of several measures enables testing the robustness of political instability and 
investigating whether some measures are empirically more important than others.  
 
When it comes to the different measures of socio-economic inequality, the matter becomes 
more complicated. As discussed in chapter 3, a major challenge to all quantitative studies of 
socio-economic inequality is the limited data availability. This analysis has incorporated 
                                                 
85 One could have used factor analysis to examine what instability variables measure different phenomena, and 
thus how an efficient index could be constructed. This is, unfortunately, outside the scope of this thesis. 
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several measures of inequality both to investigate whether the contrasting results of existing 
studies is due to the fact that different measures of inequality have been used, and because 
there is no agreement as to how socio-economic inequality should be measured.86 The 
construction of the inequality variables faces a familiar trade-off, namely that between 
internal comparability and validity on the one hand, and sample size and generalisability on 
the other (Muller and Jukam 1983: 161). As was discussed in section 3.2.1, the inequality 
measures with the largest number of observations consist of different income definitions and 
units of analysis: GINI and MIDCLASS include all income definitions and all units of 
analysis; GINIINC and MIDINC include both income and consumption data, and GINIIN and 
MIDIN include both gross and net income and all units of analysis. The mixing of 
observations that are based on different income definitions and units of analysis might not be 
appropriate and may constitute a validity problem, as several scholars have argued (Deininger 
and Squire 1996; Keefer and Knack 2002; Nel 2003). Nonetheless, this is perhaps a price 
necessary to pay to have a sample that is large and varied enough to enable generalisation. 
 
The measures that distinguish between different income definitions and analytical units, on 
the other hand, have smaller samples, and in some cases, biased samples. For example, 
MIDCON and GINICON include only observations that are based on consumption data. This 
implies not only that the sample size for these variables is much lower than for the other 
inequality variables, but also that they cover only developing countries. Consequently, the 
findings in the models where these measures of socio-economic inequality have been used 
cannot be generalised to developed countries. In addition, the quality rating of the data differs 
between developing and developed countries in a non-random way, and one could thus say 
that the data for developed countries are more reliable than those for developed countries.  
 
This implies that the reliability of GINICON and MIDCON is arguably lower than of the other 
inequality measures, and the results of these models should not be emphasised. The analytical 
results revealed that the models where GINICON or MIDCON were included, differed from 
the other models with regard to the effect of the different variables in the two equations, and 
in addition the explanatory power was lower and the amount of autocorrelation was higher in 
these models. Thus, even though GINICON and MIDCON are internally comparable with 
                                                 
86 For example, while Temple (1998: 319) argues that using the income share of the middle class is a more 
appropriate measure of socio-economic inequality than the Gini coefficient, the latter is the most commonly 
used. 
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regard to the way income has been measured, there is reason to doubt the reliability of the 
analytical results in the models including these measures of inequality. As was demonstrated 
earlier, most of the cases (8 out of 10) where inequality had a significant (or close to 
significant) and positive effect on political instability, inequality was measured either as 
GINICON or MIDCON, as opposed to only 2 of the 10 cases where it had a significant and 
negative effect. Therefore, one could say that to the extent that socio-economic inequality 
affects political instability, this analysis supports the hypothesis that it has a negative and not 
a positive effect, as some have claimed (cf. section 2.3, pages 17-19).  
 
GINISM and MIDSM consist only of data that are comparable both regarding units of analysis 
and income definitions, and are qualitatively the best measures of inequality. The drawback, 
however, is the fact that many developing countries are not included in these samples due to 
the fact that they only report data on socio-economic inequality based on consumption or 
expenditure.87 In addition, the samples are substantially smaller than for most of the other 
inequality variables, and their generalisability might thus be questioned. As we see there are 
drawbacks to all measures, and except in the cases of GINICON and MIDCON, it is hard to 
say that some measures are better than others. In addition, it has previously been shown that 
different measures of inequality are highly correlated (Clarke 1995: 405), something that is 
the case here as well (see Table 19 below). Therefore, it might be the variables’ different 
samples that make them produce such different results, and not the way the variables have 
been constructed. This adds to the difficulty of distinguishing between the measures in terms 
of quality, and doing so thus might not be warranted. 
 
Table 19: Correlation between the inequality measures 
 GINI GINIINC GINIIN GINICON GINISM MIDCLASS MIDINC MIDIN MIDCON MIDSM
GINI 1          
GINIINC 1 1         
GINIIN 1 1 1        
GINICON 0,97 0,97 0,90 1       
GINISM 1,00 1 1 0,91 1      
MIDCLASS -0,91 -0,91 -0,92 -0,86 -0,92 1     
MIDINC -0,92 -0,92 -0,92 -0,88 -0,92 1 1    
MIDIN -0,91 -0,91 -0,92 -0,84 -0,92 1 1 1   
MIDCON -0,89 -0,88 -0,92 -0,92 -0,92 0,96 0,96 0,89 1  
MIDSM -0,92 -0,92 -0,92 -0,86 -0,92 1 1 1 0,89 1 
 
 
                                                 
87 This is the case also for GINIIN and MIDIN. 
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4.2.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE RECURSIVE AND THE S.E. MODELS 
In this section I will investigate to what extent the analytical results depend on whether a 
recursive model has been used or whether the analysis has been run using a simultaneous 
equations model. In equation 1, there is no systematic difference in the behaviour of the 
various inequality variables depending on what model has been used. As for the control 
variables, POPDEN is somewhat different in the two kinds of models: while in the S.E. 
models this variable is never significant, it is significant and with the expected sign in 13 
cases of the recursive models. However, the fact that POPDEN is insignificant in about 86 of 
the 101 recursive models, suggests that it is not a very important variable for explaining the 
variation in levels of instability across countries.  
 
Similarly, REGIME seems to be more decisive in the recursive models, where it has a 
significant effect upon the various measures of political instability in about half of the 101 
models. And when it is significant, its effect is for the most part positive indicating that 
authoritarianism is associated with higher levels of political instability. In the simultaneous 
equations models, REGIME is insignificant in 32 of the 39 models, and in the remaining 
models its effect goes in both directions. Finally, the effect of GDP is more often significant 
in the recursive models, where it is significant in about half of the models, than the S.E. 
models, where it is insignificant in 29 of the 39 models. The difference is not as large as for 
POPDEN and REGIME, however, and the significant entries of GDP are equally distributed 
between positive and negative effects in the two models types.   
 
In equation 2, it appears that there are systematic and sometimes large differences in some of 
the variable effects across the model types. As for the control variables, while OPEN is 
insignificant in all of the 14 recursive models, it has a significant and positive effect upon the 
rate of economic development in 27 of the 39 simultaneous equations models. GDP, on the 
other hand, is statistically significant in all of the 14 recursive models while it is significant 
only in half of the S.E. models. And in the cases in which GDP is significant in the recursive 
models, its effect is positive in 7 and negative in 7, while in the S.E. models the effect of GDP 
is almost always negative (19 of 20 significant entries).  
 
Most important, however, is the difference in the effect of the political instability variables. 
As we can see from Table 20, the instability variables have a significant effect upon the rate 
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of economic development in almost all of the recursive models: only in 2 out of 14 models 
was the variable measuring political instability insignificant, and its effect was always 
negative. For the simultaneous equations models, on the other hand, as much as in 33 of the 
39 models was political instability insignificant, and in one case it was actually significantly 
positive. Further, it appears that for equation 2 the adjusted R² is systematically different in 
the recursive models compared to the S.E. models when GROWTH is the dependent 
variable.88 While the adjusted R² in the GROWTH models is generally around .30, it is 
approximately .06 in seven models, and it appears that these are all the recursive models. 
 
Table 20: The effect of instability – differences between the model types 
Variable Model Total 
number 
Insignificant 
effect 
Significant 
positive effect 
Significant 
negative effect 
Expected 
Sign 
   N % N % N %  
Instability 
(various) Recursive 14 2 14,3 % 0 0 % 12 (2*) 85,7 % - 
PRED 
(various) 
Simultaneous 
equations 39 33 84,6 % 1 2,6 % 5 (1*) 12,8 % - 
 
 
The common denominator seems to be the differences in the sample sizes. The recursive 
models in the second equation do not include the inequality variables, but merely the 
explanatory variables of economic development as specified in section 3.2.4, and the sample 
size in these models is therefore about 5830. In the simultaneous equations models, however, 
all of the right hand side variables, including the inequality variables, have been used to 
produce the predicted values. Since the inequality variables are the variables in the dataset 
with the fewest number of observations, the sample size in the S.E. models will be 
conditioned by these variables. This can explain why the adjusted R² is so dramatically 
different in the recursive GROWTH models than in the S.E. models, and it can also account 
for the different effect of the instability variables and some of the control variables on the rate 
of economic development in the recursive models as compared to the simultaneous equations 
models.89 In this regard, it is tempting to view the results in the recursive models as more 
reliable, as their samples are so much larger than in the S.E. models. Viewing these models as 
more reliable, I therefore conclude that political instability has a statistically significant 
                                                 
88 For the models where political instability is the dependent variable (equation 1), the adjusted R² does not vary 
systematically according to whether a recursive or an S.E. model has been employed. Further, the estimated 
autocorrelation does not depend on model type in any of the equations.   
89 As previously discussed, the fact that the adjusted R² was almost always very low for the INVESTC models 
indicates that the explanatory variables included in this analysis do not account for much of the variation in 
INVESTC. 
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negative effect upon economic growth. Choosing to give more weight to the models with the 
largest samples implies, however, also that the explanatory power of the set of variables 
included at in equation 2 is relatively low.90 
 
An alternative explanation for the differences between the recursive and S.E. models, and one 
that might account for the fact that some of the control variables in equation 1 are different in 
the recursive models than in the simultaneous equations models, despite that there is no 
difference in sample size across the two kinds of models for equation 1, is the following: One 
instability variable and one inequality variable appear more often in simultaneous equations 
models than others: RIOTS in 16 out of 20 models and GINISM in 9 out of 14 models. It 
might thus be, in the case of equation 1, that POPDEN, REGIME and GDP have different 
effects on RIOTS than on the other instability variables, and in the case of equation 2, that the 
effect of RIOTS on economic development is different than the effect of the other instability 
variables. Alternatively, that the sample that is analysed in the presence of GINISM give 
different results than the samples produced by the other inequality variables, something that 
also might account for the differences in the explanatory power of the models. 
 
4.2.3 IS THE EFFECT OF INEQUALITY ALTERED BY THE INTRODUCTION OF SEMI? 
As described in the theoretical discussion it is a viewpoint in parts of the literature that it is 
not socio-economic inequality or relative deprivation that makes people engage in collective 
protest activity, but rather something that people might choose to do after having weighted its 
cost against its benefits (see section 2.3.2). To investigate whether the semi-repressiveness of 
the regime has a higher explanatory power of political instability than socio-economic 
inequality, I will include the variable SEMI (see section 3.2.4, and Appendix A for details on 
this variable) in the models where the measure of socio-economic inequality proved to have 
an incremental and statistically significant effect upon the level of political instability. If 
SEMI removes the significance of socio-economic inequality in these models, and is itself 
significant, there is reason to assume that regime repressiveness is indeed more important than 
socio-economic inequality in explaining political violence. Recall from the presentation of the 
analytical results that there were 10 models in which socio-economic inequality had a 
significant, or close to significant, and positive effect upon political instability.  
                                                 
90 Recall the objection that the relevance of the R² is disputable and that it should no be given too much weight. 
Thus, the low adjusted R² does not necessarily imply a low explanatory power of these models. 
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Table 21: The effect of intermediate levels of regime repressiveness 
Inequality SEMI Adjusted R² Economic 
development 
measure 
Instability 
variable 
Inequality 
variable t-stat t-stat   
Model*
   
Without 
SEMI 
With 
SEMI  
Without 
SEMI 
With 
SEMI 
 
GROWTH CINDEX GINIIN 1,68 1,41 0,76 0,40 0,40 R 
 ASSASS MIDCLASS -1,76 -1,76 0,58 0,28 0,38 R 
 ASSASS MIDIN -2,15 -1,97 0,24 0,29 0,29 R 
 RIOTS MIDINC -2,17 -2,15 -0,13 0,05 0,06 S 
 RIOTS MIDCON -1,68 -1,96 -2,03 0,12 0,12 R 
INVESTC CINDEX GINIIN 1,71 1,45 0,60 0,39 0,40 R 
 ASSASS MIDCLASS -1,76 -1,75 0,62 0,28 0,27 R 
 ASSASS MIDIN -2,11 -1,96 0,20 0,29 0,29 R 
 RIOTS MIDINC -2,21 -2,29 -0,02 0,12 0,06 S 
  RIOTS MIDCON -2,36 -2,28 -1,53 0,13 0,13 R 
* R = recursive model; S = simultaneous equations model 
 
We can see from Table 21 that the effect of socio-economic inequality was generally not 
affected by the inclusion of SEMI. As for the effect of SEMI, this was significant only in one 
model, and then with the unexpected sign. This implies that in this model, intermediate levels 
of regime repressiveness had a decreasing effect on the level of political instability. Further, 
we see that the fit of the model, measured as the adjusted R², remained largely the same in the 
models where SEMI was included as compared to those where it was not. One can thus 
conclude that 1) generally, the semi-repressiveness of the regime does not remove any 
explanatory power from the variables measuring socio-economic inequality; 2) the semi-
repressiveness of the regime does not increase the level of political instability; and 3) the 
inclusion of SEMI does not add to the explanatory power of the model as a whole.91 In other 
words, the hypothesis that political instability will be highest at intermediate levels of regime 
repressiveness is not supported in this analysis.92  
 
4.2.4 EXCLUSION OF RELEVANT EXPLANATORY VARIABLES 
It is commonly claimed that results from regression analyses are sensitive to changes in the 
set of control variables included, and it has been shown that this also concerns studies 
                                                 
91 The estimated autocorrelation was around .10 or lower in all of these models, except when MIDCON was the 
inequality variable. Here, estimated autocorrelation was .38 and .37. 
92 The viewpoint that the decision to participate in acts of political protest and collective violence is a result of 
weighing costs against benefits might still be valid, although the notion that the repressiveness of the regime is 
an important conditioner of this evaluation does not seem to hold empirically. For example, it has been suggested 
that other variables are better measures of costs and political opportunities, such as state strength and degree of 
political institutionalisation (Schock 1996: 107-108). 
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involving income inequality (Clarke 1995: 404; Levine and Renelt 1992; Torstensson 1996). 
An important goal of this analysis has been to investigate why previous studies have 
concluded so differently with regard to the relationship between socio-economic inequality, 
political instability and economic growth, and the focus has been set on testing various ways 
of measuring these phenomena. In face of the limited scope of this thesis, the resulting large 
number of different models has made it necessary to have a fixed set of control variables. The 
analytical results could therefore have been different with other control variables, and one 
cannot rule out the possibility that the discrepancy in existing studies’ conclusions about these 
relationships might partly be due to their different set of control variables. One can always 
debate which variables should be included, but one would probably never agree. More 
serious, however, is the fact that some variables that the literature has found empirically to be 
important explanatory variables of political instability and the rate of economic development 
have been impossible to include in this analysis. The reasons for this will now be presented 
and the consequences of their exclusion will be explored. 
 
EXCLUSION DUE TO LIMITED VARIABLE COVERAGE 
Controlling for human capital, i.e., the level of education in the population, is suggested by a 
wide variety of endogenous growth theories and human capital theories - Barro being perhaps 
the most prominent advocate for its inclusion (e.g. Barro 1991; 1997). The underlying logic is 
that human capital affects growth positively, by increasing the productivity of labour, 
elevating technological progress and facilitating technological transfers from richer countries 
(Krieckhaus 2004: 640). However, the limited coverage of variables measuring educational 
attainment in terms of number of observations, in the face of the panel design of this analysis 
and the varying coverage of the different variables that are included would reduce the sample 
size substantially and create a serious problem of missing data. In particular, the limited 
coverage of the inequality variables makes it problematic to include other variables with many 
missing values as the combination of these can wipe out a major part of the observations. In 
addition, measures of human capital are highly correlated with level of GDP and including 
both variables would therefore create multi-collinearity and violate one of the regression 
assumptions.  
 
EXCLUSION DUE TO TIME INVARIANCE 
The Fixed Effects Model used in this analysis renders impossible the inclusion of time-
invariant country-specific variables. In equation 1, measures of ethnic, religious, linguistic 
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and regional fractionalisation have been excluded due to time invariance. Many studies of 
political instability focus on ethnic fractionalisation as one of the main driving forces behind 
various kinds of political instability, and several find empirical support for its causal effect 
(e.g. Alesina et al. 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005; Easterly and Levine 1997; Fearon and 
Laitin 2003; Keefer and Knack 2002; Mauro 1995; Reynal-Querol 2002a; VanHanen 1999). 
As for equation 2, there are mainly three variables that could have been included. First, being 
an exporter of primary products is expected to be negatively correlated with economic 
development, something that is also evident in empirical investigations on this matter. 
Secondly, the inclusion of tropical climate and landlocked location is also suggested by Sachs 
and Warner (1995; 1997), who argue that agricultural productivity and health is lower in 
tropical climates and that these factors directly inhibit development or growth. Subsequent 
studies have found that these variables significantly influences growth (Bleaney and 
Nishiyama 2004; Easterly 2001; Easterly 2002; Krieckhaus 2006).  
 
CONSEQUENCES 
The exclusion of a relevant explanatory variable can have serious consequences for the 
regression estimates: if it is correlated with some of the included explanatory variables in 
addition to the dependent variable, the parameter estimates of these will be biased. Further, as 
the standard error is proportional with the variation in the dependent variable that remains 
unaccounted for, the standard error of the parameter estimates will be higher if relevant 
explanatory variables have been excluded, independently of whether it is correlated with 
another right hand side variable or not. This affects the significance testing, which depends on 
the ratio between the parameter estimate and the standard error. Thus the parameter estimates 
and significance testing of the included explanatory variables are not reliable, and any 
detected effects might be spurious. In addition, it can have consequences for the explanatory 
power of the model: the R² will be lower if a relevant explanatory variable has been excluded 
(Skog 2004: 271-290). 
 
This being said, it should be emphasised that it is impossible to include all relevant variables. 
In some cases we are not even aware of their existence, and in other cases the correlation 
between the explanatory variables creates problems with multi-collinearity. In addition, 
parsimony is a methodological goal, and the inclusion of a high number of independent 
variables violates this objective. Further, as already shown, the inclusion of one of the 
abovementioned variables would create serious problems with losing too many data points, 
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and the inclusion of the others is impossible given their time-invariant characteristics.93 Due 
to these circumstances, I have to accept any limitations to the analytical approach and results 
that might follow. At the same time, any quantitative study, especially those with a panel 
design using a Fixed Effects Model, face similar limitations due to excluded relevant 
variables, and it is doubtful whether the problem is larger in this analysis than elsewhere.94 
 
4.2.5 THE EFFECT OF LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT 
Many analysts have claimed that the effect of inequality on economic growth depends on the 
level of development. For example, Perotti (1993) and García-Peñalosa (1995) both found 
that inequality is beneficial to growth in developing countries but has the opposite effect in 
developed ones (Temple 1998: 319). Other studies have found evidence of the contrary, 
namely that inequality is bad for growth in developing countries and that it has the adverse 
effect in developed countries (Bandyopadhyay and Basu 2005; Barro 2000; Chang and Ram 
2000). Their disagreement notwithstanding, what these examples tell us is that the variables, 
whether in the reduced-form relationship or in a two-equation analysis with a mediating 
variable, may have different effects in developed as compared to developing countries.95  
 
In his comment on Benabou’s article “Inequality and Growth” (1996) Perotti (1996b: 78) 
asserts that the difference in the effect of inequality on growth in developing as compared to 
developed countries is due to measurement error and poor data quality in developing 
countries. Similarly, Knack and Keefer (1997: 327) state that “[i]f autocracies tend to be poor, 
and poverty and closed political systems generate less reliable data, we are less likely to 
detect a “true” relationship between inequality and growth among non-democracies than 
among democracies”. As previously discussed, the quality ratings of the data in the WIID 
dataset do indeed differ systematically between developed and developing countries.  
 
Whether an interaction effect between inequality and level of development exists has not been 
analysed specifically in this study. Although this might constitute a weakness, it is not 
                                                 
93 In the latter case, one could divide the sample into subsamples and run separate analyses, but this is outside the 
scope of this thesis. 
94 Indeed, far from all studies of the effect of inequality on political instability, or of the effect of instability on 
economic growth, include all the variables that previously have been hypothesised or found to be relevant. 
95 Russett  (1964: 452) contends that  “extreme inequality of land distribution leads to political instability only in 
those poor, predominantly agricultural societies where limitation to a small plot of land almost unavoidably 
condemns one to poverty”. 
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necessarily so that such an interaction effect really exists. Some studies have found that the 
effect of socio-economic inequality on economic growth is independent of level of 
development (e.g. Torstensson 1996), and the inclusion of level of GDP per capita as a 
control variable in all models at least captures the effect that the level of development might 
have. As described in the previous section, GDP was insignificant in about half of the models 
for both equations, and when it did have a significant effect it was generally negative. This 
might indicate that to the extent that the level of development matters, poor countries tend to 
be less politically stable but have higher rates of economic growth than richer countries.  
 
A related issue is that there might be regional differences in the variable relationships. As 
stated by Fielding (2003b: 160), no one seriously claims that the causal link between political 
and economic performance is homogenous throughout the world. Further, inequality is 
thought to be greatest in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin-America and lowest in Northern 
Europe, an assertion that is empirically supported by Temple (1998: 320). The Fixed Effects 
Model that has been applied in this thesis implies that one has controlled for country-specific 
effects. That means that the effects that are detected are not biased due to country-specific 
circumstances. However, as discussed above, using a Fixed Effects Model also implies that 
one cannot include time-invariant control variables such as regional belonging. One 
possibility would be to split the sample and analyse these subsamples, but the number of 
observations would then become critically low due to the low degree of coverage of the 
inequality variables, and further, the scope of this analysis in terms of space does not allow it. 
Tests of regional effects have therefore not been conducted in this study.96  
 
4.2.6 OTHER METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
In section 3.1.2 the five regression assumptions were listed. Most of these have already been 
discussed, such as how well the models have been specified with regard to what explanatory 
variables have been included. Further, any bias due to heteroskedasticity has been removed by 
the inclusion of White’s heteroskedasticity corrected covariance matrix, and all the analyses 
have estimated auto-correlation. Except in a few cases, the amount of auto-correlation present 
                                                 
96 Some would argue that controlling for regions, or even countries, is flawed since it is just a way of avoiding 
the fact that one has not been able to find all the relevant explanatory variables. As Przeworski & Teune (1970: 
18) put it: “[s]cience is concerned with the explanation of specific events by means of statements that are 
invariably true from one set of circumstances to another”. 
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in the models was too low to represent a problem.97 One of the regressions assumption is that 
the explanatory variables included in the equation should not be perfectly correlated, in which 
case there would be a multicollinearity problem related to the model. The presence of multi-
collinearity boosts the standard error of the regression because the additional explanatory 
power of a variable that is highly correlated with another explanatory variable in the system is 
marginal (Skog 2004: 286). It therefore reduces the t-statistic and makes it difficult to know 
how much of the variation in Y that each of the variables actually explains. To investigate the 
presence of multicollinearity, I scrutinised the correlation between all the independent 
variables in each equation. Except for a relatively high correlation between GDP and 
URBPOP (Pearson’s R = .70), none of the variables are correlated at a critically high level 
(see Appendix F).98  
 
Examining the correlation coefficients is not sufficient to determine whether multicollinearity 
is a problem, however, and tolerance tests were conducted to supplement these correlations.99 
As can be seen in Tables 32 and 33 in Appendix F, the tolerance tests report serious problems 
of multicollinearity in both equations. However, many econometricians argue that the 
importance of this regression assumption is disputable, because some degree of 
multicollinearity will always be present (Berry and Sanders 2000: 43). As stated by 
Blanchard, “multicollinearity is God’s will, not a problem with OLS or statistical technique in 
general” (Blanchard 1967, cited in Gujarati 2003: 363). It has also been argued that when 
acknowledged data sources are used, a high degree of multicollinearity is acceptable due to 
the absence of measurement error in these data (Pennings et al. 2006: 163). Although the 
consequences of multicollinearity should be taken into account in the interpretation of the 
statistical outputs, its presence should thus not be given too much emphasis.  
 
Another regression assumption is that there is no specification error due to a non-linear 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables. In chapter 2 I discussed the 
assertion some have made that the relationship between inequality and political instability is 
curvilinear, and both a U-shaped and an inverted U-shaped relationship has been 
                                                 
97 These cases were those in which either GINICON or MIDCON were the inequality measure, and as previously 
discussed, these are models with several other problems as well, and should not be ascribed very much weight. 
98 It should be noted that there is no agreement as to what is a too high correlation. 
99 Tolerance tests are run in the following way: each explanatory variable is regressed upon all of the other 
explanatory variables in the equation, and the R² is subtracted from 1. If the R² is high, it means that one 
explanatory variable is to a large degree explained by the other X-variables. The lower the tolerance, then, the 
more multicollinearity is present.  
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hypothesised. I tested the linearity assumption by producing scatterplots of the bivariate 
relationships between each of the dependent variables and the independent variable in the two 
models, in addition to the whole models, where the standardised predicted values entered as 
the independent variable and the standardised residuals as the dependent variable. I was not 
able to distinguish any obvious curvilinear pattern in these scatterplots. This being said, 
determining whether curvilinearity is present on the basis of a subjective evaluation of 
scatterplots necessarily implies little accuracy. In addition, the nature of the instability 
variables, which have a skewed distribution of observations (most have the value zero), made 
the interpretation even more difficult. Therefore, although the scatterplots did not reveal any 
clear pattern of curvilinearity, I cannot rule out the possibility that such does exist.  
 
The final regression assumption to be dealt with is that the error terms should be normally 
distributed. The histograms in Appendix G show that the error terms are relatively normally 
distributed. Therefore, this regression assumption is regarded as met. As discussed previously, 
non-stationarity is a common problem in panel data analyses. Here, the Phillips-Pearon unit 
root test has been used as a test of non-stationarity. According to this test, non-stationarity is 
not present in the models of this analysis, and thus the results are not biased due to non-
stationarity.100 The statistical significance of all the models has been determined using two-
tailed tests. One could argue that for some of the variable relationships a one-tailed test could 
have been used because the expected direction of causality is sufficiently uniform, and in that 
way achieving more accurate significance estimations. However, I have chosen not to exclude 
any possibility regarding how the explanatory variables affect the left hand side variables in 
the two equations as none of them should be treated as given. The consequence might thus be 
that some variables are in fact more significant than what appears from the models, but this is 
much less serious than the opposite, namely to ascribe more importance to a variable than 
what really is the case. 
  
As for the generalisability and reliability of the analytical results, the following must be 
considered. First, there is reason to question the degree to which the results can be generalised 
to all countries and regions of the world, as data availability is not randomly determined 
(Temple 1998: 320). Appendix H lists the number of observations of each country on GINI, 
the most general inequality variable with the largest coverage. It reveals that Western 
                                                 
100 Appendix I presents two examples of test output, obtained through Limdep. 
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countries are overrepresented in the sample as compared to other regions in terms of number 
of observations, especially Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia. The number of 
observations on inequality measures thus seems to be correlated with the level of development 
and to some extent also with the presence of democracy and its level of consolidation, a 
pattern that is not very surprising. However, and as others have concluded regarding this bias 
(Nel 2003: 631-632), the countries included cover a broad inequality spectrum, from highly 
equal to very unequal countries. In addition, there is a sufficiently large degree of variation in 
the sample to conclude that it is not skewed in the sense that it almost only covers countries at 
one end of the spectrum. Further, the fact that all regions are represented by a large number of 
countries, adds to the generalisability of the analytical results. 
 
The second issue that must be discussed is the possibility that the degree of underreporting of 
incidents of civil disobedience, protests, violence and other manifestations of a politically 
unstable situation is non-randomly distributed across the sample. It is likely that such 
underreporting is most serious in those countries that are most politically unstable, have 
authoritarian regimes, or are poor (Weede 1981: 651). One obvious reason why this might be 
the case is the wish to downplay the presence of political dissent in the population in the face 
of possible international sanctions and pressure, another is the wish to avoid scaring off 
possible investors. Likewise, a similar bias is possibly present regarding the inequality 
variables as well: countries with severe income disparities might have incentives to downplay 
the existence of such disparities, especially if those who are controlling the financial 
information to statistical bureaus and research organisations come from segments of the 
population that want to preserve the status quo. These biases actually represent a kind of 
measurement error that reduces the reliability of the measures of instability and inequality. 
The consequence is that these variables might have different, and stronger, effects than what 
appears from the analytical results.  
 
Finally, the appropriateness of using a panel design to analyse the relationships between the 
variables must be considered. Some argue that it is not necessarily appropriate to use panel 
methods with relatively high frequency data when the mechanisms being studied are quite 
stable over time and thus long term characteristics (Easterly 2002; Lindert and Williamson 
2001). Indeed, it is the case that those that have approached the relationship between 
inequality and growth using panel data, have come up with different results than most analysts 
in the field, and have typically found a zero, non-linear, or positive relationship between 
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inequality and growth (Banerjee and Duflo 2003; Barro 2000; Forbes 2000). Others argue that 
economic inequality changes very slowly over time, while political instability changes 
erratically. It is therefore unlikely to observe a strong and direct relationship between 
inequality and political instability (Lichbach 1989: 438-439). 
 
However, these objections are misplaced if the dataset reveals that there are relatively large 
variations in the data on the central variables of this analysis. For some of them this is the 
case, not only across sections but also across time. For example, Armenia’s Gini coefficient is 
28 in 1988 and 47.5 in 2003; in Bulgaria it varies between 15.6 and 36.8 from 1963 and 2003; 
in Taiwan between 27.7 and 50 in the same period; and in Zimbabwe the Gini coefficient was 
46 in 1950 and 73.3 in 1995.101  The variation on GROWTH is for most of the countries quite 
varied across time, but less so for OECD countries. For example, Albania’s growth rate was -
47 percent in 1991 and 26 in 1994, while that of Luxembourg varied between -8 and 10 
percent from 1951 to 2004, although it stayed mostly between -1 and 5 percent. And as 
discussed in chapter 3, there are several advantages of using panel design that arguably 
outweigh the drawbacks related to any temporal invariance, especially regarding the 
instability variables, that might exist in the dataset. In particular, the fact that the data 
availability on socio-economic inequality is becoming greater and greater as time goes by and 
data is collected from a large number of countries, should be taken advantage of to measure 
its causes and effects more accurately. Nonetheless, Easterly’s objection should be noted, and 
the possibility that the results could have been different if a plain cross-section had been 
employed, must remain open. 
 
4.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION OF ANALYSIS   
The main finding of this analysis is, then, that socio-economic inequality does not seem to 
increase the level of political instability, and therefore it cannot be said to reduce the rate of 
economic development through this path of causation. The hypothesised causal pattern as 
described in chapter 2 has thus not been supported by this analysis. However, the analysis has 
also shown that this result is not robust to alternative ways of measuring inequality and 
instability. This finding, in turn, provides an answer to the second research question of this 
                                                 
101 It should be mentioned here that the referred numbers are collected from the variable GINI, and the data are 
thus based on various income definitions and units of analysis. However, also the more internally comparable 
variables display similar variations. It must also be mentioned that in several countries the Gini coefficient is in 
fact relatively stable across time. 
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thesis: namely that one possible reason why previous studies of the inequality-instability 
nexus have concluded differently is that they diverge on this dimension.   
 
The lack of measurement robustness notwithstanding, the general pattern in the analysis is 
that there is relatively strong evidence of a negative effect of political instability on the rate of 
economic growth, but that inequality in very few models had a positive effect upon the level 
of political instability. The literature offers some possible explanations of this. First, it might 
simply be the case that inequality does not breed political instability. For example, even 
though relative deprivation might still cause political violence, it is a possibility that socio-
economic inequality does not produce feelings of relative deprivation in the population. As 
stated by Weede (2002: 98):  
 
Relative deprivation may result from different characteristics of nations or even be a purely 
psychic state largely independent of objective or measurable macro-characteristics of nations. 
Or, the impact of the size distribution of income on violence may depend on the presence or 
absence of some widely accepted ideological justifications of inequality.  
 
It might also be that in the mobilisation of discontent other factors are more decisive than the 
presence of stark socio-economic inequalities or relative deprivation. Important here is the 
argument put forth by game theory: the role played by political entrepreneurs is decisive in 
the mobilisation of discontent and the presence of inequality or other societal cleavages alone 
are not sufficient to spur protest activity (Elster 2007; Munck 2001).    
 
However, due to the strong theoretical grounds on which to expect a causal relationship 
between inequality and political instability, added to its intuitive logic, other possibilities 
should also be considered. Indeed, the fact that both this analysis and previous empirical 
studies have shown that the no-relationship finding is not robust, increases the likelihood that 
other explanations are more credible. The following suggestions should thus mark future 
research in this field. First, as previously shown, the possibility that the effect of socio-
economic inequality is curvilinearly related to political instability has not been 
unambiguously ruled out in this analysis.  
 
Secondly, some would argue that measuring inequality in terms of income or consumption is 
flawed because it does not capture “real” inequalities. Some measure inequality in terms of 
the distribution of land and land tenure, claiming that in developing countries this is the kind 
of inequality that is relevant in an instability and growth setting (Deininger and Squire 1998) 
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(cf. section 3.2.1). However, measuring inequality in terms of land tenure would rule out 
developed countries from the analysis, since this is not a relevant indicator of a person’s 
economic ability in a modern economy. Other kinds of inequality have also been advocated 
for: For example, Castelló and Doménech, find evidence that human capital inequality 
measures (the amount of education obtained by the different income quintiles and across the 
Gini coefficient), provide more robust results than income inequality measures (Castello and 
Domenech 2002). However, it is likely that education and economic inequality is highly 
correlated. Generally, using these and other alternative measures of inequality imply serious 
problems of data availability. Consequently, despite their theoretical appeal, it is difficult to 
test such notions empirically. 
 
Thirdly, and perhaps even more appealing, is the contention that the lack of a clear pattern in 
empirical findings is due to the fact that the relationship between inequality and instability is a 
conditional relationship (Lichbach 1989: 465). Within the relative deprivation framework, 
Gurr (1970: 230) argues that discontent, and its potential to breed violence, is tempered by the 
intensity and scope of normative and utilitarian justifications for political violence. That is, it 
depends on the degree to which overt aggression is culturally and sub-culturally sanctioned; 
on the degree of success of past violence; and on the legitimacy of the political system and the 
kind of responses it makes and has made to relative deprivation. This suggests that it would be 
necessary to control for the presence of such characteristics to find the “true” effect of socio-
economic inequality on political instability. 
 
It is also argued that other sources of conflict are more important, such as ethnic, religious and 
cultural cleavages (Sigelman and Simpson 1977: 126). It has been suggested that it is when 
inequality interacts with these other cleavages that it becomes an important determinant of 
conflict (Barrows 1976; Horowitz 2000; Lichbach 1989; Nafziger and Auvinen 2002; Reynal-
Querol 2002b; Østby 2005). For example, Østby (2005: 7-11) investigates the existence of 
horizontal inequalities and finds that the interplay between socio-economic inequalities and 
identity cleavages (ethnic, religious, regional) enhances group grievances, which in turn 
facilitates conflict mobilisation. She finds that this relationship is further conditioned by 
regime type and level of political inclusiveness, that is, democracies and proportional 
electoral institutions are more vulnerable to horizontal inequalities because these political 
arrangements facilitate civil activism. Therefore, it might be the case that the link between 
inequality and instability does exist, but that it is dependent on the interaction with other kinds 
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of cleavages. The fact that such interaction effects have not been scrutinised here implies that 
there might be a pattern of causality between inequality and political instability that has not 
been captured by this analysis. Similarly, there is of course the viewpoint that the effect of 
inequality, or any other variable for that matter, is context-specific. But as argued earlier, 
context-specificity is just another way of admitting that one lacks knowledge about existing 
relevant variables. However, it might still be that context-specific variables have been left out 
that when analysed in interaction with inequality would disclose a clearer pattern of causality.  
 
Finally, it is important to note the following: As discussed in section 3.1.1, the quantitative 
method applied to the research question with its variable-oriented and generalising focus, 
implies that the analytical results do not fit all cases and that many exceptions exist. The 
results of the analysis merely describe the general patterns in the sample, and do not capture 
all the nuances that exist in the real world. Further, this thesis has investigated one of several 
possible paths of causation between socio-economic inequality and economic development. 
Based on the results of this analysis one can neither say that socio-economic inequality 
decreases, increases or has no effect upon economic development – it has merely shown that 
the contention that socio-economic inequality decreases economic growth by producing 
political instability does not seem to hold, but again that this depends on how one measures 
the different phenomena. Hence, the thesis does not reject the possibility that socio-economic 
inequality reduces the rate of economic development through some of the other paths of 
causation presented in chapter 2.  
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5 CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has aimed at answering the following questions: 1) Does socio-economic 
inequality affect the rate of economic development negatively by producing political 
instability; and 2) why have previous studies reached so highly divergent conclusions? I 
started out by discussing the theoretical basis for the hypothesis that socio-economic 
inequality affects economic growth negatively by breeding political instability. The main 
focus in chapter 2 was given to the expected causal relationship between inequality and 
instability. Based on the theoretical contributions made by the literature in the field, this 
pattern of causality was explained in the following manner: Socio-economic inequality is an 
important cause of relative deprivation and as such it produces discontent. This discontent 
increases the number of potential participants in protest behaviour, and therefore is socio-
economic inequality thought to increase the level of political instability. I then explained why 
political instability is expected to have a negative effect upon growth. By creating uncertainty 
around private property and the protection of this, political instability constitutes a 
disincentive to invest. As economic development depends on investments, political instability 
thus reduces the rate of economic growth. Through this path of causation then, socio-
economic inequality was hypothesised to have a negative effect upon the rate of economic 
development.  
 
In chapter 3 I presented the method used to analyse the relationships between these variables, 
namely a regression analysis of an unbalanced panel of 188 countries from 1950 through 
2004. The hypothesis was approached using a two-equation system in which political 
instability was the dependent variable in the first equation, and economic development in the 
second. The chapter described how certain issues related to the panel design of the analysis, 
and the presence of simultaneity in the two-equation system, were dealt with. I then discussed 
the measurement and operationalisation of the variables in the analysis. An improvement 
relative to existing studies on this subject was the use of the most recently updated data source 
of socio-economic inequality, WIID2b, which is also the most extensive in coverage. While 
most of the previous studies have been limited to cross-section analyses, this new dataset 
enabled a large-N panel data analysis. Further, the detailed information about each 
observation that was offered by the data source made it possible to construct various measures 
of inequality, which together with different measures of political instability and economic 
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development were included in the analysis to test the robustness of the analytical findings. In 
chapter 4 the analytical results were presented and discussed.  
 
FINDINGS 
The analytical results did not support the hypothesis that inequality decreases the rate of 
economic development by producing political instability. While the analysis to a large degree 
established a negative effect of political stability on the rate of economic development, the 
vast majority of the models reported statistically insignificant effects of inequality upon 
political instability. However, the analysis also showed that these results are not robust to 
alternative ways of measuring socio-economic inequality and political instability. As the 
analytical results varied depending on what measures is used, one could in practice find 
support for whatever hypothesis one had put forth.  
 
For example, when inequality was measured as the income share of the middle class (with 
income defined as disposable income (or disposable monetary income) and various income 
sharing units were included); when political instability was measured as the number of 
politically motivated murders or attempted murders during a year; and the rate of economic 
development as the yearly change in the amount of investment, I found that inequality 
increased political instability, and that instability decreased growth. In other words, that 
specific constellation of variables provides support for the hypothesis that socio-economic 
inequality lowers growth by producing political instability. If, one the other hand, the Gini 
coefficient was used to measure income inequality (with all definitions of income and units of 
analysis included); anti-government demonstrations was used as a measure of political 
instability; and the growth rate of GDP measured the rate of economic development, then I 
found that socio-economic inequality did not spur political instability. Based on this specific 
variable combination, then, one would have to conclude that socio-economic inequality does 
not have a negative effect upon the rate of economic development by spurring political 
instability. Another combination, still, would tell us that inequality actually affects economic 
development positively, because it decreased the level of political instability.  
 
Despite the methodological improvements of this analysis with regard to data and sample 
size, one has thus not been able to answer the first research question of this thesis, that is, 
whether socio-economic inequality decreases economic growth by breeding political 
instability. However, using the largest and most recently updated data source on income 
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inequality has contributed in a different regard. It has given an answer to the second research 
question of the thesis, namely why previous studies on this alleged causal pattern have 
concluded so differently. The analysis has demonstrated that using different measures of 
socio-economic inequality and political instability produces different results. This can explain 
why the existing literature has reached such highly diverging conclusions, and it constitutes a 
reason why we still know very little about the relationship between socio-economic 
inequality, political instability and economic growth. 
 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINDINGS  
This finding highlights the importance of assuming a conscious and considerate use of 
quantitative data. The analysis has shown that the way we define and measure a phenomenon 
to a large extent affects the results we get, and awareness of this should mark the 
interpretation of the conclusions of previous studies. Probably, such “measurement 
dependency” is not only present in studies dealing with the political and economic effects of 
socio-economic inequality, but is most likely a challenge in all research fields in the social 
sciences. Another implication of the results of this analysis is that there is reason to doubt the 
validity of any policy recommendations concerning the distribution of income that is based on 
empirical analyses such as this. Whether or not socio-economic inequalities affect economic 
development negatively by breeding political instability remains unanswered, and policy-
makers aiming at either reducing political instability or establishing a pro-growth environment 
cannot be sure of the effectiveness of adjusting the distribution of income in this regard.  
 
However, as the empirical cases described in the first part of this thesis demonstrate, the 
discontent associated with stark socio-economic inequalities does sometimes result in 
collective protests and violence. As many observers of the violence that still marks the 
political scenery in Kenya have argued, promoting a more equal distribution of income thus 
appears as a necessary means to alleviate the tension among people and groups in the country 
and the human suffering that exists at the lower end of the distributional scale. In addition, it 
is important to note that reducing socio-economic inequality may be a goal per se, 
independently of its effects on political instability and economic growth. Indeed, even though 
people do not actively protest, their demands might be highly legitimate. After all, promoting 
human well-being and dignity is the ultimate goal of all scientific endeavours in this field, not 
least those that aim at explaining differences in rates of economic development. 
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APPENDIX A: Detailed variable description 
 
Table 22: The variables and their sources 
Variable: Description:  Source: Coverage: 
GINI Gini coefficient (WIDER). The variable includes 
different income definitions, units of analysis and 
data sources. 
WIID2b (a) 1561 country-
years 
GINIINC  
 
Equals GINI but excludes gross income; earnings; 
primary, market and factor income; plus undefined 
income data, and data on all other units of analysis 
than household or family that are person-weighted.  
Ibid. 917 country-
years 
GINICON  
 
Equals GINI but excludes all income data that are 
not consumption or expenditure. 
Ibid. 348 country-
years 
GINIIN  Equals GINI but excludes data on all other income 
definitions than income, disposable income, 
monetary income and disposable monetary income.  
Ibid. 1273 country-
years 
GINISMALL Equals GINIINC but excludes data on all other 
income definitions than income, disposable income, 
monetary income and disposable monetary income. 
Ibid. 664 country-
years 
MIDCLASS  The income share of the middle class (Third and 
Fourth quintile) of the total income of the population. 
The variable includes different income definitions, 
units of analysis and data sources. 
Ibid. 928 country-
years 
MIDINC Equals MIDCLASS but excludes gross income; 
earnings; primary, market and factor income; plus 
undefined income data, and data on all other units 
of analysis than household or family that are person-
weighted. 
Ibid. 679 country-
years 
MIDCON  Equals MIDCLASS but excludes all income data 
that are not consumption or expenditure. 
Ibid. 181 country-
years 
MIDIN 
 
Equals MIDCLASS but excludes data on all other 
income definitions than income, disposable income, 
monetary income and disposable monetary income. 
Ibid. 778 country-
years 
MIDSMALL Equals MIDINC but excludes data on all other 
income definitions than income, disposable income, 
monetary income and disposable monetary income. 
Ibid. 530 country-
years 
ASSASS 
(Assassi-
nations) 
Any politically motivated murder or attempted 
murder of a high government official or politician. 
Banks' Cross-
National Time-
Series Data 
Archive*  
8255 country-
years 
STRIKES 
(General 
strikes) 
Any strike of 1000 or more industrial or service 
workers that involves more than one employer and 
that is aimed at national government policies or 
authority. 
Ibid. Ibid. 
GWAR 
(Guerrilla 
warfare) 
Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried 
on by independent bands of citizens or irregular 
forces and aimed at the overthrow of the present 
regime. 
Ibid. Ibid. 
RIOTS Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 
citizens involving the use of physical force. 
Ibid. Ibid. 
REVS 
(Revolu- 
tions) 
Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental 
elite, any attempt at such a change, or any 
successful or unsuccessful armed rebellion whose 
aim is independence from the central government. 
Ibid. Ibid. 
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DEMS 
(Anti-
government 
demonstra-
tions) 
Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people 
for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their 
opposition to government policies or authority, 
excluding demonstrations of a distinctly anti-foreign 
nature. 
Ibid. Ibid. 
CINDEX An unweighed conflict index that equals the sum of 
ASSASS, STRIKES, GWAR, RIOTS, REVS and 
DEMS. 
Ibid. Ibid. 
REGIME Regime classification: 1 = Dictatorship; 0 = 
Democracy 
ACLP(b)  8194 country-
years 
POPG 
 
Annual percentage growth of total population. Global 
Development 
Network 
Growth 
Database (c)  
8899 country-
years 
URBPOP Urban population as a percentage of total 
population. 
Ibid. 
 
8176 country-
years 
POPDEN 
 
The natural logarithm of population density, 
calculated from an area in square miles (scaling: 
1000) and population. Scaling: 0.1. 
Banks' Cross-
National Time-
Series Data 
Archive 
8403 country-
years 
GDP The natural logarithm of real gross domestic product 
per capita (RGDPCH): a chain index obtained by 
first applying the component growth rates between 
each pair of consecutive years, t-l and t (t=1951 to 
2000), to the current price component shares in year 
t-1 to obtain the DA growth rate for each year. This 
DA growth rate for each year t is then applied 
backwards and forwards from 1996, and summed to 
the constant price net foreign balance to obtain the 
Chain GDP series. 
Penn World 
Table Version 
6.2 (d) 
7334 country-
years 
GROWTH Growth rate of real GDP per capita in constant 
prices, Chain series, (RGDPCH). Unit: percent in 
2000 constant prices. 
Ibid. 7146 country-
years 
INVEST Investment share of real GDP per capita. Unit: 
percent in 2000 constant prices (RGDPL)** RGDPL 
is obtained by adding up consumption, investment, 
government and exports, and subtracting imports in 
any given year.  
  
INVESTC Annual change in the investment share of real GDP 
per capita.  
Constructed 
on the basis of 
INVEST 
7146 country-
years 
OPEN Trade openness in constant prices. Unit: percent in 
2000 constant prices. Exports plus Imports divided 
by real GDP: total trade as a percentage of GDP. 
Ibid. 8329 country-
years 
GOVCON Government consumption measured as government 
share of real GDP per capita. Unit: percentage in 
2000 constant prices.** 
Ibid. 8312 country-
years 
SEMI A dichotomous variable based on the POLITY IV 
regime classification (values from -10 to 10: the 
higher the more democratic). Here, the value 1 is 
given to the cases displaying values between -3 and 
+3; the value 0 otherwise. 
POLITY IV 
2004 (e) 
7001 country-
years 
* Political instability variables, Banks' Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive: All the variables are 
derived from the daily files of The New York Times. The eight variable definitions are adopted from 
Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations", General Systems 
Yearbook, VIII [19631, 1-50). 
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** Since 1996 has been taken as the reference year for PWT 6.0, the real shares in constant prices 
are the same as the current shares in 1996. The components in international dollars are moved to 
another year by the national accounts growth rate for that component between 1996 and the given 
year. This includes exports and imports. INVEST and GOVCON are obtained by dividing each of them 
by real GDP per capita plus exports and minus imports in 1996 prices. 
 
a: UNU/WIDER World Income Inequality Database, Version 2.0b: 
http://www.wider.unu.edu/wiid/wiid.htm 
 
b: Jose Antonio Cheibub and Jennifer Gandhi: "Classifying Political Regimes: An Extension and an 
Update",  Yale University, 2004 
 
c: Global Development Finance & World Development Indicators: New York University Development 
Research Institute (NYU-DRI): 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/global%20development%20network%20growth%20database.htm 
 
d: Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.2, Center for 
International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, 
September 2006: http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php 
 
e: http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ 
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APPENDIX B: Countries included in the dataset 
 
Table 23: Overview of the total of 188 countries included in the dataset102  
Afghanistan Djibouti Latvia Samoa 
Albania Dominica Lebanon Sao Tome and Principe 
Algeria Dominican Republic Lesotho Saudi Arabia 
Angola Ecuador Liberia Senegal 
Antigua Egypt Libya Serbia and Montenegro 
Argentina El Salvador Lithuania Seychelles 
Armenia Equatorial Guinea Luxembourg Sierra Leone 
Australia Eritrea Macao Singapore 
Austria Estonia Macedonia Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Madagascar Slovenia 
Bahamas Fiji Malawi Solomon Islands 
Bahrain Finland Malaysia Somalia 
Bangladesh France Maldives South Africa 
Barbados Gabon Mali Spain 
Belarus Gambia, The Malta Sri Lanka 
Belgium Georgia Mauritania St. Kitts & Nevis 
Belize Germany Mauritius St. Lucia 
Benin Ghana Mexico St. Vincent & Grenadines 
Bermuda Greece Micronesia, Fed. Sts. Sudan 
Bhutan Grenada Moldova Suriname 
Bolivia Guatemala Mongolia Swaziland 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Guinea Morocco Sweden 
Botswana Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Switzerland 
Brazil Guyana Namibia Syria 
Brunei Haiti Nepal Taiwan 
Bulgaria Honduras Netherlands Tajikistan 
Burkina Faso Hong Kong Netherlands Antilles Tanzania 
Burundi Hungary New Zealand Thailand 
Cambodia Iceland Nicaragua Togo 
Cameroon India Niger Tonga 
Canada Indonesia Nigeria Trinidad &Tobago 
Cape Verde Iran Norway Tunisia 
Central African Republic Iraq Oman Turkey 
Chad Ireland Pakistan Turkmenistan 
Chile Israel Palau Uganda 
China Italy Panama Ukraine 
Colombia Jamaica Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates 
Comoros Japan Paraguay United Kingdom 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jordan Peru United States 
Congo, Republic of Kazakhstan Philippines Uruguay 
Costa Rica Kenya Poland Uzbekistan 
Cote d`Ivoire Kiribati Portugal Vanuatu 
Croatia Korea, Dem. Rep. Puerto Rico Venezuela 
Cuba Korea, Republic of Qatar Vietnam 
Cyprus Kuwait Romania Yemen 
Czech Republic Kyrgyzstan Russia Zambia 
Denmark Laos Rwanda Zimbabwe 
                                                 
102 The number of time points for which there is data for each country is not included here as it varies depending 
on what measures of inequality and instability is used.  
 112
 113
APPENDIX C: Issues regarding the presence of simultaneity 
 
THE SIMULTANEITY TEST 
To determine whether simultaneity was present in a model, a simultaneity test was employed. 
This implies that when creating the predicted values with which to replace the explanatory 
variables that we suspect are not truly exogenous, residuals were created and included in the 
equation along with the predicted value and the other explanatory variables.  
 
EQUATION 1 
REGRESS; LHS=GROWTH; RHS=ONE, LNGDP, INVEST, GOVCON, OPEN, POPG; PANEL; FIXED; HET; HET=CODE; 
STR=CODE; KEEP=PRED; RES=RES $ 
 
REGRESS; LHS=ASSASS; RHS=ONE, PRED, RES, ASSASSL, LNPOPDEN, LNGDP, REGIME, URBPOP, GINI; PANEL; 
FIXED; HET; HET=CODE; STR=CODE $  
 
EQUATION 2 
REGRESS; LHS=ASSASS; RHS=ONE, ASSASSL, LNPOPDEN, LNGDP, REGIME, URBPOP, GINI; PANEL; FIXED; HET; 
HET=CODE; STR=CODE; KEEP=PRED; RES=RES $ 
 
REGRESS; LHS=GROWTH; RHS=ONE, PRED, RES, LNGDP, INVEST, GOVCON, OPEN, POPG; PANEL; FIXED; HET; 
HET=CODE; STR=CODE $ 
 
If the variable representing the residuals turn out to be statistically significant, then 
simultaneity is present in the model, and a simultaneous equations model must be used to 
analyse that specific combination of variables. As a rule of thumb, I applied an S.E. model if 
RES in at least one of the equations was significant, but in practice it was significant in both 
or none of the equations. 
 
 
THE RANK AND ORDER CONDITIONS 
Below I present the structural equations of the system of simultaneous equations. (Hereafter, β represents estimated regression coefficients of 
endogenous variables, and γ represents estimated regression coefficients of exogenous variables). 
 
(1) REVS = β11GROWTH + γ11REVSL + γ12POPDEN + γ13GDP + γ 14REGIME + γ15URBPOP + γ16GINI + u1 
(2) GROWTH = β21REVS + γ21GDP + γ22INVEST + γ23GOVCON + γ24OPEN + γ25POPG + u2  
 
Rearranging, the equations can be represented as: 
       REVS - β11GROWTH - γ11REVSL – γ12POPDEN – γ13GDP – γ15URBPOP – γ16GINI                                                                                                  = u1 
- β21REVS + GROWTH                                           – γ21GDP                                     – γ22INVEST – γ23GOVCON – γ24OPEN – γ25POPG                      = u2 
 
Reduced form equations (endogenous variables expressed as functions of exogenous variables): 
REVS = π11REVSL + π12POPDEN + π13GDP + π14REGIME + π15URBPOP + π16GINI + π17INVEST + π18GOVCON + π19OPEN + π110POPG + ε1   
GROWTH= π21REVS + π22POPDEN + π23GDP + π24REGIME + π25URBPOP + π26GINI + π27INVEST + π28GOVCON + π29OPEN + π210POPG + ε2   
 
(1) First, we check the order condition: 
Given:  G = # of equations = 2 
  K = # of variables (endogenous and exogenous) = 12 
  M = # of variables included in the equation 
Order Equation: (K-M) must be equal to or greater than (G-1) 
Equation 1: (K-M) = 12-7 = 5 > 1 = (G-1)          overidentified 
Equation 2: (K-M) = 12-6 = 6 > 1 = (G-1)          overidentified 
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To check equation 1, we strike out row 1, and then strike out all the non-zero columns in row 1. If any of the - γ22, - γ23, - γ24, - γ25 coefficients 
are non-zero then the equation is identified. We know from our estimation results that these coefficients are in fact non-zero, thus, equation 1 is 
identified.  
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Equation 2 (observe the coefficients of the matrix-form structured equations model presented above): 
(2) Second, we check the rank condition: 
 
Equation 1 (observe the coefficients of the matrix-form structured equations model presented above): 
- β21     1     0     0 - γ21    0    0    0 - γ22 - γ23 - γ24 - γ25 
- β21     1     0     0 - γ21    0    0    0 - γ22 - γ23 - γ24 - γ25 
    1 - β11 - γ11 - γ12 - γ13 - γ14 - γ15 - γ16    0    0    0    0 
    1 - β11 - γ11 - γ12 - γ13 - γ14 - γ15 - γ16    0    0    0    0 
 
 
 
 
 
To check equation 2, we strike out row 2, and then strike out all the non-zero columns in row 2. If any of the – γ11, - γ12, - γ14, - γ15, - γ16 
coefficients are non-zero then the equation is identified. We know from our estimation results that these coefficients are in fact non-zero, thus, 
equation 2 is identified.  
APPENDIX D: Details on the inequality measures  
 
Table 24: An example from the WIID2b dataset: Argentina 1961 
 
Gini Reported 
Gini 
Area 
Covr 
Pop 
Covr 
IncSharU UofAnala Equivsc IncDefn Source 
1 
Survey/ 
Source2 
Quality 
43,4 41,90 All All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Monetary 
Income, 
Disposable 
Altimir 
1986 
Based on 
National 
Accounts 
3 
42,1 40,70 Urban All Household Household No  
adjust- 
ment 
Monetary 
Income, 
Disposable 
Altimir 
1986 
Based on 
National 
Accounts 
3 
42,3 42,30 All All Household Household No  
adjust- 
ment 
Income, .. Crom-
well  
1977 
Weisskoff 
1970 
4 
49,9 50,82 Agricult All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Income, .. Jain  
1975 
Cline 1972 4 
51,3 53,11 Agricult Income 
Reci-pient 
Person Person No  
adjust-
ment 
Income, .. Jain  
1975 
UN-ECLA 
69 
4 
43,1 43,75 All All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Income, .. Jain  
1975 
UN-ECLA 
69 
4 
47,6 48,95 All Income 
Reci-pient 
Person Person No 
adjust-
ment 
Income, .. Jain  
1975 
UN-ECLA 
69 
4 
41,3 42,04 Non-
agricult 
All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Income, .. Jain  
1975 
Cline 1972 4 
46,4 47,72 Non-
agricult 
All . Income  
Recipient 
. Income, .. Jain  
1975 
Synthetic 
estimates 
(UN-ECLA 
1970) 
3 
42,5 42,50 Urban All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Primary 
Income 
Lecaill- 
on et al. 
1984 
. 4 
47,8 47,80 Urban Econ. 
Active 
Pop. 
. Person . Primary 
Income 
Lecaill- 
on et al. 
1984 
. 4 
42,5 42,00 All All Household Household/ 
Family 
No  
adjust-
ment 
Income, 
Gross 
Paukert 
1973 
Weisskoff 
1970 
4 
43,3 43,40 All All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Income, .. Weiss- 
koff 
1970 
ACND 3 
43,4 41,90 All All Household Household No  
adjust-
ment 
Monetary 
Income, 
Disposable 
Altimir 
1986 
Based on 
National 
Accounts 
3 
 
The WIID2b dataset contains both “Reported GINI” – the Gini coefficient reported by the 
different sources, and “GINI”, which is calculated by WIDER using methods developed by 
Tony Shorrocks and Guang Hua Wan to estimate the Gini coefficient from decile data “almost as 
accurately as if unit record data were used” (UNU/WIDER 2007: 9). When decile data were not 
available, “GINI” was equal to “Reported GINI”. To enhance comparability, I use “GINI”.  
 
PRIORITISING INCOME DEFINITIONS 
Both theoretical considerations and the coverage of the different definitions have guided the 
ranking of income definitions. There is disagreement in the literature whether inequality 
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measures should be based on income or consumption. Most industrialised countries and Latin 
American countries have traditionally collected data based on income while in most 
developing countries in Africa and Asia inequality has been assessed with reference to 
consumption. As societies are different, it is sometimes appropriate to use different 
expressions to measure the same phenomena (Przeworski and Teune 1970; Sartori 1970). In 
developing countries consumption is a better basis for measuring the economic situation of an 
individual than income. Hence, in an effort to ensure comparability of the actual inequality in 
different countries rather than in the means of measuring this inequality I have chosen to use 
income data for industrialised countries and Latin America, and consumption data for 
developing when available.103   
 
Table 25: Prioritising the different income definitions in WIID2b 
Priority Income category Income definition 
1/2 Income a) Disposable income 
  b) Disposable monetary income 
  c) Income,... 
  d) Monetary income,… 
2/1 Consumption/ Expenditure a) Consumption 
  b) Expenditure 
3 Gross Income a) Gross income 
  b) Gross monetary income 
4 Earnings a) Net earnings 
  b) Gross earnings 
5 Market, factor and primary income  
6 Undefined  
 
Table 25 shows how the income definitions have been ranked. Income definitions such as 
gross income, gross monetary income, earnings and market, factor and primary earnings were 
only included when data with higher ranking were not available. This is because taxes and 
social assistance are not included in these data, while what we want for this purpose is data 
that reflect the actual economic ability of a person. Further, the coverage of most of these 
measures is quite small. Consumption and expenditure are grouped together as they are 
thought to be roughly expressing the same. However, when data on both definitions were 
available, consumption was prioritised before expenditure, as, to the degree that they differ, 
                                                 
103 There are some exceptions from the list of countries that are defined as developing by the World Bank and the 
Global Development Network Growth Database. (These are: The Latin American countries, except Jamaica; 
Bulgaria; China; Croatia; Czech Republic; Estonia, the Republic of Korea; Latvia; Lithuania; Macedonia; 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia). Income data have been prioritised before consumption/ expenditure data 
for these countries either because the quality of the income data is rated higher, or because they have much more 
data on inequality based on income than on consumption/ expenditure.  
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consumption is more precise (it measures what is actually consumed and not just merely 
purchased). Further, it is greater in coverage. 
 
PRIORITISING UNITS OF ANALYSIS AND WEIGHTS 
Next, the inequality data varied with regard to the unit of analysis. The following scheme 
guided the removal of duplicate country-years which varied on this dimension: 
 
Table 26: Prioritising the different units of analysis and weights in WIID2b 
Priority Income-sharing 
unit 
Unit of analysis Weight 
1 Household/family  Person Household per capita 
2   Household eq., (HBAI, national scale, OECD 
mod., OECD, square root, etc.) 
3   Family eq. (square root, social assistance 
4   Family per capita 
5   Family unit per capita 
6   - 
7   No adjustment 
8  Family/ household Adjustment (undefined) 
9   No adjustment 
10  Undefined Undefined 
 
This priority scheme, as the former, is partly guided by conceptual relevance, partly by 
coverage. In line with the recommendations of WIDER and the Canberra Group for 
international comparisons of income distribution, the household/family is chosen as the basic 
statistical unit (UNU/WIDER 2007: 7). Further, “person” is prioritised before 
“family/household” as the unit of analysis both because the former exceeds the latter by far in 
coverage and because when the unit of analysis is person, it means that the needs of different 
sized households have been taken into account. Next, whether the observations are weighted 
or not constitutes an important point of variance in the dataset: when the income sharing unit 
is the household or family, it is not enough that the data takes into account the number of 
members in the household (which is the case when person is the unit of analysis). This 
adjustment ignores economies of scale in household consumption relating to size and other 
differences in needs among household members (e.g. age, sex, labour force status) 
(UNU/WIDER 2007: 17-18). Among the wide range of equivalence scales used in different 
surveys the priority scheme first differs between surveys that use such scales and those with 
no adjustment. It then ranks the different scales depending on coverage: the scale “household 
per capita” is prioritised because it is by far most widely used. This increases unity among the 
data used, which again promotes comparability.  
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PRIORITISING SOURCES 
After these two selection rounds there still existed duplicates in the dataset, namely those with 
different sources. The total number of 228 sources implies that in some way one would have 
to rank them to decide which observation to include in the final dataset when two sources 
reported observations on the same country-year. In these situations the choices of which 
observation to include were guided both by the kind of source and their extension. Public and 
primary sources such as the World Bank (World Bank Poverty Monitoring Database 2002 and 
World Development Indicators, various years), the UN (1981 and 1985), international survey 
organisations such as Luxembourg Income Study and official national statistical units were 
deemed to have more credibility than the many different authors that refer to surveys 
conducted by these or other more or less acknowledged institutions. Of the official sources, 
the Deininger & Squire dataset from 1997, updated in 2004, was by far the most extensive 
one. As this dataset also constituted the basis for the first WIID dataset (1997), in addition to 
the fact that the people behind it are from the World Bank (Klaus Deiniger and Kihoon Lee) 
and the Global Development Network (Lyn Squire), this was the source that was first 
prioritised. In addition to these official data sources, some authors offer big compilations of 
inequality data which have been widely used in previous studies of income inequalities. These 
are Paukert (1973), Jain (1975), Cromwell (1977), Lecallion et al. (1984), Fields (1989) and 
Transmonee (2004). 
  
This handful of sources covered most of the data, and in cases where country-years were 
covered by other sources, aspects such as coverage and recency guided the choice between 
them. I recognise that this can seem somewhat arbitrary. However, when it comes to which of 
these sources are most credible there is of course no agreement in the literature, and thus my 
guess is as good as anyone’s. Further, the observations in question are quite few, they are not 
systematically distributed and in most instances have very similar values, so I have come to 
the conclusion that it will not affect the analysis in any significant way. 
 
THE QUALITY RATINGS 
Income distribution data suffer from several problems, one of them being the quality of the 
data (Castello and Domenech 2002: 188). And as Clarke (1995: 406) states, poor data quality 
can make it difficult to compare across countries. In the WIID2b dataset quality ratings are 
given to all the observations. It ranges from 1 (high quality) to 4 (low quality), and are based 
on the following criteria: 1) whether the concepts underlying the observations are known or 
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not; 2) the coverage of the income/ consumption concept; and 3) the survey quality, with 
regard to coverage issues, questionnaires and data collection methodology.  
 
The WIID datasets builds upon the Deininger & Squire dataset from 1997 and employ the 
same quality rating system, however with a few improvements. Using this original dataset, 
Deininger and Squire (1998: 269) found in their important study “New ways of looking at old 
issues: inequality and growth” that the results of the analysis they conducted using their high 
quality dataset was not different from the findings of the existing empirical research at that 
time. This might suggest that the quality of the “lower quality” dataset might not be that low 
after all. In any case, it is arguably difficult to ensure that a subjective quality rating based 
upon criteria that are sometimes hard to judge by and most likely even evaluated by different 
people (e.g. area experts), are consistent and uniform. Further, Atkinson and Brandolini 
(1999, in Easterly 2002: 16) argue that many observations excluded from their high quality 
dataset have just as good reasons to be labelled high quality as the data included in this 
dataset. Thus, the quality ratings were not given very much weight when constructing the 
different inequality variables in this analysis. Only when all else was equal, that is, very 
rarely, I let the quality rating decide which observation to choose for the same country-year.   
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APPENDIX E: Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 27: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Minimum Maximum N 
GDP 7091,88 8049,66 170,55 84408,23 7334 
GROWTH 2,04 7,58 -63,32 151,06 7146 
INVEST 14,69 9,34 0,14 103,16 7334 
INVESTC 0,01 2,93 -47,06 37,72 7146 
OPEN 72,48 54,31 2,00 986,45 7344 
GOVCON 21,93 11,17 1,53 93,72 7334 
POPG 1,91 1,70 -44,41 21,76 7934 
URBPOP 46,40 24,74 1,80 100,00 8175 
POPDEN 3024,93 9398,82 14,00 175606,00 7429 
REGIME 0,58 0,49 0 1 7222 
SEMI 0,12 0,33 0 1 6813 
ASSASS 0,19 0,92 0 25 7289 
STRIKES 0,13 0,53 0 13 7290 
GWAR 0,20 0,80 0 34 7284 
RIOTS 0,45 1,83 0 55 7290 
REVS 0,18 0,51 0 9 7290 
DEMS 0,51 1,79 0 60 7290 
CINDEX 1,66 4,08 0 87 7281 
GINI 37,96 11,19 15,90 73,90 1560 
GINIINC 36,59 11,36 18,00 73,90 916 
GINICON 39,85 9,57 16,63 73,90 347 
GINIIN 37,31 11,42 15,90 65,79 1273 
GINISM 34,79 11,50 18,00 65,79 664 
MIDCLASS 36,65 4,59 17,43 45,98 927 
MIDINC 36,92 4,45 17,43 45,98 678 
MIDCON 35,24 3,98 17,43 44,36 181 
MIDIN 37,05 4,60 19,79 45,98 778 
MIDSM 37,57 4,36 22,50 45,98 530 
LNGDP 8,28 1,12 5,14 11,34 7334 
LNPOPD 6,90 1,52 2,64 12,08 7429 
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APPENDIX F: Variable correlations and tolerance tests  
 
 
Table 28: Correlation between the control variables in equation 1 
 GROWTH INVESTC GDP URBPOP POPDEN REGIME 
GROWTH 1      
INVESTC -0,08 1     
GDP 0,03 -0,01 1    
URBPOP 0,02 -0,02 0,70 1   
POPDEN 0,05 -0,02 0,15 0,21 1  
REGIME -0,02 0,00 -0,35 -0,42 -0,03 1 
 
 
Table 29: Correlation between the control variables in equation 1 and the inequality variables  
 GROWTH INVESTC GDP URBPOP POPDEN REGIME 
GINI -0,08 -0,04 -0,47 -0,25 -0,04 0,19 
GINIINC -0,09 -0,05 -0,52 -0,30 -0,14 0,23 
GINIIN -0,05 -0,03 -0,50 -0,23 -0,03 0,17 
GINICON -0,18 -0,07 -0,28 -0,21 -0,13 0,21 
GINISM -0,05 -0,03 -0,54 -0,22 -0,20 0,17 
MIDCLASS 0,11 0,03 0,54 0,34 0,29 -0,28 
MIDINC 0,12 0,05 0,54 0,33 0,28 -0,28 
MIDIN 0,09 0,02 0,55 0,29 0,29 -0,28 
MIDCON 0,13 0,12 0,33 0,32 0,24 -0,13 
MIDSM 0,10 0,02 0,53 0,02 0,27 -0,25 
 
 
Table 30: Correlation between the control variables in equation 2 
 GDP INVEST OPEN GOVCON POPG 
GDP 1     
INVEST 0,31 1    
OPEN 0,19 0,20 1   
GOVCON -0,20 -0,10 0,19 1  
POPG -0,09 -0,17 0,00 -0,05 1 
 
 
Table 31: Correlation between the control variables in equation 2 and the instability variables 
 GDP INVEST OPEN GOVCON POPG 
ASSASS -0,03 -0,04 -0,09 -0,04 -0,02 
CINDEX -0,06 0,01 -0,22 -0,04 -0,03 
DEMS 0,03 0,06 -0,15 -0,04 -0,06 
GWAR -0,08 -0,04 -0,11 0,00 0,04 
REVS -0,17 -0,16 -0,10 0,03 0,06 
RIOTS -0,03 0,02 -0,16 -0,03 -0,01 
STRIKES 0,00 0,01 -0,13 -0,03 -0,05 
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Table 32: Collinearity statistics: Tolerance test – equation 1 (example)* 
Dependent Variable Tolerance 
GDP 0,04 
URBPOP 0,02 
POPDEN 0,01 
REGIME 0,27 
GINI 0,17 
* Lagged variables have not been included 
 
 
Table 33: Collinearity statistics: Tolerance test – equation 2 (example)* 
Variable Tolerance 
GDP 0,07 
INVEST 0,28 
OPEN 0,23 
GOVCON 0,20 
POPG 0,52 
CINDEX 0,76 
* Lagged variables have not been included 
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APPENDIX G: The distribution of the error terms 
 
Figure 6: Frequency distribution of the error terms and the normality curve: Equation 1 
Histogr am  for  V ar iable RE S
Fr
eq
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 -21.051   -9 .098    2 .856   14.809   26.763   38.716   50.670   62 .623
 
(Inequality variable: GINI) 
 
Figure 7: Frequency distribution of the error terms and the normality curve: Equation 2  
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 -62.435  -33.114   -3 .793   25.528   54.849   84.169  113.490  142.811
 
(Instability variable: CINDEX)
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APPENDIX H: Country coverage of the Gini variable 
 
Table 34: Overview of countries covered by the Gini variable and their number of observations 
Western countries Africa  Latin America  Asia  
Middle East and  
Northern Africa 
Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe 
Country N Country N Country N Country N Country N Country N 
Albania 1           
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina 1           
Cyprus 2 
Central African  
Republic 1         
Croatia 4 
Congo,  
Republic of 1         
Serbia and  
Montenegro 5 Liberia 1         
Switzerland 6 Mozambique 1         
Latvia 9 Namibia 1         
Lithuania 9 Rwanda 1         
Portugal 9 Seychelles 1         
Macedonia 12 Somalia 1         
Austria 11 Swaziland 1 Cuba 1       
Belgium 13 Togo 1 Suriname 1       
Germany 13 Botswana 2 Uruguay 1       
Ireland 13 Burundi 2 Guyana 2       
Luxembourg 13 Djibouti 2 Barbados 3       
Slovenia 14 Guinea 2 Nicaragua 3       
Greece 15 Guinea-Bissau 2 Haiti 3 
Papua New 
Guinea 1     
Romania 15 Uganda 2 Argentina 4 Laos 2     
Estonia 16 Burkina Faso 3 Bolivia 6 Mongolia 2     
France 16 Cameroon 3 Ecuador 7 Cambodia 3     
Poland 19 Zimbabwe 3 Paraguay 7 Fiji 3     
Spain 20 Gabon 4 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 7 Vietnam 4     
Hungary 21 Gambia, The 4 Guatemala 8 Nepal 5 Benin 1   
Slovak Republic 22 Lesotho 5 Puerto Rico 8 Hong Kong 10 Lebanon 1   
Netherlands 23 Mauritania 5 Bahamas 14 Singapore 10 Jordan 2 Tajikistan 3 
Czech Republic 24 Senegal 5 Honduras 14 Sri Lanka 10 Yemen 2 Azerbaijan 5 
Finland 25 Sierra Leone 5 
Dominican  
Republic 15 Indonesia 11 Iraq 3 Uzbekistan 6 
Norway 26 Malawi 6 Jamaica 15 Philippines 12 Iran 6 Kazakhstan 7 
Denmark 27 Mauritius 6 Peru 15 Malaysia 14 Israel 6 Belarus 12
Canada 30 Ghana 7 Panama 16 Bangladesh 15 Algeria 2 Kyrgyzstan 12
Italy 31 Madagascar 7 El Salvador 17 Thailand 17 Morocco 7 Russia 12
Sweden 33 Nigeria 8 Colombia 18 
Korea,  
Republic of 20 Tunisia 7 Turkmenistan 5 
Bulgaria 38 Zambia 8 Mexico 19 Pakistan 20 Egypt 9 Georgia 4 
United Kingdom 44 Cote d`Ivoire 9 Chile 23 China 28 Sudan 2 Armenia 6 
United States 54 Tanzania 9 Costa Rica 25 Japan 30 Chad 1 Moldova 6 
Australia 17 Kenya 10 Brazil 29 India 33 Mali 2 Ukraine 9 
New Zealand 18 South Africa 12 Venezuela 30 Taiwan 37 Niger 4 Turkey 9 
Total: 669 Total: 141 Total: 311 Total: 287 Total: 55 Total: 96
Per country 18 P. c.: 4 P. c.: 12 P. c.: 15 P. c.: 4 P. c.: 9 
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APPENDIX I: Phillips-Pearon unit root test of non-stationarity 
 
As can be seen from the two outputs, both Z (tau) and Z (rho) are well beyond the values 
indicated by all three confidence intervals, but perhaps more importantly, the slope 
coefficients are not significantly negative, but actually positive and statistically significant 
(.58 and .17, respectively). Therefore, non-stationarity does not represent a problem in these 
models. 
 
EQUATION 1: 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ |Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant       .70512106      .04302947    16.387   .0000 
 CINDEXL        .57560990      .00971882    59.226   .0000    1.67611793 
 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Phillips - Perron tests for unit root                               | | Sample size  =  7089, Number of regressors =    2                   | 
| Sample statistics:        Z(tau) =   -42.4044 |Z(rho) = -2772.3866  | |                           ------[Z(tau)]------+------[Z(rho)]------ | | 3 cases (models)            99%    95%    90% | 99%    95%    90%   | | 1. y(t)=ry(t-1)+u(t)       -2.58  -1.95  -1.62|-13.80  -8.10  -5.70 | | 2. y(t)=a+ry(t-1)+u(t)     -3.43  -2.86  -2.57|-20.70 -14.10 -11.30 | | 4. y(t)=a+ry(t-1)+dt+u(t)  -3.96  -3.41  -3.12|-29.50 -21.80 -18.30 | 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 
EQUATION 2: 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
|Variable | Coefficient  | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] | Mean of X| 
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+ 
 Constant      1.73476653      .09197832    18.861   .0000 
 GROWTHL        .16999058      .01174027    14.479   .0000    2.01230135 
 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
| Phillips - Perron tests for unit root                               | | Sample size  =  6962, Number of regressors =    2                   | | Sample statistics:        Z(tau) =   -70.7590 |Z(rho) = -5815.2880  | |                           ------[Z(tau)]------+------[Z(rho)]------ | | 3 cases (models)            99%    95%    90% | 99%    95%    90%   | | 1. y(t)=ry(t-1)+u(t)       -2.58  -1.95  -1.62|-13.80  -8.10  -5.70 | | 2. y(t)=a+ry(t-1)+u(t)     -3.43  -2.86  -2.57|-20.70 -14.10 -11.30 | | 4. y(t)=a+ry(t-1)+dt+u(t)  -3.96  -3.41  -3.12|-29.50 -21.80 -18.30 | 
+---------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
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